Dmitar Tasić – författare

Paramilitarism in the Balkans analyses the origins and manifestations of paramilitary violence in three neighbouring Balkan countries - Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania - after the First World War. It shows the role of paramilitarism in internal and external policies in all three states, focusing on the main actors and perpetrators of paramilitary violence, their social backgrounds, motivations, and future career trajectories. Dmitar Tasić places the region into the broader European context of booming paramilitarism that came as the result of the first global conflict, dissolution of old empires, the creation of nation-states, and simultaneous revolutions. While paramilitarism in most post-Great War European states was the product of violence of the First World War and brutalization which societies of both victorious and defeated countries went through, paramilitarism in the Balkans was closely connected with the already existing traditions originating from the period of armed struggle against Ottoman rule, and state and nation building projects of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Paramilitary traditions were so strong that in all subsequent crises and military conflicts in the Balkans the legacy of paramilitarism remained alive and present.

Yugoslav military cooperation with West emerged after the country’s split with the U.S.S.R. and its allies in 1948. It came as a surprise for many, since Yugoslavia used to be one of the staunchest followers of Soviet politics. However, faced with possible military escalation of the ideological, political, and economic worsening of relations with the East, the Yugoslav leadership quickly turned to their former “class enemies.” For the United States, it presented an opportunity to acquire many unexpected political benefits. Yugoslav alienation from the Kremlin provided territorial consolidation of the southern flank of NATO, denial of direct approach to the Adriatic Sea and Northern Italy to Soviet troops, and dealt a strong political blow to the homogeneity of the Eastern bloc. While not insisting on changing the ideological nature of Yugoslav state, the United States provided much needed material and financial aid, developing the base for entering into sphere of military cooperation. It had two main categories—direct support for Yugoslav forces through shipments of military equipment, as well as Yugoslavia entering into defensive, military alliance (the Balkan Pact) with Greece and Turkey, already full members of NATO. Such trends, aiming towards closer Yugoslav bonding with Western military and political structures, ended in the mid-1950s with Stalin’s death, the outbreak of the Trieste crisis, and Tito’s reconciliation with Soviet leadership. Developing the new policy of non-alignment with either of the confronting blocs, Yugoslavia stepped out from the program of Western military aid, while the Balkan Pact slowly faded in growing animosity between Greece and Turkey.