Christopher Storrs – författare

Christopher Storrs presents a fresh new appraisal of the reasons for the survival of Spain and its European and overseas empire under the last Spanish Habsburg, Carlos II (1665-1700). Hitherto it has been largely assumed that in the ''Age of Louis XIV'' Spain collapsed as a military, naval and imperial power, and only retained its empire because states which had hitherto opposed Spanish hegemony came to Carlos''s aid.However, this view seriously underestimates the efforts of Carlos II and his ministers to raise men to fight in Spain''s various armies - above all in Flanders, Lombardy, and Catalonia - and to ensure that Spain continued to have galleons in the Atlantic and galleys in the Mediterranean. These commitments were expensive, so that the fiscal pressures on Carlos'' subjects to fund the empire continued to be considerable. Not surprisingly, these demands added to the political tensions in a reign inwhich the succession problem already generated difficulties. They also put pressure on an administrative structure which revealed some weaknesses but which also proved its worth in time of need. The burden of empire was still largely carried in Spain by Castile (assisted by the silver of the Indies),but Spain''s ability to hang onto empire was also helped by a greater integration of centre and periphery, and by the contribution of the non-Castilian territories, notably Aragon in Spain and Naples in Spanish Italy.This book radically revises our understanding of the last decades of Habsburg Spain. As Storrs demonstrates, it was a state and society more clearly committed to the retention of empire - and more successful in achieving this - than historians have hitherto acknowledged.

Christopher Storrs presents a fresh new appraisal of the reasons for the survival of Spain and its European and overseas empire under the last Spanish Habsburg, Carlos II (1665-1700). Hitherto it has been largely assumed that in the 'Age of Louis XIV' Spain collapsed as a military, naval and imperial power, and only retained its empire because states which had hitherto opposed Spanish hegemony came to Carlos's aid.However, this view seriously underestimates the efforts of Carlos II and his ministers to raise men to fight in Spain's various armies - above all in Flanders, Lombardy, and Catalonia - and to ensure that Spain continued to have galleons in the Atlantic and galleys in the Mediterranean. These commitments were expensive, so that the fiscal pressures on Carlos' subjects to fund the empire continued to be considerable. Not surprisingly, these demands added to the political tensions in a reign in which the succession problem already generated difficulties. They also put pressure on an administrative structure which revealed some weaknesses but which also proved its worth in time of need. The burden of empire was still largely carried in Spain by Castile (assisted by the silver of the Indies), but Spain's ability to hang onto empire was also helped by a greater integration of centre and periphery, and by the contribution of the non-Castilian territories, notably Aragon in Spain and Naples in Spanish Italy.This book radically revises our understanding of the last decades of Habsburg Spain. As Storrs demonstrates, it was a state and society more clearly committed to the retention of empire - and more successful in achieving this - than historians have hitherto acknowledged.

This book deals with the crucial relationship between war and state formation in early modern Europe by considering the role of the Duchy of Savoy and the rise of this hitherto weak state into one of the regular members of the anti-French coalitions of the eighteenth century. Through his participation in the Nine Years War (1688-97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy, acquired a reputation for unrivalled 'Machiavellian' diplomacy on the international stage. The book puts this diplomacy in context, and considers how the duke raised men and money (at home and abroad), the administrative changes forced by war, the resulting domestic pressures, and how these were dealt with.

This book deals with the crucial relationship between war and state formation in early modern Europe by considering the role of the Duchy of Savoy and the rise of this hitherto weak state into one of the regular members of the anti-French coalitions of the eighteenth century. Through his participation in the Nine Years War (1688-97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy, acquired a reputation for unrivalled 'Machiavellian' diplomacy on the international stage. The book puts this diplomacy in context, and considers how the duke raised men and money (at home and abroad), the administrative changes forced by war, the resulting domestic pressures, and how these were dealt with.

In recent decades, historians of early-modern Europe, and above all those who study the eighteenth century, have elaborated the concept of what has been called the 'fiscal-military state'. This is a state whose international effectiveness was founded upon the development of large armed forces, whose performance and supply necessitated both further administrative development and the provision of large sums, the raising of which involved unprecedented levels of taxation and borrowing by governments. The present collection of essays, by leading authorities in their individual fields, all of whom have published widely on their chosen topic, explores the subject of the fiscal-military state by focusing on its leading exemplars in eighteenth-century Europe: Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia. It also includes a chapter on the Savoyard state (the kingdom of Sardinia), a lesser power whose career illuminates by comparison developments elsewhere. In addition, and rather unusually, a further chapter considers the fiscal-military state in a broader, comparative international context, in the arena of international relations. Each chapter provides a summary of the state of knowledge regarding the fiscal-military state debate insofar as it relates to the state under consideration. As well as contributing to that debate, they take matters further by systematically analysing the sources of wealth and income, and the way these were tapped, and the broader impact that this attempt to extract resources had on society and the state, both in the short and longer term. The differing patterns, and the variety of models of fiscal-military state makes for ease of comparison across Europe, making the volume an invaluable resource to both students and researchers alike.

