Douglas McDermid - Böcker

The Rise and Fall of Scottish Common Sense Realism examines the ways in which five Scottish philosophers - Lord Kames (1696-1782), Thomas Reid (1710-1796), Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), and James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864) - tackled a problem which has haunted Western philosophy ever since Descartes: that of determining whether any form of perceptual realism is defensible, or whether the very idea of a material world existing independently of perception and thought is more trouble than it is worth. This century-long conversation about the relation between mind and world led these five Scots to think uncommonly hard about a host of challenging issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and meta-philosophy. In order to present each philosopher's views in a fair and reasonably charitable light, Douglas McDermid has tried to identify the main problems each was attempting to solve, to relate his work to that of his predecessors where possible, to describe the mistakes (real or perceived) he was particularly anxious to correct, to explain the internal logic of his position, and to discuss some of the main objections which he anticipated and tried to rebut. McDermid's hope is that even seasoned students of the realism controversy may learn something new and valuable from this exercise, if only because he has chosen to focus not on the usual suspects - Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant - but on a fresh and undervalued cast of characters.

For much of the twentieth century, many Anglo-American philosophers supported three theses - one about reality, one about truth, and one about human knowledge - that, taken together, underwrote debates in epistemology. The first was realism: the commonsensical-sounding view that the world of physical objects exists independently of human thought or language. The second was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which true statements or beliefs are those which accurately represent the way the world is. The third was foundationalism: the view that our knowledge of the world, like an edifice, must rest on firm foundations (i.e. on beliefs whose justification does not depend on any other beliefs). In the last two decades, however, a radical anti-epistemology movement led by the influential American philosopher Richard Rorty has put partisans of all three theses on the defensive. Moreover, Rorty has repeatedly claimed that his opposition to the shibboleths of traditional epistemology draws inspiration from the grand tradition of Pragmatism (especially from William James and John Dewey.  In this important new book, Douglas McDermid argues persuasively for two key claims: first, that the so-called "Neo-Pragmatist" critique of traditional epistemology is thoroughly unconvincing; second, that Rorty is guilty of taking the name of Pragmatism in vain, since there are crucial and far-reaching differences between Neo-Pragmatism and the Classical Pragmatism of James and Dewey. The Varieties of Pragmatism will take its place in the forefront of the literature on this most vital part of the American philosophical legacy.