Colin R. Caret – författare

Logical consequence is the relation that obtains between premises and conclusion(s) in a valid argument. Orthodoxy has it that valid arguments are necessarily truth-preserving, but this platitude only raises a number of further questions, such as: how does the truth of premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion, and what constraints does validity impose on rational belief? This volume presents thirteen essays by some of the most important scholars in the field ofphilosophical logic. The essays offer ground-breaking new insights into the nature of logical consequence; the relation between logic and inference; how the semantics and pragmatics of natural language bear on logic; the relativity of logic; and the structural properties of the consequencerelation.

Logical consequence is the relation that obtains between premises and conclusion(s) in a valid argument. Orthodoxy has it that valid arguments are necessarily truth-preserving, but this platitude only raises a number of further questions, such as: how does the truth of premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion, and what constraints does validity impose on rational belief? This volume presents thirteen essays by some of the most important scholars in the field of philosophical logic. The essays offer ground-breaking new insights into the nature of logical consequence; the relation between logic and inference; how the semantics and pragmatics of natural language bear on logic; the relativity of logic; and the structural properties of the consequence relation.

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This view emerged in a dialectical context in which certain laws of logic were hotly debated by philosophers. For example, philosophers have spilled a great deal of ink over the logical principle of explosion ('from a contradiction, everything follows'). One side in the debate accepts this principle, the other side rejects it. It is exceedingly natural to assume that these rival points of view are incompatible, hence one side of the debate is correct while the other is incorrect. This is logical monism: the view that there is exactly one correct logic. Pluralists argue that the monistic assumption is subtly and surprisingly wrong. According to the pluralist, some logics that appear to be irreconcilable rivals are, in fact, both correct in their own ways. This Element will explain the debate over logical pluralism in an accessible manner.