Häftad, Engelska, 2026
571 kr
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Fred Wilson – författare
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21 produkter
21 produkter
- E-bokPDF, Engelska, 1999
1 736 kr
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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Aristotelian notions of logic and causation came under serious attack. Traditional philosophy speaks of this period as marking a revolution in scientific thought. In this book Fred Wilson reinstates and extends the traditional conception of the scientific revolution and its significance, and explores the goals and directions of the new science according to the differing interpretations of rationalist and empiricist thinkers.Wilson argues for an empiricist approach to scientific method and explanation, and defends an empiricist as opposed to an Aristotelian account of logic. Calling on an impressive range of intellectual history, he gives a sympathetic account of the earlier Aristotelian philosophy, including such topics as the role of God in explanations, and then proceeds to examine the evolution of the empiricist account of science through a number of early modern figures: Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume. He shows that the new science was characterized not just by its methodology and the kinds of explanations it engendered, but also by a new epistemology and a new understanding of being.A skilled and widely published author in the history of modern philosophy and the philosophy of science, Wilson brings persuasive new argument and detail to his re-evaluation of this important subject. - E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2008
1 736 kr
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David Hume is often considered to have been a sceptic, particularly in his conception of the individual's knowledge of the external world. However, a closer examination of his works gives a much different impression of this aspect of Hume's philosophy, one that is due for a thorough scholarly analysis. This study argues that Hume was, in fact, a critical realist in the early twentieth-century sense, a period in which the term was used to describe the epistemological and ontological theories of such philosophers as Roy Wood Sellars and Bertrand Russell.Carefully situating Hume in his historical context, that is, relative to Aristotelian and rationalist traditions, Fred Wilson makes important and unique insights into Humean philosophy. Analyzing key sections of the Treatise, the Enquiry, and the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Wilson offers a deeper understanding of Hume by taking into account the philosopher's theories of the external world. Such a reading, the author explains, is not only more faithful to the texts, but also reinforces the view of Hume as a critical realist in light of twentieth-century discussions between externalism and internalism, and between coherentists and foundationalists.Complete with original observations and ideas, this study is sure to generate debates about Humean philosophy, critical realism, and the limits of perceptual knowledge. - E-bokEngelska, 2008
1 894 kr
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David Hume is often considered to have been a sceptic, particularly in his conception of the individual's knowledge of the external world. However, a closer examination of his works gives a much different impression of this aspect of Hume's philosophy, one that is due for a thorough scholarly analysis. This study argues that Hume was, in fact, a critical realist in the early twentieth-century sense, a period in which the term was used to describe the epistemological and ontological theories of such philosophers as Roy Wood Sellars and Bertrand Russell.Carefully situating Hume in his historical context, that is, relative to Aristotelian and rationalist traditions, Fred Wilson makes important and unique insights into Humean philosophy. Analyzing key sections of the Treatise, the Enquiry, and the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Wilson offers a deeper understanding of Hume by taking into account the philosopher's theories of the external world. Such a reading, the author explains, is not only more faithful to the texts, but also reinforces the view of Hume as a critical realist in light of twentieth-century discussions between externalism and internalism, and between coherentists and foundationalists.Complete with original observations and ideas, this study is sure to generate debates about Humean philosophy, critical realism, and the limits of perceptual knowledge. - E-bokPDF, Engelska, 1981
537 kr
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The essays in this volume are connected with the main areas of Thomas A. Goudge''s research: Peirce studies and the philosophy of science, especially the philosophy of biology. There are two sections, each opened with an essay on Goudge''s contribution to the field.
The first section deals with C.S. Peirce. Essays examine major features of his thought: his proof of pragmatism, his logic of relations, his semiotics, his theory of truth, his philosophy of induction, and his Scotist metaphysics of individuals. Other essays in this group relate pragmatism and pragmaticism to the work of others, in particular Collingwood, Descartes, and James and Santayana. Each involves substantial dialogue with Peirce, and a philosophical evaluation of his work and the work of others.
