Avihay Dorfman – författare

What makes private law private? What is its domain? What are the values it promotes? Relational Justice: A Theory of Private Law addresses these foundational questions in a robust analysis of the key doctrines of private law, including torts, contracts, and restitution. Discarding the vision of private law as a bastion of negative duties of non-interference or efficiency maximization, this book reframes private law in terms of what it calls 'relational justice' reciprocal respect for self determination and substantive equality. By vindicating self-determination, private law can forge the horizontal interactions vital to the ability to shape and implement a conception of the good life. By structuring these interactions in terms requiring parties to respect one another for who they are, private law can cast them as interactions between equals. In the book's first part, the authors set out a normative position they term relational justice, whereby the rules of private law abide by the fundamental maxim of reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. The second part of the book applies this framework to an analysis of familiar private law doctrinal areas, followed by a third part charting newer areas including workplace safety, poverty, discrimination, and implications for transnational law. Throughout, the authors show how relational justice theory provides a normative vocabulary for evaluating core features of existing private law, while suggesting directions for necessary or desirable reforms.

What makes private law private? What is its domain? What are the values it promotes? Relational Justice: A Theory of Private Law addresses these foundational questions in a robust analysis of the key doctrines of private law, including torts, contracts, and restitution.Discarding the vision of private law as a bastion of negative duties of non-interference or efficiency maximization, this book reframes private law in terms of what it calls 'relational justice' - reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. By vindicating self-determination, private law can forge the horizontal interactions vital to the ability to shape and implement a conception of the good life. By structuring these interactions in terms requiring parties to respect one another for who they are, private law can cast them as interactions between equals. In the book's first part, the authors set out a normative position they term relational justice, whereby the rules of private law abide by the fundamental maxim of reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. The second part of the book applies this framework to an analysis of familiar private law doctrinal areas, followed by a third part charting newer areas including workplace safety, poverty, discrimination, and implications for international law. Throughout, the authors show how relational justice theory provides a normative vocabulary for evaluating core features of existing private law, while suggesting directions for necessary or desirable reforms.

What makes private law private? What is its domain? What are the values it promotes? Relational Justice: A Theory of Private Law addresses these foundational questions in a robust analysis of the key doctrines of private law, including torts, contracts, and restitution.Discarding the vision of private law as a bastion of negative duties of non-interference or efficiency maximization, this book reframes private law in terms of what it calls ''relational justice'' - reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. By vindicating self-determination, private law can forge the horizontal interactions vital to the ability to shape and implement a conception of the good life. By structuring these interactions in terms requiring parties to respect one another for who they are, private law can cast them as interactions between equals. In the book''s first part, the authors set out a normative position they term relational justice, whereby the rules of private law abide by the fundamental maxim of reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. The second part of the book applies this framework to an analysis of familiar private law doctrinal areas, followed by a third part charting newer areas including workplace safety, poverty, discrimination, and implications for international law. Throughout, the authors show how relational justice theory provides a normative vocabulary for evaluating core features of existing private law, while suggesting directions for necessary or desirable reforms.

What makes private law private? What is its domain? What are the values it promotes? Relational Justice: A Theory of Private Law addresses these foundational questions in a robust analysis of the key doctrines of private law, including torts, contracts, and restitution. Discarding the vision of private law as a bastion of negative duties of non-interference or efficiency maximization, this book reframes private law in terms of what it calls 'relational justice' - reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. By vindicating self-determination, private law can forge the horizontal interactions vital to the ability to shape and implement a conception of the good life. By structuring these interactions in terms requiring parties to respect one another for who they are, private law can cast them as interactions between equals. In the book's first part, the authors set out a normative position they term relational justice, whereby the rules of private law abide by the fundamental maxim of reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. The second part of the book applies this framework to an analysis of familiar private law doctrinal areas, followed by a third part charting newer areas including workplace safety, poverty, discrimination, and implications for international law. Throughout, the authors show how relational justice theory provides a normative vocabulary for evaluating core features of existing private law, while suggesting directions for necessary or desirable reforms.

Conflict between Equals argues that tort law has to be understood and ultimately vindicated as the actualization of two theories: the conflict and the equality theory of tort law. It is not harm, wrongdoing, or social cost that gives us reason to have tort law in the first place. Instead, it is human conflict-specifically, conflict between our fundamental interests-that serves as the moral function of tort law. How we respond to such conflicts determines which harms, wrongs, or costs should, if at all, be addressed by tort law. The conflict theory elaborates on the nature and normative significance of three types of conflict: inherently valuable, tolerably valuable, and valueless. The theory emphasizes the importance of preventing valueless conflict, containing tolerably valuable conflict, and constructing the conditions necessary for inherently valuable conflict to arise. Moreover, the human conflict to which tort law responds reflects a commitment to treating the parties to a conflict as equals. The equality theory is grounded in the egalitarian ideal of relating as equals, thus tort law must determine terms of interaction that take seriously differences in the interests and conditions of the interacting parties. By doing so, tort law secures the ability of the parties in a conflict to relate as substantive, rather than merely formal, equals.

