Daniel Whiting – författare

The Range of Reasons contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person's actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person's beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against; possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle.

Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) was a philosopher, scientist, essayist, critic, biographer, and author of plays, poems, and prose. While she has received increasing attention in recent years, Sympathy in Harmony is the first book to examine Cavendish's philosophy of value. Is there such a thing as value? If so, is value a fundamental feature of reality or does it admit of explanation? Does the value something possesses depend in some way on the value we take it to possess? Is our taking something to possess value a matter of belief, say, or of feeling? Either way, is it an exercise of reason? Daniel Whiting demonstrates Cavendish's philosophy of value to be systematic, continuous with her metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and wide-ranging. Her reflections encompass the beauty of the natural world, the expressive qualities of music, the pedagogical role of literature, the free play of the imagination, the nature of virtue, the depth of moral disagreement, and the limits of moral theory. By exploring Cavendish's perspectives on these varied topics, Whiting unearths a unified conception of value. He shows that that conception is distinctive relative to that of her peers-including René Descartes, Kenelm Digby, Thomas Hobbes, and Henry More-and indebted to ancient thought. At the same time, Whiting demonstrates the significance of Cavendish's writings for contemporary aesthetics and ethics.This is an open access title. It is available to read and download as a free PDF version on Oxford Academic and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International licence.

What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. Philosophers have tended to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology, and vice versa. This collection of new essays by leading philosophers focuses on a central concern of both epistemology and ethics: normativity. Normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. The volume is innovative in drawing together issues from epistemology and ethics and in exploring neglected connections between epistemic and practical normativity. It represents a burgeoning research programme in which epistemic and practical normativity are seen as two aspects of a single topic, deeply interdependent and raising parallel questions.