Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

The EditorsBLAKE ROEBER is Thomas J. and Robert T. Rolfs Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is Associate Editor of Philosophical Studies and has published in Nous, PPR, Mind, and other leading journals.ERNEST SOSA is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is the author of numerous papers and books on epistemology and is the editor of Nous, Philosophical Issues, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.MATTHIAS STEUP is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology and numerous articles on epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth, and Duty and the co-editor of A Companion to Epistemology.JOHN TURRI is Professor and Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo, where he directs the Philosophical Science Lab. He has published research in many leading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science journals.

• Notes on Contributors viiPreface to the Third Edition xiiiPreface to the Second Edition xivPreface to the First Edition xvIntroduction xvii1 Does Knowledge Come First in Epistemology? 1Knowledge Comes First 1Mona SimionKnown Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge 7Aidan McGlynnKnowledge Still Comes First 14Mona SimionCircumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology 16Aidan McGlynn2 Does Justification Supervene on the Internal? 23Is Justification Just in the Head? 23Clayton LittlejohnThe Possibility of Internalist Epistemology 36Kurt L. Sylvan3 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? 55Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, Not Really 55Matthew McGrathSuspension of Judgment Is a Question-Directed Attitude 66Jane Friedman4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? 79There Are Practical Reasons for Belief 79Susanna RinardThere Are No Practical Reasons for Belief 81Thomas Kelly and Stewart CohenReply to and Kelly and Cohen 93Susanna Rinard5 Is Evidence Permissive? 103Introductions and Stage-Setting 103Sophie Horowitz and Sinan DogramaciA Permissive Notion of Rationality 105Miriam SchoenfieldWe Are Not Mushy Permissivists and, Moreover, We Should Not Be 110Sophie Horowitz and Sinan DogramaciIs the Disagreement Between Us Substantive? 116Miriam SchoenfieldA Final Plea for Impermissivism 121Sophie Horowitz and Sinan DogramaciSome Final Thoughts 123Miriam SchoenfieldPermissivism and Metaepistemology 124Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield6 Does Fundamental Evidence Consist in Seemings? 127Evidence Is Seemings 127Michael HuemerEvidence Is Not Seemings 134Maria Lasonen-AarnioFour Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism 142Michael HuemerPreservative Memory and Trouble for Internalism 146Maria Lasonen-Aarnio7 Does Knowledge Exclude Luck? 151Knowing Can Include Luck 151Stephen HetheringtonThere Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge 159Duncan PritchardOn Whether Knowing Can Include Luck: Asking the Correct Question 169Stephen HetheringtonReply to Hetherington 171Duncan Pritchard8 Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Important for Epistemology? 175Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Superficial? 175Timothy WilliamsonThe Significance of A Priori Justification 183Paul BoghossianResponse to Boghossian 191Timothy WilliamsonReply to Williamson 194Paul Boghossian9 How Should We Use Thought Experiments in Epistemology? 201How to Use Thought Experiments 201Elijah ChudnoffA Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology 209Wesley BuckwalterHow to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments 218Elijah ChudnoffThinking About Using Thought Experiments: Further Questions 222Wesley Buckwalter10 Is Belief a Species of Credence? 229Credences Are Degrees of Belief 229Roger ClarkeIs Belief Credence 1? Depends on What You Mean! 237Julia StaffelTwo in the Model, One in the Head 247Roger Clarke11 Is Epistemic Normativity Instrumental? 253Epistemic Normativity Is Independent of Our Goals 253Alex WorsnipEpistemic Normativity Is Not Independent of Our Goals 263J. Adam CarterA Brief Reply to Carter 274Alex Worsnip12 Is Testimony a Basic Source of Justification? 279A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony 279Elizabeth FrickerAnti- Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony 290Sanford C. GoldbergComments on Sanford Goldberg’s “Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony” 300Elizabeth FrickerComments on Elizabeth Fricker’s “A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony” 301Sanford C. Goldberg13 Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism? 305Skepticism Is Common Sense 305Allan HazlettSkepticism Is Not Common Sense 311Krista LawlorReply to Lawlor 318Allan HazlettReply to Hazlett 323Krista Lawlor14 Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? 329Knowledge Is the Norm of Assertion 329Matthew A. BentonKnowledge Is Not Our Norm of Assertion 339Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding PedersenIndex 355