F. Emery – författare

Exploration of the nature of human communication and the media is a pre­ requisite to any assessment of the likely future role of communications . . We cannot assume that the nature of these things is transparently obvious to everyone and therefore commonly understood. Three developments in recent decades should adequately warn against such an assumption. First, we had the fiasco of social scientists trying to apply Shannon''s mathematical theory of information as if it were a theory of human communication. ''In Shannon''s use of information we cannot speak of how much information a person has only how much a message has. '' (Ackoff and Emery, 1972, p. 145). They would not have wandered into that blind alley if they had stopped to think about the nature of human communication. Second was the belated but wholehearted acceptance of the Heider theory of balance and its subse­ quent wane. Its wane had nothing to do with its inherent merits. It waned because it could not survive on the Procrustean bed of the psychologists'' theory of choice. It did not occur to the psychologists to question their as­ sumptions about how people made the choices that lead to purposeful com­ munication (Ackoff and Emery, 1972, p. 58). The last example has been the bitter and unended furore about McLuhan. This time the psychologists and sociologists haye been strangely quiet but we can be sure this does not imply acquiescence in McLuhan''s views.

Exploration of the nature of human communication and the media is a pre­ requisite to any assessment of the likely future role of communications . . We cannot assume that the nature of these things is transparently obvious to everyone and therefore commonly understood. Three developments in recent decades should adequately warn against such an assumption. First, we had the fiasco of social scientists trying to apply Shannon's mathematical theory of information as if it were a theory of human communication. 'In Shannon's use of information we cannot speak of how much information a person has only how much a message has. ' (Ackoff and Emery, 1972, p. 145). They would not have wandered into that blind alley if they had stopped to think about the nature of human communication. Second was the belated but wholehearted acceptance of the Heider theory of balance and its subse­ quent wane. Its wane had nothing to do with its inherent merits. It waned because it could not survive on the Procrustean bed of the psychologists' theory of choice. It did not occur to the psychologists to question their as­ sumptions about how people made the choices that lead to purposeful com­ munication (Ackoff and Emery, 1972, p. 58). The last example has been the bitter and unended furore about McLuhan. This time the psychologists and sociologists haye been strangely quiet but we can be sure this does not imply acquiescence in McLuhan's views.

After explicating the analytical framework I will proceed to develop scenarios as follows: I. General scenarios -maladaptive and adaptive. 2. The future for the Western group of societies. Within this will seek to identify the main changes in the natures of work, leisure, family organisation, education and life styles. 3. The future for the major Asian powers, China, Japan and India. 4. A world scenario centred about the first two scenarios but also aimed to locate within this pattern the most probable future for sets of the smaller societies and under-developed countries. The scenarios will be developed in that order, for good reasons. Sociological forecasting has to deal, in the first instance, with sets of societies that are closely interdependent, each with the other. A scenario for Western societies generally is required before one can hope to write one for the individual countries, e.g. France, Australia, because they are not evolving independently. The widespread upsurge of student revolts in 1967-68 well illustrates this interdependence. Some writers, like Stevens (1970) have taken the U.S.A. as the model of the future for the other smaller Western societies. There is some justifi­ cation for this as the U.S. has certainly been the ''leading part'' in the West for some decades. However, there is danger in assuming that that will persist. A change in the near future in the problems that commonly confront Western societies may make the U.S. example ''depasee'', old hat, if not down-right misleading.

After explicating the analytical framework I will proceed to develop scenarios as follows: I. General scenarios -maladaptive and adaptive. 2. The future for the Western group of societies. Within this will seek to identify the main changes in the natures of work, leisure, family organisation, education and life styles. 3. The future for the major Asian powers, China, Japan and India. 4. A world scenario centred about the first two scenarios but also aimed to locate within this pattern the most probable future for sets of the smaller societies and under-developed countries. The scenarios will be developed in that order, for good reasons. Sociological forecasting has to deal, in the first instance, with sets of societies that are closely interdependent, each with the other. A scenario for Western societies generally is required before one can hope to write one for the individual countries, e.g. France, Australia, because they are not evolving independently. The widespread upsurge of student revolts in 1967-68 well illustrates this interdependence. Some writers, like Stevens (1970) have taken the U.S.A. as the model of the future for the other smaller Western societies. There is some justifi­ cation for this as the U.S. has certainly been the 'leading part' in the West for some decades. However, there is danger in assuming that that will persist. A change in the near future in the problems that commonly confront Western societies may make the U.S. example 'depasee', old hat, if not down-right misleading.