"Liberty and Nature - an Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order" describes the manner in which Aristotle's way of thinking has normally been understood as hostile to modern liberal, pluralistic, and commercial society. In opposition to this prevailing view, the authors set out to show that the Aristotelian approach to ethics supports the natural rights which forms the most secure basis for liberal principles. Rasmussen and Den Uyl lay the foundations of their thesis by rebutting the most prominent arguments against the Aristotelian approach; they then offer a new interpretation of the basic nature of Aristotelian ethics as a natural-end ethics in which the human flourishing is the ultimate moral standard. "Liberty and Nature" examines the concept of the common good in the light of theory of rights. The Aristotelian claim that the function of the state is the promotion of the common good is consistent with the Lockean claim that the function of the state is to protect the natural right to liberty in all its forms, for "the common good of a political community need not be a single goal that all men must strive to attain.Rather, the common good need only be that set of conditions that allows for the well-being and self-actualization of the community's members". The authors provide a close analysis of the relation between Aristotelian friendship and commercial transactions. They also compare their own theory with alternative defences of liberal social orders.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society's wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society''s wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society''s wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society's wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Contemporary political philosophy - especially in the works of Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Amartya Sen - has assumed that it can separate itself off from other philosophical positions and frameworks. In this book, Den Uyl and Rasmussen challenge this trend by moving from the liberalism they advocate in their earlier work to what they call ‘individualistic perfectionism’ in ethics. They continue to challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support a liberal, non-perfectionist political theory by filling in the nature of the perfectionist ethical approach utilised in their previous political theorising. By developing the central features and principles of individualistic perfectionism they show that it is a major and powerful alternative to much contemporary ethical thinking - particularly to constructivism - and that it is capable of overcoming standard objections to perfectionism.

How is it possible for something to be a supreme virtue at one time and later to be perceived as no virtue at all? This is the legacy left to us by the virtue of prudence. At one time, prudence was regarded as the highest of the «four cardinal virtues». Many today, in contrast, take prudence to be incompatible with morality. In this book Den Uyl examines prudence from both a topical and historical perspective. The «devolution» of the virtue of prudence is discussed by examining certain central figures in the history of ethics. In addition, the frameworks in ethical theory most conducive or detrimental to prudence being regarded as a virtue are examined as well. Den Uyl concludes his study with a theory of prudence rooted in the classical ethical tradition but suited to modern pluralistic social settings.

"Liberty and Nature - an Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order" describes the manner in which Aristotle's way of thinking has normally been understood as hostile to modern liberal, pluralistic, and commercial society. In opposition to this prevailing view, the authors set out to show that the Aristotelian approach to ethics supports the natural rights which forms the most secure basis for liberal principles. Rasmussen and Den Uyl lay the foundations of their thesis by rebutting the most prominent arguments against the Aristotelian approach; they then offer a new interpretation of the basic nature of Aristotelian ethics as a natural-end ethics in which the human flourishing is the ultimate moral standard. "Liberty and Nature" examines the concept of the common good in the light of theory of rights. The Aristotelian claim that the function of the state is the promotion of the common good is consistent with the Lockean claim that the function of the state is to protect the natural right to liberty in all its forms, for "the common good of a political community need not be a single goal that all men must strive to attain.Rather, the common good need only be that set of conditions that allows for the well-being and self-actualization of the community's members". The authors provide a close analysis of the relation between Aristotelian friendship and commercial transactions. They also compare their own theory with alternative defences of liberal social orders.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society's wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society''s wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society''s wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Should corporations seek to alleviate social inequalities? Or should they, rather, aim solely for profit maximization? Most social thinkers writing on the topic of corporate social responsibility have assumed that the question has been settled, that indeed, corporations ought to act as mere trustees for society's wealth because they exist at the pleasure of society, and so should do its bidding.

Contemporary political philosophy - especially in the works of Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Amartya Sen - has assumed that it can separate itself off from other philosophical positions and frameworks. In this book, Den Uyl and Rasmussen challenge this trend by moving from the liberalism they advocate in their earlier work to what they call ‘individualistic perfectionism’ in ethics. They continue to challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support a liberal, non-perfectionist political theory by filling in the nature of the perfectionist ethical approach utilised in their previous political theorising. By developing the central features and principles of individualistic perfectionism they show that it is a major and powerful alternative to much contemporary ethical thinking - particularly to constructivism - and that it is capable of overcoming standard objections to perfectionism.

How is it possible for something to be a supreme virtue at one time and later to be perceived as no virtue at all? This is the legacy left to us by the virtue of prudence. At one time, prudence was regarded as the highest of the «four cardinal virtues». Many today, in contrast, take prudence to be incompatible with morality. In this book Den Uyl examines prudence from both a topical and historical perspective. The «devolution» of the virtue of prudence is discussed by examining certain central figures in the history of ethics. In addition, the frameworks in ethical theory most conducive or detrimental to prudence being regarded as a virtue are examined as well. Den Uyl concludes his study with a theory of prudence rooted in the classical ethical tradition but suited to modern pluralistic social settings.