Eric J. Wittenberg – författare

After the ferocious fighting at Cold Harbor, Virginia, in June 1864, Union Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant ordered his cavalry, commanded by Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, to distract the Confederate forces opposing the Army of the Potomac. Glory Enough for All chronicles the battle that resulted when Confederate cavalry pursued and caught their Federal foes at Trevilian Station, Virginia, perhaps the only truly decisive cavalry battle of the American Civil War. Eric J. Wittenberg tells the stories of the men who fought there, including eight Medal of Honor winners and one Confederate whose death at Trevilian Station made him the third of three brothers to die in the service of Company A of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry. He also addresses the little-known but critical cavalry battle at Samaria (Saint Mary's) Church on June 24, 1864, where Union Brig. Gen. David N. Gregg's division was nearly destroyed. The only modern strategic analysis of the battle, Glory Enough for All challenges prevailing interpretations of General Sheridan and of the Union cavalry. Wittenberg shows that the outcome of Trevilian Station ultimately prolonged Grant's efforts to end the Civil War.

This Civil War sourcebook organizes the crucial details of the war in an inventive format designed to enhance the reader's knowledge base and big-picture understanding of key events and outcomes. The war's causes, political and economic issues, important personalities, campaigns and battles are examined. Nearly 200 reader challenges stimulate reviews of critical moments, with suggested further reading. Photographs and maps have been carefully selected to supplement the topic being explored.

Unlike Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. William T. Sherman, whose controversial Civil War-era reputations persist today, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan has been largely untouched by controversy. In Little Phil, historian Eric J. Wittenberg reassesses the war record of a man long considered one of the Union Army's greatest generals. From his earliest days at West Point, Phil Sheridan refused to play by the rules. He was fortunate to receive merely a suspension, rather than expulsion, when as a cadet he charged a superior officer with a bayonet. Although he achieved fame as a cavalryman late in the Civil War, Sheridan actually began the conflict as an infantry commander and initially knew little of the mounted service. In his first effort as a cavalry commander with the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1864, he gave a performance that Wittenberg argues has long been overrated. Later that year in the Shenandoah Valley, where Sheridan secured his legendary reputation, he benefited greatly from the tactical ability of his subordinates and from his huge manpower advantage against the beleaguered Confederate troops of Lt. Gen. Jubal Early. Sheridan was ultimately rewarded for numerous acts of insubordination against his superiors throughout the war, while he punished similar traits in his own officers. Further, in his combat reports and postwar writings, he often manipulated facts to show himself in the best possible light, ensuring an exalted place in history. Thus, Sheridan successfully foisted his own version of history on the American public. This controversial new study challenges the existing literature on Phil Sheridan and adds valuable insight to our understanding of this famous, but altogether fallible, warrior.

Selected by Military Heritage Magazine as the Year's Best Book on Custer"Chronicling the hardship and glory of wartime service with George Custer's famed Michigan Brigade, Avery's memoir is an insightful record of one Federal trooper's experience on campaign and battlefield.  His narrative is an important contribution to our understanding of the Union cavalry's emergence as a potent agent of victory" - Brian C. Pohanka

Unlike Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. William T. Sherman, whose controversial Civil War-era reputations persist today, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan has been largely untouched by controversy. In Little Phil, historian Eric J. Wittenberg reassesses the war record of a man long considered one of the Union Army's greatest generals. From his earliest days at West Point, Phil Sheridan refused to play by the rules. He was fortunate to receive merely a suspension, rather than expulsion, when as a cadet he charged a superior officer with a bayonet. Although he achieved fame as a cavalryman late in the Civil War, Sheridan actually began the conflict as an infantry commander and initially knew little of the mounted service. In his first effort as a cavalry commander with the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1864, he gave a performance that Wittenberg argues has long been overrated. Later that year in the Shenandoah Valley, where Sheridan secured his legendary reputation, he benefited greatly from the tactical ability of his subordinates and from his huge manpower advantage against the beleaguered Confederate troops of Lt. Gen. Jubal Early. Sheridan was ultimately rewarded for numerous acts of insubordination against his superiors throughout the war, while he punished similar traits in his own officers. Further, in his combat reports and postwar writings, he often manipulated facts to show himself in the best possible light, ensuring an exalted place in history. Thus, Sheridan successfully foisted his own version of history on the American public. This controversial new study challenges the existing literature on Phil Sheridan and adds valuable insight to our understanding of this famous, but altogether fallible, warrior.

One day. Fourteen hours. Twelve thousand Union cavalrymen against 9,000 of their Confederate counterparts—with three thousand Union infantry thrown in for good measure. Amidst the thunder of hooves and the clashing of sabers, they slugged it out across the hills and dales of Culpepper County, Virginia.And it escalated into the largest cavalry battle ever fought on the North American continent.Fleetwood Hill at Brandy Station was the site of four major cavalry battles during the course of the Civil War, but none was more important than the one fought on June 9, 1863. That clash turned out to be the opening engagement of the Gettysburg Campaign—and the one-day delay it engendered may very well have impacted the outcome of the entire campaign.The tale includes a veritable who’s-who of cavalry all-stars in the East: Jeb Stuart, Wade Hampton, John Buford, and George Armstrong Custer. Robert E. Lee, the great Confederate commander, saw his son, William H. F. Lee, being carried off the battlefield, severely wounded. Both sides suffered heavy losses.But for the Federal cavalry, the battle was also a watershed event. After Brandy Station, never again would they hear the mocking cry, “Whoever saw a dead cavalryman?”In Out Flew the Sabers: The Battle of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863—The Opening Engagement of the Gettysburg Campaign, award-winning Civil War historian Eric J. Wittenberg has written the latest entry in Savas Beatie’s critically acclaimed Emerging Civil War Series.

