Hugh Ragsdale - Böcker

Drawing on archival studies, revisionist historians have taken issue with the traditional view that Tsar Paul I was mad and was assassinated because of the clear danger he posed to the state. Professor Ragsdale contends that the question of Paul's mental condition is not as simple as either his detractors or modern apologists suppose. In the first full-length study to be published outside Russia, the author places the subject in a wholly new perspective and offers some trenchant criticisms of traditional psychohistorical methods.He first describes the development of the personality of the Grand Prince in light of the conflicts between the European Enlightenment values that influenced his formal education and the social and political realities of eighteenth-century Russia. Professor Ragsdale next examines Paul's reign and the events surrounding his assassination, particularly the evidence suggesting that the conspirators planned beforehand to defame the Tsar's reputation as a means of justifying the deed. The next two chapters compare Paul's thinking and policies with those of other absolute sovereigns of the time and look at how mental illness was defined and treated in other instances of royal madness. The final chapter explores the question of the Tsar's mental condition in terms of twentieth-century psychological and psychiatric theory. A significant scholarly contribution, this book sheds light on an old controversy and provides some valuable new insights on the uses of psychology and psychiatry in the study of history.

The Munich crisis is everywhere acknowledged as the prelude to World War II. If Hitler had been stopped at Munich then World War II as we know it could not have happened. The subject has been thoroughly studied in British, French and German documents and consequently we know that the weakness in the Western position at Munich consisted in the Anglo-French opinion that the Soviet commitment to its allies - France and Czechoslovakia - was utterly unreliable. What has never been seriously studied in the Western literature is the whole spectrum of East European documentation. This book targets precisely this dimension of the problem. The Romanians were at one time prepared to admit the transfer of the Red Army across their territory. The Red Army, mobilised on a massive scale, was informed that its destination was Czechoslovakia. The Polish consul in Lodavia reported the entrance of the Red Army into the country. In the meantime, Moscow focused especially on the Polish rail network. All of these findings are new, and they contribute to a considerable shift in the conventional wisdom on the subject.

Imperial Russian Foreign Policy aims to demythologise a field hitherto dominated by suspicions of diabolical cunning, inscrutable motives, and international plots using unseen forces of the gigantic, fear-inspiring empire of the tsar. The contributors, leading historians from both Russia and the West, examine Imperial foreign policy from its origins to the October Revolution, revealing a policy that, as in other countries, had a complex of motives - commerce, nationalism, the interests of various social groups - but an unusual origin, coming almost exclusively from the entourage of the tsar. The work is based largely on original research in Soviet archives, which only became possible after Soviet glasnost.

The Munich crisis is everywhere acknowledged as the prelude to World War II. If Hitler had been stopped at Munich then World War II as we know it could not have happened. The subject has been thoroughly studied in British, French and German documents and consequently we know that the weakness in the Western position at Munich consisted in the Anglo-French opinion that the Soviet commitment to its allies - France and Czechoslovakia - was utterly unreliable. What has never been seriously studied in the Western literature is the whole spectrum of East European documentation. This book targets precisely this dimension of the problem. The Romanians were at one time prepared to admit the transfer of the Red Army across their territory. The Red Army, mobilised on a massive scale, was informed that its destination was Czechoslovakia. The Polish consul in Lodavia reported the entrance of the Red Army into the country. In the meantime, Moscow focused especially on the Polish rail network. All of these findings are new, and they contribute to a considerable shift in the conventional wisdom on the subject.

This work provides an interpretive history of Russia from earliest times to today, recounting the story of Russia's past. It discusses Russia's strengths and weaknesses as a civilization, and the challenges posed by the contemporary effort to remake Russia.