Donald G. Saari – författare
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15 produkter
15 produkter
Inbunden, Engelska, 2027
949 kr
Kommande
Decisions are everywhere--from a group's choice of pizza to a decision on a family vacation to the elections of political leaders. Central to the functioning of our organizations is the belief that these decisions reflect the wishes of voters. Yet most voting rules are unreliable and can lead to unfair outcomes. And, while a large body of academic literature describes the flaws and limitations of standard voting methods, little is known about why they occur.In Fair Voting Methods, Donald G. Saari explores the difficulties that have plagued social choice theory for over seventy-five years. Focusing on ranked choice voting and group decision-making, Saari expands on Arrow's impossibility theorem and presents a more precise statement: all standard voting rules either fail to always rank the candidates to determine who is preferred to whom, or the voting outcomes can result in inferior choices that are not what the voters wanted. Saari then identifies and resolves the structures that negatively impact voting systems. While Arrow's seminal result asserted that the problems of standard voting systems are unavoidable, Saari makes a bold and compelling case that there are indeed usable fair voting methods. He introduces one such method that achieves Arrow's objectives of always ranking candidates with outcomes that reflect voters' intent. The book concludes by applying insights from voting theory into other topics where parts are also assembled into wholes, including judgement aggregation, corporate structures, crime prevention, the US Electoral College, and standard scientific procedures.
Häftad, Engelska, 2001
563 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
It is not uncommon to be frustrated by the outcome of an election or a decision in voting, law, economics, engineering, and other fields. Does this 'bad' result reflect poor data or poorly informed voters? Or does the disturbing conclusion reflect the choice of the decision/election procedure? Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow's famed theorem has been interpreted to mean 'no decision procedure is without flaws'. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen dashes hope for individual liberties by showing their incompatibility with societal needs. This highly accessible book offers a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2008
631 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
We decide by elections, but do we elect who the voters really want? The answer, as we have learned over the last two centuries, is 'not necessarily'. What a negative, frightening assertion about a principal tool of democracy! This negativism has been supported by two hundred years of published results showing how bad the situation can be. This expository, largely non-technical book is the first to find positive results showing that the situation is not anywhere as dire and negative as we have been led to believe. Instead there are surprisingly simple explanations for the negative assertions, and positive conclusions can be obtained.
Häftad, Engelska, 2008
391 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
We decide by elections, but do we elect who the voters really want? The answer, as we have learned over the last two centuries, is 'not necessarily'. What a negative, frightening assertion about a principal tool of democracy! This negativism has been supported by two hundred years of published results showing how bad the situation can be. This expository, largely non-technical book is the first to find positive results showing that the situation is not anywhere as dire and negative as we have been led to believe. Instead there are surprisingly simple explanations for the negative assertions, and positive conclusions can be obtained.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2001
1 392 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
It is not uncommon to be frustrated by the outcome of an election or a decision in voting, law, economics, engineering, and other fields. Does this 'bad' result reflect poor data or poorly informed voters? Or does the disturbing conclusion reflect the choice of the decision/election procedure? Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow's famed theorem has been interpreted to mean 'no decision procedure is without flaws'. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen dashes hope for individual liberties by showing their incompatibility with societal needs. This highly accessible book offers a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated.
Häftad, Engelska, 2001
473 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
What does the 2000 U.S. presidential election have in common with selecting a textbook for a calculus course in your department? Was Ralph Nader's influence on the election of George W. Bush greater than the now-famous chads? In ""Chaotic Elections!"", Don Saari analyzes these questions, placing them in the larger context of voting systems in general. His analysis shows that the fundamental problems with the 2000 presidential election are not with the courts, recounts, or defective ballots, but are caused by the very way Americans vote for president. This expository book shows how mathematics can help to identify and characterize a disturbingly large number of paradoxical situations that result from the choice of a voting procedure. Moreover, rather than being able to dismiss them as anomalies, the likelihood of a dubious election result is surprisingly large.These consequences indicate that election outcomes - whether for president, the site of the next Olympics, the chair of a university department, or a prize winner - can differ from what the voters really wanted. They show that by using an inadequate voting procedure, we can, inadvertently, choose badly. To add to the difficulties, it turns out that the mathematical structures of voting admit several strategic opportunities, which are described. Finally, mathematics also helps identify positive results: by using mathematical symmetries, we can identify what the phrase 'what the voters really want' might mean and obtain a unique voting method that satisfies these conditions.Saari's book should be required reading for anyone who wants to understand not only what happened in the presidential election of 2000, but also how we can avoid similar problems from appearing anytime any group is making a choice using a voting procedure. Reading this book requires little more than high school mathematics and an interest in how the apparently simple situation of voting can lead to surprising paradoxes.