Conflict between Equals argues that tort law has to be understood and ultimately vindicated as the actualization of two theories: the conflict and the equality theory of tort law. It is not harm, wrongdoing, or social cost that gives us reason to have tort law in the first place. Instead, it is human conflict-specifically, conflict between our fundamental interests-that serves as the moral function of tort law. How we respond to such conflicts determines which harms, wrongs, or costs should, if at all, be addressed by tort law. The conflict theory elaborates on the nature and normative significance of three types of conflict: inherently valuable, tolerably valuable, and valueless. The theory emphasizes the importance of preventing valueless conflict, containing tolerably valuable conflict, and constructing the conditions necessary for inherently valuable conflict to arise. Moreover, the human conflict to which tort law responds reflects a commitment to treating the parties to a conflict as equals. The equality theory is grounded in the egalitarian ideal of relating as equals, thus tort law must determine terms of interaction that take seriously differences in the interests and conditions of the interacting parties. By doing so, tort law secures the ability of the parties in a conflict to relate as substantive, rather than merely formal, equals.

Conflict between Equals argues that tort law has to be understood and ultimately vindicated as the actualization of two theories: the conflict and the equality theory of tort law. It is not harm, wrongdoing, or social cost that gives us reason to have tort law in the first place. Instead, it is human conflict-specifically, conflict between our fundamental interests-that serves as the moral function of tort law. How we respond to such conflicts determines which harms, wrongs, or costs should, if at all, be addressed by tort law. The conflict theory elaborates on the nature and normative significance of three types of conflict: inherently valuable, tolerably valuable, and valueless. The theory emphasizes the importance of preventing valueless conflict, containing tolerably valuable conflict, and constructing the conditions necessary for inherently valuable conflict to arise. Moreover, the human conflict to which tort law responds reflects a commitment to treating the parties to a conflict as equals. The equality theory is grounded in the egalitarian ideal of relating as equals, thus tort law must determine terms of interaction that take seriously differences in the interests and conditions of the interacting parties. By doing so, tort law secures the ability of the parties in a conflict to relate as substantive, rather than merely formal, equals.

Some goods and services seem to be fundamentally public, such as legislation, criminal punishment, and fighting wars. By contrast, other functions, such as garbage collection, do not. This volume brings together prominent scholars from a range of academic fields - including law, economics, philosophy, and sociology - to address the core question of what makes a certain good or service fundamentally public and why. Sometimes, governments and other public entities are superior because they are more likely to get at the right decisions or follow fair procedures. In other instances, the provision of goods and services by public entities is intrinsically valuable. By analyzing the these answers, the authors also explore the nature of the state and its authority. This handbook explores influential arguments for and against privatization and also develops a number of key studies explaining, justifying, or challenging the legitimacy and the desirability of public provision of particular goods and services.

Reclaiming the Public defines and defends the intrinsic value of "the public" that resides in our public institutions and the officials that run them. The book argues that public institutions do not simply act for us but instead speak and act in our name; i.e., they represent us. Representation requires that decisions made by public institutions or officials are consistent with the perspectives of citizens. If the decisions satisfy this requirement, these decisions are attributable to citizens, and citizens can be held responsible for them. This theory of political authority accounts for major features of our legal system, such as the non-instrumental grounds for the separation of law-making powers, the non-instrumental value of constitutions, the limits of privatization, the nature and value of public property, and the impermissibility of using artificial intelligence in setting certain policies and making certain decisions.

Reclaiming the Public defines and defends the intrinsic value of "the public" that resides in our public institutions and the officials that run them. The book argues that public institutions do not simply act for us but instead speak and act in our name; i.e., they represent us. Representation requires that decisions made by public institutions or officials are consistent with the perspectives of citizens. If the decisions satisfy this requirement, these decisions are attributable to citizens, and citizens can be held responsible for them. This theory of political authority accounts for major features of our legal system, such as the non-instrumental grounds for the separation of law-making powers, the non-instrumental value of constitutions, the limits of privatization, the nature and value of public property, and the impermissibility of using artificial intelligence in setting certain policies and making certain decisions.

Some goods and services seem to be fundamentally public, such as legislation, criminal punishment, and fighting wars. By contrast, other functions, such as garbage collection, do not. This volume brings together prominent scholars from a range of academic fields - including law, economics, philosophy, and sociology - to address the core question of what makes a certain good or service fundamentally public and why. Sometimes, governments and other public entities are superior because they are more likely to get at the right decisions or follow fair procedures. In other instances, the provision of goods and services by public entities is intrinsically valuable. By analyzing the these answers, the authors also explore the nature of the state and its authority. This handbook explores influential arguments for and against privatization and also develops a number of key studies explaining, justifying, or challenging the legitimacy and the desirability of public provision of particular goods and services.

Some goods and services seem to be fundamentally public, such as legislation, criminal punishment, and fighting wars. By contrast, other functions, such as garbage collection, do not. This volume brings together prominent scholars from a range of academic fields - including law, economics, philosophy, and sociology - to address the core question of what makes a certain good or service fundamentally public and why. Sometimes, governments and other public entities are superior because they are more likely to get at the right decisions or follow fair procedures. In other instances, the provision of goods and services by public entities is intrinsically valuable. By analyzing the these answers, the authors also explore the nature of the state and its authority. This handbook explores influential arguments for and against privatization and also develops a number of key studies explaining, justifying, or challenging the legitimacy and the desirability of public provision of particular goods and services.