Award-winning authors Scott L. Mingus Sr. and Eric J. Wittenberg are back with the second and final installment of “If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania”: The Army of Northern Virginia’s and Army of the Potomac’s March to Gettysburg. This compelling and bestselling study is the first to fully integrate the military, political, social, economic, and civilian perspectives with rank-and-file accounts from the soldiers of both armies during the inexorably march north toward their mutual destinies at Gettysburg. Gen. Robert E. Lee’s bold movement north, which began on June 3, shifted the war out of the central counties of the Old Dominion into the Shenandoah Valley, across the Potomac, and beyond. The first installment (June 3-22, 1863) carried the armies through the defining mounted clash at Battle of Brandy Station, after which Lee pushed his corps into the Shenandoah Valley and achieved the magnificent victory at Second Winchester on his way to the Potomac. Caught flat-footed, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker used his cavalry to probe the mountain gaps, triggering a series of consequential mounted actions. The current volume (June 23-30) completes the march to Gettysburg and details the actions and whereabout of each component of the armies up to the eve of the fighting. The large-scale maneuvering in late June prompted General Hooker to move his Army of the Potomac north after his opponent and eventually above the Potomac, where he loses his command to the surprised Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. Jeb Stuart begins his controversial and consequential ride that strips away the eyes and ears of the Virginia army. Throughout northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania, civilians and soldiers alike struggle with the reality of a mobile campaign and the massive logistical needs of the armies. Untold numbers of reports, editorials, news articles, letters, and diaries describe the passage of the long martial columns, the thunderous galloping of hooves, and the looting, fighting, suffering, and dying. Mingus and Wittenberg mined hundreds of primary accounts, newspapers, and other sources to produce this powerful and gripping saga. As careful readers will quickly discern, other studies of the runup to Gettysburg gloss over most of this material. It is simply impossible to fully grasp and understand the campaign without a firm appreciation of what the armies and the civilians did during the days leading up to the fateful meeting at the small crossroads town in Adams County, Pennsylvania.

The Johnson-Gilmor Raid represents one of three attempts to free prisoners of war during the American Civil War. Like the other two, it was destined to fail for a variety of reasons, mostly because the timetable for the operation was a schedule impossible to meet. The mounted raid was a fascinating act of increasing desperation by the Confederate high command in the summer of 1864, and award-winning cavalry historian Eric J. Wittenberg presents the gripping story in detail for the first time in Destined to Fail: The Johnson-Gilmor Cavalry Raid around Baltimore, July 10-13, 1864. The thundering high-stakes operation was intended to ease the suffering of 15,000 Confederate prisoners held at Point Lookout, Maryland, a peninsula at the confluence of the Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay. The story includes a motley cast of characters on both sides and fast-paced drama in a deeply researched study that draws upon published and unpublished primary sources, including contemporary newspapers. Part of Wittenberg’s cogent analysis compares and contrasts this raid to a pair of other unsuccessful attempts to free Union prisoners of war – the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid of February-March 1864, and the Stoneman Raid on Macon, Georgia of July 1864 – as well as Gen. George S. Patton’s attempt to free his son-in-law and other American prisoners in March of 1945. This book will be welcomed by anyone with an interest in the Civil War, high-stakes cavalry operations, or the politics of Civil War high command.

July 1863 was a momentous month in the Civil War. News of the Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg electrified the North and devastated the South. Sandwiched geographically between them—and lost in the heady tumult of events—was news that William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland had driven Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee entirely out of Middle Tennessee. The brilliant campaign nearly cleared the state of Rebels and changed the calculus of the Civil War in the Western Theater. Despite its decisive significance, surprisingly few people know much about Rosecrans’s triumph. Now in paperback, Tullahoma: The Forgotten Campaign that Changed the Course of Civil War, June 23–July 4, 1863 by award-winning authors David A. Powell and Eric J. Wittenberg rectifies that oversight.On June 23, 1863, Rosecrans, with 60,000 men, began a classic campaign of maneuver against Bragg’s 40,000\. Confronted by rugged terrain and a heavily entrenched foe, Rosecrans intended to utilize strategic maneuver to defeat Bragg rather than direct assaults. He would outflank him, seize control of the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad (Bragg’s supply line) at Tullahoma, force the Rebels out of their extensive earthworks, and fight the decisive battle thereafter. The complex and fascinating campaign included deceit, hard marching, fighting, and incredible luck—both good and bad. Rosecrans executed a pair of feints against Guy’s Gap and Liberty Gap to deceive the Rebels about where the main blow would fall. An ineffective Confederate response exposed one of Bragg’s flanks—and thus his entire army—to complete disaster. Torrential rains and consequential decisions in the field wreaked havoc on Rosecrans’s well-designed scheme. Bragg, however, hesitated as he teetered on the brink of losing the second most important field army in the Confederacy. The hour was late, the time was short, and his limited withdrawal left the armies poised for a climactic engagement to decide the fate of Middle Tennessee and perhaps the war.Authors Powell and Wittenberg mined hundreds of archival and firsthand accounts to craft a splendid study of this overlooked campaign that set the stage for the fighting to follow at Chickamauga and Chattanooga, the removal of Rosecrans and Bragg from the chessboard of war, the elevation of U. S. Grant to command the Union armies, and the early stages of William T. Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign. Readers will find the original maps and extensive footnotes enhance their understanding of this dramatic event.Tullahoma was one of the most brilliantly executed major campaigns of the war and was pivotal to Union success in 1863 and beyond. Now, after all these decades, students of the war everywhere will know precisely why.