Häftad, Engelska, 2018
761 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
The mathematical challenges coming from the social and behavioral sciences differ significantly from typical applied mathematical concerns. ""Change,"" for instance, is ubiquitous, but without knowing the fundamental driving force, standard differential and iterative methods are not appropriate. Although differing forms of aggregation are widely used, a general mathematical assessment of potential pitfalls is missing. These realities provide opportunities to create new mathematical approaches.These themes are described in an introductory, expository, and accessible manner by exploring new ways to handle dynamics and evolutionary game theory, to identify subtleties of decision and voting methods, to recognize unexpected modeling concerns, and to introduce new approaches with which to examine game theory. Applications range from avoiding undesired consequences when designing policy to identifying unanticipated voting (where the ""wrong"" person could win), nonparametric statistical, and economic ""supply and demand"" properties.
Häftad, Engelska, 2019
384 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This textbook invites the reader to develop a holistic grounding in mathematical finance, where concepts and intuition play as important a role as powerful mathematical tools. Financial interactions are characterized by a vast amount of data and uncertainty; navigating the inherent dangers and hidden opportunities requires a keen understanding of what techniques to apply and when. By exploring the conceptual foundations of options pricing, the author equips readers to choose their tools with a critical eye and adapt to emerging challenges.Introducing the basics of gambles through realistic scenarios, the text goes on to build the core financial techniques of Puts, Calls, hedging, and arbitrage. Chapters on modeling and probability lead into the centerpiece: the Black–Scholes equation. Omitting the mechanics of solving Black–Scholes itself, the presentation instead focuses on an in-depth analysis of its derivation and solutions. Advanced topics that follow include the Greeks, American options, and embellishments. Throughout, the author presents topics in an engaging conversational style. “Intuition breaks” frequently prompt students to set aside mathematical details and think critically about the relevance of tools in context.Mathematics of Finance is ideal for undergraduates from a variety of backgrounds, including mathematics, economics, statistics, data science, and computer science. Students should have experience with the standard calculus sequence, as well as a familiarity with differential equations and probability. No financial expertise is assumed of student or instructor; in fact, the text’s deep connection to mathematical ideas makes it suitable for a math capstone course. A complete set of the author’s lecture videos is available on YouTube, providing a comprehensive supplementary resource for a course or independent study. Instructors who adopt the textbook for their course, please visit http://www.sn.pub/lecturer-material to obtain the PDF of a complete solutions manual.
E-bok
Engelska, 2019443 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This textbook invites the reader to develop a holistic grounding in mathematical finance, where concepts and intuition play as important a role as powerful mathematical tools. Financial interactions are characterized by a vast amount of data and uncertainty; navigating the inherent dangers and hidden opportunities requires a keen understanding of what techniques to apply and when. By exploring the conceptual foundations of options pricing, the author equips readers to choose their tools with a critical eye and adapt to emerging challenges.
Introducing the basics of gambles through realistic scenarios, the text goes on to build the core financial techniques of Puts, Calls, hedging, and arbitrage. Chapters on modeling and probability lead into the centerpiece: the Black–Scholes equation. Omitting the mechanics of solving Black–Scholes itself, the presentation instead focuses on an in-depth analysis of its derivation and solutions. Advanced topics that follow include the Greeks, American options, and embellishments. Throughout, the author presents topics in an engaging conversational style. “Intuition breaks” frequently prompt students to set aside mathematical details and think critically about the relevance of tools in context.
Mathematics of Finance is ideal for undergraduates from a variety of backgrounds, including mathematics, economics, statistics, data science, and computer science. Students should have experience with the standard calculus sequence, as well as a familiarity with differential equations and probability. No financial expertise is assumed of student or instructor; in fact, the text’s deep connection to mathematical ideas makes it suitable for a math capstone course. A complete set of the author’s lecture videos is available on YouTube, providing a comprehensive supplementary resource for a course or independent study. Instructors who adopt the textbook for their course, please visit http://www.sn.pub/lecturer-material to obtain the PDF of a complete solutions manual.
Häftad, Engelska, 2019
653 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This monograph develops a method of creating convenient coordinate systems for game theory that will allow readers to more easily understand, analyze, and create games at various levels of complexity. By identifying the unique characterization of games that separates the individual’s strategic interests from the group’s collective behavior, the authors construct a single analytical methodology that readers will be able to apply to a wide variety of games. With its emphasis on practicality and approachability, readers will find this book an invaluable tool, and a viable alternative to the ad hoc analytical approach that has become customary for researchers utilizing game theory.The introductory chapters serve two important purposes: they review several games of fundamental importance, and also introduce a dynamic that is inherent in games, but has gone unexplored until now. After this has been established, readers will advance from simple 2 x 2 games to games with more player strategies and dynamics. For interested readers, a rigorous treatment of the underlying mathematics is conveniently gathered at the end of the book. Additional topics of interest, such as extensive form and coalitional games, are presented to help readers visualize more complex settings that will be vital in aiding the understanding of advanced topics, such as coalition-free Nash points, multi-player repeated games, and more.Coordinate Systems for Games is ideal for a wide variety of researchers interested in game theory, including social scientists, economists, mathematicians, computer scientists, and more. The authors' approachable style also makes this accessible to an audience at any scale of experience, from beginning non-specialists to more practiced researchers.
