Blake Roeber – författare

This book aims to change the way we think about politics, talk about politics, and vote.

It does this in two ways. First, it shows it’s impossible for a Republican, Democrat, or voter in any political party to possess a significant level of knowledge of facts that would help their party secure or maintain political power. It calls this knowledge “political knowledge” and shows how unfeasible it is for anyone to have it. Second, it explains how we might best be politically engaged, given that we have virtually no political knowledge.

To argue that it is impossible for any person to possess a significant amount of political knowledge, the book depends on two empirically verified facts. The first is that we have virtually no means of acquiring political information except by believing what other people say. The second is that, when people start talking about politics, they become highly unreliable. They’re very likely to say false things when voicing political opinions because they employ a belief‑forming process that psychologists call “identity protective cognition.” This is a type of reasoning aimed, not at truth, but at preserving one’s membership in some identity‑defining group. In combination, these two observations cast serious doubt on all of our political beliefs.

As the book explains, however, the proper response to this doubt is not to simply avoid politics. Rather the best response is a kind of humble but real engagement with politics that constantly manifests one’s awareness that one is, at best, making educated guesses rather than speaking and acting from knowledge.

This book aims to change the way we think about politics, talk about politics, and vote.

It does this in two ways. First, it shows it’s impossible for a Republican, Democrat, or voter in any political party to possess a significant level of knowledge of facts that would help their party secure or maintain political power. It calls this knowledge “political knowledge” and shows how unfeasible it is for anyone to have it. Second, it explains how we might best be politically engaged, given that we have virtually no political knowledge.

To argue that it is impossible for any person to possess a significant amount of political knowledge, the book depends on two empirically verified facts. The first is that we have virtually no means of acquiring political information except by believing what other people say. The second is that, when people start talking about politics, they become highly unreliable. They’re very likely to say false things when voicing political opinions because they employ a belief‑forming process that psychologists call “identity protective cognition.” This is a type of reasoning aimed, not at truth, but at preserving one’s membership in some identity‑defining group. In combination, these two observations cast serious doubt on all of our political beliefs.

As the book explains, however, the proper response to this doubt is not to simply avoid politics. Rather the best response is a kind of humble but real engagement with politics that constantly manifests one’s awareness that one is, at best, making educated guesses rather than speaking and acting from knowledge.

The perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology, completely overhauled for its third edition

In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pairs of specially commissioned essays defend opposing views on some of today’s most compelling epistemological issues and problems. Offering a unique blend of accessibility and originality, this timely volume brings together fresh debates on hotly contested issues to provide readers with the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts.

Now in its third edition, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology features up-to-date coverage of the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays examine questions of epistemic normativity and knowledge, the relationship between belief and credence, the possibility of internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, the use of thought experiments in epistemology, and more.

Part of the Wiley-Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, remains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, and epistemologists who want to keep current with contemporary epistemological debates.