Clemens Puppe – författare

The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice provides an overview of issues arising in work on the foundations of decision theory and social choice over the past three decades. Drawing on work by economic theorists mainly, but also with contributions from political science, philosophy and psychology, the collection shows how the related areas of decision theory and social choice have developed in their applications and moved well beyond the basic models of expectedutility and utilitarian approaches to welfare economics.Containing twenty-three contributions, in many cases by leading figures in their fields, the handbook shows how the normative foundations of economics have changed dramatically as more general and explicit models of utility and group choice have been developed. This is perhaps the first time these developments have been brought together in a manner that seeks to identify and make accessible the recent themes and developments that have been of particular interest to researchers in recent years.The collection will be of particular value to researchers in economics with interests in utility or welfare but it will also be of interest to any social scientist or philosopher interested in theories of rationality or group decision-making.

The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice provides an overview of issues arising in work on the foundations of decision theory and social choice over the past three decades. Drawing on work by economic theorists mainly, but also with contributions from political science, philosophy and psychology, the collection shows how the related areas of decision theory and social choice have developed in their applications and moved well beyond the basic models of expected utility and utilitarian approaches to welfare economics.Containing twenty-three contributions, in many cases by leading figures in their fields, the handbook shows how the normative foundations of economics have changed dramatically as more general and explicit models of utility and group choice have been developed. This is perhaps the first time these developments have been brought together in a manner that seeks to identify and make accessible the recent themes and developments that have been of particular interest to researchers in recent years. The collection will be of particular value to researchers in economics with interests in utility or welfare but it will also be of interest to any social scientist or philosopher interested in theories of rationality or group decision-making.

This book offers a comprehensive account of Condorcet domains—structured sets of preference orders in which the pairwise majority relation remains transitive for any odd-numbered group of voters. These domains form the foundation for normatively robust voting procedures and enable strong possibility results in incentive-compatible mechanism design.Well-known examples include single-peaked, single-crossing, and group-separable domains. The study of Condorcet domains bridges multiple disciplines, including economics, political science, mathematics, and computer science, and has seen significant theoretical advances in recent years.This monograph systematically presents these developments, covering both foundational concepts and cutting-edge results. It will be of interest to economists, mathematicians, and scholars in related fields seeking a deep understanding of preference aggregation and its structural underpinnings.“This interdisciplinary book by Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko offers a canonical reference on the mathematical foundations of Condorcet domains. It shows how discrete convexity, median graphs, and permutation lattices play a central role in understanding coherent collective decision-making, and applies the insights to voting systems and incentive compatibility.”— Prof. Hervé Moulin, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

This book offers a comprehensive account of Condorcet domains—structured sets of preference orders in which the pairwise majority relation remains transitive for any odd-numbered group of voters. These domains form the foundation for normatively robust voting procedures and enable strong possibility results in incentive-compatible mechanism design.Well-known examples include single-peaked, single-crossing, and group-separable domains. The study of Condorcet domains bridges multiple disciplines, including economics, political science, mathematics, and computer science, and has seen significant theoretical advances in recent years.This monograph systematically presents these developments, covering both foundational concepts and cutting-edge results. It will be of interest to economists, mathematicians, and scholars in related fields seeking a deep understanding of preference aggregation and its structural underpinnings.“This interdisciplinary book by Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko offers a canonical reference on the mathematical foundations of Condorcet domains. It shows how discrete convexity, median graphs, and permutation lattices play a central role in understanding coherent collective decision-making, and applies the insights to voting systems and incentive compatibility.”— Prof. Hervé Moulin, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

This book provides a systematic, formal treatment of a recently proposed extension of the expected utility model of choice under risk: the so-called rank-dependent utility model. In this approach the representation of preferences is based upon a (generalized) utility function defined on the outcome/probability-plane. The main purpose of the book is to demonstrate the flexibility of this model with respect to its explanatory power. This is achieved by analyzing a certain subclass of the rank-dependent utility approach which incorporates the notion of price-dependent distortions of probabilities. This particular approach captures an optimistic point of view towards gambling (as can often be observed), whilst being compatible with a suitably formulated concept of risk aversion. The resulting model is used to explain some of the observed behavioral patterns as the Allais-paradox and the behavior described by the Friedman-Savage hypothesis.