G.S. Pearson – författare

The papers in this volume provide an integrated overview and in-depth analysis of the issues involved in the negotiations leading to the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, involving consideration of the key scientific and technical issues involved and also of the political context within which these issues have to be considered by the negotiators.

There is increasing concern over the possible use of biological weapons. If they are used, an attack will manifest as a disease outbreak among humans, animals or plants. It is thus important to be able to distinguish between natural disease outbreaks and the result of such an attack. This volume discusses the scientific and technical means available to investigate this question and then goes on to consider the agents of concern. It concludes with a look forward to future developments.

There is increasing concern over the possible use of biological weapons. If they are used, an attack will manifest as a disease outbreak among humans, animals or plants. It is thus important to be able to distinguish between natural disease outbreaks and the result of such an attack. This volume discusses the scientific and technical means available to investigate this question and then goes on to consider the agents of concern. It concludes with a look forward to future developments.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, while it is primarily a security treaty, does contain provisions for the promotion of technical co-operation and development. There is clearly a direct relationship between technical co-operation in regard to disease surveillance and reporting and the capability to distinguish between natural and deliberate outbreaks of disease. This book provides contributions related to this key linkage between security and development in the rapidly growing biotechnology field. The book's 31 chapters are all written by experts who attended two NATO Advanced Research Workshops on "BTWC Security Implications of Human, Animal and Plant Epidemiology" and "Maximising the Security Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology" held in Romania at the turn of the 21st century.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, while it is primarily a security treaty, does contain provisions for the promotion of technical co-operation and development. There is clearly a direct relationship between technical co-operation in regard to disease surveillance and reporting and the capability to distinguish between natural and deliberate outbreaks of disease. This book provides contributions related to this key linkage between security and development in the rapidly growing biotechnology field. The book's 31 chapters are all written by experts who attended two NATO Advanced Research Workshops on "BTWC Security Implications of Human, Animal and Plant Epidemiology" and "Maximising the Security Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology" held in Romania at the turn of the 21st century.

Incidents of bioterrorism and biowarfare are likely to recur, leading to increased public concern and government action. The deficiencies of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are in urgent need of attention: the BTWC is the central international agreement to prevent the proliferation of biological warfare programmes. Uniquely, this book is written by diplomats involved in the decade-long effort (1991-2001) in which State Parties to the BTWC tried to agree a Protocol to the Convention with legally binding measures to strengthen its effectiveness, and academics concerned with the negotiations. Just before negotiations foundered, when the Chairman's proposed text was virtually complete, the problems and proposed solutions were examined thoroughly, leading to this book. The book is wide-ranging in its review of the history of biological warfare, the reasons why the current biological revolution is of such concern, and the main features of the BTWC itself. The core of the book examines the key elements of the proposed protocol - declarations, visits, challenge-type investigations, and enhanced international cooperation - and the implications for government, industry and biodefence, giving us all a better understanding of what still remains to be done to avert a biowarfare catastrophe.

Incidents of bioterrorism and biowarfare are likely to recur, leading to increased public concern and government action. The deficiencies of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are in urgent need of attention: the BTWC is the central international agreement to prevent the proliferation of biological warfare programmes. Uniquely, this book is written by diplomats involved in the decade-long effort (1991-2001) in which State Parties to the BTWC tried to agree a Protocol to the Convention with legally binding measures to strengthen its effectiveness, and academics concerned with the negotiations. Just before negotiations foundered, when the Chairman's proposed text was virtually complete, the problems and proposed solutions were examined thoroughly, leading to this book. The book is wide-ranging in its review of the history of biological warfare, the reasons why the current biological revolution is of such concern, and the main features of the BTWC itself. The core of the book examines the key elements of the proposed protocol - declarations, visits, challenge-type investigations, and enhanced international cooperation - and the implications for government, industry and biodefence, giving us all a better understanding of what still remains to be done to avert a biowarfare catastrophe.