Charles W. Calomiris – författare

The world-wide trend towards privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation has produced substantial economic benefits. Nevertheless, liberalisation has had its shortcomings and there are potential threats to further progress, including in particular an anti-liberalisation backlash. Continuing progress depends on the ability to articulate a clear vision of the positive effects of global liberalisation and to establish institutions and policies which can help realise that vision. Reversing globalisation would harm the world's poorest inhabitants. Professor Calomiris, well known for his work on national and international financial markets, examines the successes and failures of recent global liberalisation and derives a 'globalist manifesto' for public policy. His paper is a revised version of the tenth annual Hayek Memorial Lecture given in July 2001.

This book shows how and why deregulation has transformed the size, structure and geographic range of US banks, the scope of banking services, and the nature of bank-customer relationships. Over recent decades the characteristics that had made American banks different - the fragmented geographical structure of the industry, which restricted the scale of banks and their ability to compete with one another, and strict limits on the kinds of products and services commercial banks could offer - have virtually been eliminated. Understanding the origins and persistence of the unique banking regulations that defined US banking for over a century lends an important perspective on the economic and political causes and consequences of the current process of deregulation. History helps to define the political constituencies for and against deregulation, the political process through which bank regulations are determined, and the way deregulation is likely to affect future bank performance and stability.

This book shows how and why deregulation has transformed the size, structure and geographic range of US banks, the scope of banking services, and the nature of bank-customer relationships. Over recent decades the characteristics that had made American banks different - the fragmented geographical structure of the industry, which restricted the scale of banks and their ability to compete with one another, and strict limits on the kinds of products and services commercial banks could offer - have virtually been eliminated. Understanding the origins and persistence of the unique banking regulations that defined US banking for over a century lends an important perspective on the economic and political causes and consequences of the current process of deregulation. History helps to define the political constituencies for and against deregulation, the political process through which bank regulations are determined, and the way deregulation is likely to affect future bank performance and stability.

Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

This work draws on nine case studies to determine the motivation for bank mergers, to assess the advertised gains in efficiency and services, and to resolve inconsistencies between econometric studies and comparisons of performance in different US states and in different countries.