The second is concerned with the philosophy of science. Some of the essays study the nature of scientific explanation: whether there is a logic of discovery, and whether life and teleology could be fitted into the mechanistic view of the universe that arose in the early modern period of philosophy. Various problems specifically concerning the synthetic theory of evolution are also discussed: for example, is it a theory somehow intrinsically different in kind from theories in physics? Does it yield special forms of explanation? How is it related to modern genetic theory? Other essays deal with problems arising out of an evolutionary view of life and man: for example, emergence, the place of consciousness in nature, man''s knowledge of necessary truths.
This is an important collection for those working in Peirce studies or the philosophy of biology, and a substantial contribution to the history of Canadian philosophy.
- Häftad, Engelska, 2017
203 kr
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- Häftad, Engelska, 2018
203 kr
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- E-bokEngelska, 2018
79 kr
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Memories of a Retired Fell-Walker is a delightful book full of charm, comradeship and nostalgia. Those who walk and love Lakeland fells will enjoy the author’s personal reflections and recollections of many happy hours spent walking in the Lake District on his own, or with friends. This book will also appeal to those who will be enticed to follow the author’s footsteps marvelling at the wonderful scenery. Also, those who can no longer visit the highest mountains can relive past adventures detailed in this book, which are sure to bring back many happy memories. - Häftad, Engelska, 2012
204 kr
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- E-bokEngelska, 2014
168 kr
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“I had a fantastic position, but I couldn’t figure out what to do next!” Sound familiar? If so, then Fred Wilson’s Simple Attacking Plans was written for you. The author distills the complexities of mounting an offensive against your opponent’s king down to four principles that lie at the root of most successful chess attacks.Novice players and amateurs of intermediate strength will benefit from the explanations of ideas and tips for practical play, all presented in an easy, conversational style. More experienced competitors will appreciate this book as a game collection featuring masterpieces of enterprising play – some of them never before published. - Häftad, Engelska, 2019
273 kr
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- Inbunden, Engelska, 2019
325 kr
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- Inbunden, Engelska, 2007
3 368 kr
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These essays bring together forty years of work in ontology. Intentionality, negation, universals, bare particulars, tropes, general facts, relations, the myth of the 'myth of the given', are among the topics covered. Bergmann, Quine, Sellars, Russell, Wittgenstein, Hume, Bradley, Hochberg, Dummett, Frege, Plato, are among the philosophers discussed. The essays criticize non-Humean notions of cause; they criticize the notion that besides simple atomic facts there are also negative facts and general facts. They defend a realism of properties as universals, against nominalism; bare particulars; a (qualified) realism with regard to logical form; a Russellian account of relations; and an account of minds and intentionality, which is opposed to materialism, but is also a form of (methodological) behaviourism. In general, the ontology is one of logical atomism and empiricist throughout, rooted in a Principle of Acquaintance. - Del 22 - Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis
Body, Mind and Self in Hume’s Critical Realism
Inbunden, Engelska, 20082 926 kr
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This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds. - E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2013
3 410 kr
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These essays bring together forty years of work in ontology. Intentionality, negation, universals, bare particulars, tropes, general facts, relations, the myth of the ''myth of the given'', are among the topics covered. Bergmann, Quine, Sellars, Russell, Wittgenstein, Hume, Bradley, Hochberg, Dummett, Frege, Plato, are among the philosophers discussed. The essays criticize non-Humean notions of cause; they criticize the notion that besides simple atomic facts there are also negative facts and general facts. They defend a realism of properties as universals, against nominalism; bare particulars; a (qualified) realism with regard to logical form; a Russellian account of relations; and an account of minds and intentionality, which is opposed to materialism, but is also a form of (methodological) behaviourism. In general, the ontology is one of logical atomism and empiricist throughout, rooted in a Principle of Acquaintance.
- E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2013
2 962 kr
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This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
- Inbunden, Engelska, 1986
1 625 kr
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- E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2019
2 044 kr
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- E-bokPDF, Engelska, 2012
687 kr
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The purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as (1) the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as (2) the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction. - Häftad, Engelska, 2014
1 623 kr
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- Del 26 - Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science
Explanation, Causation and Deduction
Häftad, Engelska, 2011546 kr
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The purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as (1) the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as (2) the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction.