In recent decades, historians of early-modern Europe, and above all those who study the eighteenth century, have elaborated the concept of what has been called the ''fiscal-military state''. This is a state whose international effectiveness was founded upon the development of large armed forces, whose performance and supply necessitated both further administrative development and the provision of large sums, the raising of which involved unprecedented levels of taxation and borrowing by governments. The present collection of essays, by leading authorities in their individual fields, all of whom have published widely on their chosen topic, explores the subject of the fiscal-military state by focusing on its leading exemplars in eighteenth-century Europe: Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia. It also includes a chapter on the Savoyard state (the kingdom of Sardinia), a lesser power whose career illuminates by comparison developments elsewhere. In addition, and rather unusually, a further chapter considers the fiscal-military state in a broader, comparative international context, in the arena of international relations. Each chapter provides a summary of the state of knowledge regarding the fiscal-military state debate insofar as it relates to the state under consideration. As well as contributing to that debate, they take matters further by systematically analysing the sources of wealth and income, and the way these were tapped, and the broader impact that this attempt to extract resources had on society and the state, both in the short and longer term. The differing patterns, and the variety of models of fiscal-military state makes for ease of comparison across Europe, making the volume an invaluable resource to both students and researchers alike.

In recent decades, historians of early-modern Europe, and above all those who study the eighteenth century, have elaborated the concept of what has been called the ''fiscal-military state''. This is a state whose international effectiveness was founded upon the development of large armed forces, whose performance and supply necessitated both further administrative development and the provision of large sums, the raising of which involved unprecedented levels of taxation and borrowing by governments. The present collection of essays, by leading authorities in their individual fields, all of whom have published widely on their chosen topic, explores the subject of the fiscal-military state by focusing on its leading exemplars in eighteenth-century Europe: Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia. It also includes a chapter on the Savoyard state (the kingdom of Sardinia), a lesser power whose career illuminates by comparison developments elsewhere. In addition, and rather unusually, a further chapter considers the fiscal-military state in a broader, comparative international context, in the arena of international relations. Each chapter provides a summary of the state of knowledge regarding the fiscal-military state debate insofar as it relates to the state under consideration. As well as contributing to that debate, they take matters further by systematically analysing the sources of wealth and income, and the way these were tapped, and the broader impact that this attempt to extract resources had on society and the state, both in the short and longer term. The differing patterns, and the variety of models of fiscal-military state makes for ease of comparison across Europe, making the volume an invaluable resource to both students and researchers alike.

La historiografía no ha sido clemente con Felipe V, el primer Borbón en reinar en España, de 1700 a 1746. Motejado de incapaz, indolente y de estar dominado por su segunda esposa, Isabel de Farnesio, lo cierto es que bajo su cetro la Monarquía Hispánica volvió a ser una potencia dinámica y expansionista, en particular en el teatro mediterráneo, con campañas en Italia y en el norte de África. El resurgir español 1713-1748 incide en el profundo cambio que la instauración de los Borbones supuso respecto a las actitudes y prácticas de los Habsburgo, subrayando el papel que este monarca tuvo en el reverdecer del poderío español a partir de 1713, tanto en la reconstrucción del Ejército y de la Armada como, en el plano diplomático, en su capacidad de tejer una nueva red de alianzas. Además, cuestiona el paradigma tradicional acerca de la orientación atlántica de la Monarquía en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII, haciendo énfasis en el control hispánico sobre el Mediterráneo occidental, teatro de operaciones donde se desarrollaron las campañas españolas durante la Guerra de la Cuádruple Alianza (1717-1720) y las guerras de sucesión polaca (1733-1738) y austriaca (1740-1748), y las posturas tanto en España como en Italia ante el intento de Felipe V, insatisfecho con las cláusulas del Tratado de Utrecht, de reconstruir el Imperio español, y en este sentido nos hace repensar la narrativa habitual acerca de la historia de Europa. Christopher Storrs, hispanista y profesor de la Universidad de Dundee, bebe de un amplísimo caudal de fuentes primarias para documentar las innovaciones políticas, financieras y militares que pusieron los cimientos del moderno Estado español y se coadyuvaron así hacia el surgimiento de una identidad nacional, haciendo especial énfasis en la contribución personal del propio Felipe V en la consecución de este resurgir español.