Matthias Steup - Böcker

This volume gathers eleven new and three previously published essays on the fertile connection between ethics and epistemology. They examine the following topics: epistemic duty, doxastic voluntarism, the normativity of justification, internalism vs. externalism, truth as the epistemic goal, skepticism and the search for the criteria of justification, virtue epistemology, and understanding as an epistemic value. Among the contributors are Erneat Sosa, Linda Zagzebski, Susan Haack, and Alvin Goldman.

This book features original essays by leading epistemologists that address questions related to epistemic dilemmas from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles.It seems plausible that there can be "no win" moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? The contributors to this volume cover a wide variety of positions on epistemic dilemmas. The coverage ranges from discussions of the nature of epistemic dilemmas to arguments that there are no such things to suggestions for how to resolve (or at least live with) epistemic dilemmas to proposals for how thinking about epistemic dilemmas can be used to inform theorizing in other areas of epistemology.Epistemic Dilemmas will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology working on the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment.

This book features original essays by leading epistemologists that address questions related to epistemic dilemmas from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles.It seems plausible that there can be "no win" moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? The contributors to this volume cover a wide variety of positions on epistemic dilemmas. The coverage ranges from discussions of the nature of epistemic dilemmas to arguments that there are no such things to suggestions for how to resolve (or at least live with) epistemic dilemmas to proposals for how thinking about epistemic dilemmas can be used to inform theorizing in other areas of epistemology.Epistemic Dilemmas will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology working on the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment.

This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions.Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference.Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions.Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference.Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

This volume presents state-of-the-art research on issues related to evidentialism. It demonstrates the continuing relevance of evidentialist epistemology by bringing it into direct confrontation with some of its latest non-evidentialist rivals and by proposing new areas for exploration and development.Conee and Feldman’s landmark paper “Evidentialism” (1985) served as a launching point for an enormous research program in epistemology. Many epistemologists define their points of view at least partly in terms of how they relate to evidentialism. The chapters in this volume address important questions related to evidentialism, including:How should ‘evidentialism’ be defined?When does evidence suffice for belief?What does properly or appropriately responding to one’s evidence involve?Does evidentialism capture all cases of epistemically justified believing?Is there any kind of epistemic normativity that falls outside the purview of evidentialist epistemology?Are core evidentialist theses compatible with certain forms of externalism?Do classical evidentialist theses successfully preclude pragmatism?Do moral considerations ever get a say in what it is rational to believe?What (more) should evidentialists say about suspending judgment?What is the connection between evidence and logical inference?What should evidentialists say about extended memory?Does public evidence matter to epistemic justification?The range of fresh ideas in this cutting-edge volume, marking the 40th anniversary of “Evidentialism”, will appeal to scholars and graduate students working on evidentialism, evidence, the nature of justification, evidential support, and related topics in epistemology.

The perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology, completely overhauled for its third edition In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pairs of specially commissioned essays defend opposing views on some of today’s most compelling epistemological issues and problems. Offering a unique blend of accessibility and originality, this timely volume brings together fresh debates on hotly contested issues to provide readers with the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts. Now in its third edition, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology features up-to-date coverage of the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays examine questions of epistemic normativity and knowledge, the relationship between belief and credence, the possibility of internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, the use of thought experiments in epistemology, and more. Presents a rigorous yet accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemologyContains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances Focuses on core areas of epistemologyUses a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussionAll-new chapters provide fully updated coverage of new and emerging topics in epistemologyPart of the Wiley-Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, remains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, and epistemologists who want to keep current with contemporary epistemological debates.

A Companion to Epistemology, 2 Volume Set, 3rd EditionA Companion to Epistemology provides a comprehensive, up-to-date reference for understanding the theory of knowledge. Edited by distinguished scholars, this expanded third edition explores classic questions about knowledge and justified belief alongside contemporary topics such as social and political epistemology, the ethics of belief, and the epistemology of perception. With contributions from established and younger voices in the field, each entry offers insights into key issues, definitions, and debates, creating a rich resource for both introductory and advanced exploration.Extending its reach with critical coverage of emerging and underexplored areas, this third edition contains more than 50 new survey articles and an updated "Epistemology A-Z" glossary containing hundreds of entries. It also brings in wider perspectives, covering classical Indian and Islamic epistemology and featuring new entries on historical and present-day women philosophers, for example. With clear explanations and thoughtful analysis, the Companion captures the diversity and relevance of epistemology today.Ideal for undergraduate and graduate students studying philosophy, cognitive science, or ethics, A Companion to Epistemology is also an indispensable reference for educators, scholars, and researchers. Its accessible yet thorough structure makes it a valuable addition to any academic collection, supporting coursework, independent study, and advanced research.