Gail S. Reed – författare

This book provides extraordinary insight into the subtleties and diversities of contemporary clinical practice by exploring the problematic and ambiguous concept of the transference neurosis. Gail S. Reed makes use of a crucial but mostly ignored aspect of psychoanalytic discourse, its oral tradition. She reproduces extensive portions of interviews with twenty-two psychoanalysts to investigate the way they understand and use transference neurosis and transference, comments on their views, and draws on her own clinical work. The interviews detail not only the internal struggles analysts undergo in order to help their patients but also the effect of analysts' personal struggles on their immensely varied understanding.Reed discusses the development of the transference neurosis from Freud's initial formulation of an artificial illness in the patient to the testimony of many contemporary analysts that the transference neurosis includes a profound experience in them that is the critical feature of every therapeutic relationship. Reed fashions a new definition of the transference neurosis that attempts to conserve what makes sense of its traditional meaning while integrating current practice. This book is unique in combining historical and theoretical analysis of a clinical concept while conveying to the reader with astonishing immediacy what it feels like to do analysis.

In the last several decades, the analytic field has widened considerably in scope. The therapeutic task is now seen by an increasing number of analysts to require that patient and analyst work together to strengthen, or to create, psychic structure that was previously weak, missing, or functionally inoperative. This view, which may apply to all patients, but is especially relevant to the treatment of non-neurotic patients and states of mind, stands in stark contrast to the more traditional assumption that the therapeutic task involves the uncovering of the unconscious dimension of a present pathological compromise formation that holds a potentially healthy ego in thrall. The contrast which this book calls attention to is that which exists roughly between formulations of psychic structure and functioning that were once assumed to have been sufficiently well explained by the hypotheses of Freud's topographic theory and those that were not. The former are modeled on neurosis and dream interpretation, where conflicts between relatively well-defined (saturated) and psychically represented desires were assumed to operate under the aegis of the pleasure-unpleasure principle.

The concept of "screen memories" was introduced by Freud for the first time in his 1899 paper, reprinted here in its entirety. Although the clinical interest in "screen memories" has perhaps diminished in recent analytic discussion, there is much to be gained from revisiting and re-examining both the phenomenon and Freud's original paper within a contemporary context. To this end, the authors have invited contributions from eight leading psychoanalysts on the current meaning and value to them of the screen memory concept. These comments come from contemporary psychoanalysts practicing in Italy, Francophone Switzerland, Argentina, Israel, and the United States of America, each of whom has been trained in one or another of a variety of psychoanalytic traditions, among which are ego psychology, a French version of Freud, an American version of Lacan and at least two variants of Kleinian thought - one British and one Latin American.

First published in 1993. This is Volume 13, No 4 of the Psychoanalytic Inquiry which focuses on locating transference: actuality and illusion in the psychoanalytic encounter. The interrelation between actuality and illusion within the clincal encounter is a subject that has influenced the tehory and pratcice of psychoanalysis since its beginnings, particulary with regard to how clinicians identify and construe the transference.

Psychoanalytic understanding is defined by the principle that the dynamic unconscious is ubiquitous and determining. So humbling is the principle that we are always trying to deny it, forget it or find exceptions to it. And once its power is acknowledged, the analyst can never be separated from the uncertainties of his or her own unconscious. The central question Gail Reed addresses is how the analyst, buffeted by his or her own unconscious, can provide the patient with an authoritative, yet non-authoritarian understanding. Drawing on both theory and close examination of the clinical moment, Reed offers us a new model of clinical understanding as the exploration of the individual's way of signifying his or her own unique life experience. Vivid clinical examples make this book compelling reading for clinicians and anyone else interested in how we come to know the other.

In the last several decades, the analytic field has widened considerably in scope. The therapeutic task is now seen by an increasing number of analysts to require that patient and analyst work together to strengthen, or to create, psychic structure that was previously weak, missing, or functionally inoperative. This view, which may apply to all patients, but is especially relevant to the treatment of non-neurotic patients and states of mind, stands in stark contrast to the more traditional assumption that the therapeutic task involves the uncovering of the unconscious dimension of a present pathological compromise formation that holds a potentially healthy ego in thrall.The contrast which this book calls attention to is that which exists roughly between formulations of psychic structure and functioning that were once assumed to have been sufficiently well explained by the hypotheses of Freud's topographic theory and those that were not. The former are modeled on neurosis and dream interpretation, where conflicts between relatively well-defined (saturated) and psychically represented desires were assumed to operate under the aegis of the pleasure-unpleasure principle. The latter involve a different level of psychic functioning and registration, one that is more closely associated with pre-verbal, and/or massive psychic trauma, as well as with primitive mental states. It operates 'beyond the pleasure principle.' In complementary fashion, psychoanalytic theorizing has begun to shift from conceiving solely or predominantly of a universe of presences, forgotten, hidden or disguised, but there for the finding, to a negative universe of voids where creation of missing structure, often referred to by the Freudian metapsychological designation, representation, becomes of necessity part of the cure.However it is conceptualized psychoanalytically, representation is the culmination of a process through which impulse and content, and in favorable circumstances disguised versions of that part of the content that is unconscious, must all be linked. It is a term with historical roots in Freud's metapsychology, and its psychoanalytic usage refers back to that tradition and theoretical domain. It should not be confused with the way it or similar terms are used in other disciplines - e.g., child development or neuroscience - nor should references to its absence be misunderstood to necessarily imply the total absence of some kind of registration or inscription in 'the being,' i.e., the psyche or the soma, of the individual.

The concept of "screen memories" was introduced by Freud for the first time in his 1899 paper, reprinted here in its entirety. Although the clinical interest in "screen memories" has perhaps diminished in recent analytic discussion, there is much to be gained from revisiting and re-examining both the phenomenon and Freud's original paper within a contemporary context. To this end, Gail S. Reed and Howard B. Levine have invited contributions from eight leading psychoanalysts on the current meaning and value to them of the screen memory concept. These comments come from contemporary psychoanalysts practicing in Italy, Francophone Switzerland, Argentina, Israel, and the United States of America, each of whom has been trained in one or another of a variety of psychoanalytic traditions, among which are ego psychology, a French version of Freud, an American version of Lacan and at least two variants of Kleinian thought - one British and one Latin American. Their comments range from advocating that screen memories are an important, even central, feature of contemporary analytic work (LaFarge, Cohen), to finding the concept less universally applicable, but nonetheless compelling (Ahumada). The editors hope that the encounter with these creative and thought-provoking commentaries will give new meaning to our appreciation of this important clinical phenomenon and stimulate further research and clinical observation into its origins and uses. Contributors: Jorge L. Ahumada, Franco De Masi, Rivka R. Eifermann, Lucy LaFarge, Nellie Thompson, Shlomith Cohen, Florence Guignard, Howard B. Levine, Gail S. Reed, and John P. Muller.