E-bok
Engelska, 2019870 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This monograph develops a method of creating convenient coordinate systems for game theory that will allow readers to more easily understand, analyze, and create games at various levels of complexity. By identifying the unique characterization of games that separates the individual’s strategic interests from the group’s collective behavior, the authors construct a single analytical methodology that readers will be able to apply to a wide variety of games. With its emphasis on practicality and approachability, readers will find this book an invaluable tool, and a viable alternative to the ad hoc analytical approach that has become customary for researchers utilizing game theory.The introductory chapters serve two important purposes: they review several games of fundamental importance, and also introduce a dynamic that is inherent in games, but has gone unexplored until now. After this has been established, readers will advance from simple 2 x 2 games to games with more player strategies and dynamics. For interested readers, a rigorous treatment of the underlying mathematics is conveniently gathered at the end of the book. Additional topics of interest, such as extensive form and coalitional games, are presented to help readers visualize more complex settings that will be vital in aiding the understanding of advanced topics, such as coalition-free Nash points, multi-player repeated games, and more.Coordinate Systems for Games is ideal for a wide variety of researchers interested in game theory, including social scientists, economists, mathematicians, computer scientists, and more. The authors'' approachable style also makes this accessible to an audience at any scale of experience, from beginning non-specialists to more practiced researchers.
Häftad, Engelska, 1995
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
A surprise is how the complexities of voting theory can be explained and resolved with the comfortable geometry of our three-dimensional world. This book is directed toward students and others wishing to learn about voting, experts will discover previously unpublished results. As an example, a new profile decomposition quickly resolves two centuries old controversies of Condorcet and Borda, demonstrates, that the rankings of pairwise and other methods differ because they rely on different information, casts series doubt on the reliability of a Condorcet winner as a standard for the field, makes the famous Arrow`s Theorem predictable, and simplifies the construction of examples. The geometry unifies seemingly disparate topics as manipulation, monotonicity, and even the apportionment issues of the US Supreme Court.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20121 459 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Over two centuries of theory and practical experience have taught us that election and decision procedures do not behave as expected. Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select the candidate, the voters view as being inferior, and that some commonly used methods have the disturbing anomaly that a winning candidate can lose after receiving added support. A geometric theory is developed to remove much of the mystery of three-candidate voting procedures. In this manner, the spectrum of election outcomes from all positional methods can be compared, new flaws with widely accepted concepts (such as the "Condorcet winner") are identified, and extensions to standard results (e.g. Black''s single-peakedness) are obtained. Many of these results are based on the "profile coordinates" introduced here, which makes it possible to "see" the set of all possible voters'' preferences leading to specified election outcomes. Thus, it now is possible to visually compare the likelihood of various conclusions. Also, geometry is applied to apportionment methods to uncover new explanations why such methods can create troubling problems.
Del 3 - Studies in Economic Theory
Geometry of Voting
Häftad, Engelska, 2012
1 116 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Over two centuries of theory and practical experience have taught us that election and decision procedures do not behave as expected. Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select the candidate, the voters view as being inferior, and that some commonly used methods have the disturbing anomaly that a winning candidate can lose after receiving added support. A geometric theory is developed to remove much of the mystery of three-candidate voting procedures. In this manner, the spectrum of election outcomes from all positional methods can be compared, new flaws with widely accepted concepts (such as the "Condorcet winner") are identified, and extensions to standard results (e.g. Black's single-peakedness) are obtained. Many of these results are based on the "profile coordinates" introduced here, which makes it possible to "see" the set of all possible voters' preferences leading to specified election outcomes. Thus, it now is possible to visually compare the likelihood of various conclusions. Also, geometry is applied to apportionment methods to uncover new explanations why such methods can create troubling problems.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20121 408 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
A surprise is how the complexities of voting theory can be explained and resolved with the comfortable geometry of our three-dimensional world. This book is directed toward students and others wishing to learn about voting, experts will discover previously unpublished results. As an example, a new profile decomposition quickly resolves two centuries old controversies of Condorcet and Borda, demonstrates, that the rankings of pairwise and other methods differ because they rely on different information, casts series doubt on the reliability of a Condorcet winner as a standard for the field, makes the famous Arrow`s Theorem predictable, and simplifies the construction of examples. The geometry unifies seemingly disparate topics as manipulation, monotonicity, and even the apportionment issues of the US Supreme Court.