Ian Savage – författare

The move in the past decade to deregulate industries that were tightly regulated has raised the question of whether decreased regulation has brought with it decreased safety. The book considers this question in relation to the airline and motor freight industries, and the studies conclude that there is little evidence that these forms of transport have become less safe as a result of deregulation. The book derives from a conference which attracted scholars of excellent reputation in the field of regulation and safety, including Thomas Gale Moore, W. Kip Viscusi, Elizabeth E. Bailey, and Joseph Stiglitz. Although the studies concentrate on transportation in America, there is a chapter which deals exclusively with the question of regulation of road freight transport in Great Britain.

Recent legislation deregulating the airline and trucking industries has enhanced competition and reduced real transportation prices by putting pressure on firms to operate more efficiently. Yet, with the entry of many new small airlines and trucking firms facing the financial pressures of competition, many legislators fear that public safety will be reduced due to compromises in maintenance, equipment replacement, recruitment and training. This volume examines the theoretical and empirical issues involved in the debate on the relationship between safety and economic performance in the airline and trucking industries. Contributors discuss such factors as the role of government as provider of safety oversight personnel and airport and road space quality, and conclude that the government has not acted quickly enough to provide the additional safety resources to meet the changed needs of the two industries, though the evidence does not support the notion that deregulation has compromised safety.

Stemming from the traditions of industrial organization and law and economics, this text examines the exact nature of the railroad "safety problem": how much safety should be provided; what might hinder obtaining such a level of provision; and what we can do about it. Discussion of safety is often infused with emotion. By contrast, the author uses a logical approach to laying out the economics of safety, allowing the informed reader to understand what constitute the main issues. Therefore, while the book deals specifically with freight railroads, the theory is applicable to all forms of transportation. The text is divided into three main sections. The first section puts the railroad safety issue into context. The second section provides a consideration of the economics of safety. The objectives of the third section are to discuss why the market may not produce the socially-optimal level of safety, and to present the range of policy responses that might be deployed to deal with any market failures.

The American public has a fascination with railroad wrecks that goes back a long way. One hundred years ago, staged railroad accidents were popular events. At the Iowa State fair in 1896, 89,000 people paid $20 each, at current prices, to see two trains, throttles wide open, collide with each other. "Head-on Joe" Connolly made a business out of "cornfield meets" holding seventy-three events in thirty-six years. Picture books of train wrecks do good business presumably because a train wreck can guarantee a spectacular destruction of property without the messy loss of life associated with aircraft accidents. A "train wreck" has also entered the popular vocabulary in a most unusual way. When political manoeuvering leads to failure to pass the federal budget, and a shutdown is likely of government services, this is widely called a "train wreck. " In business and team sports, bumbling and lack of coordination leading to a spectacular and public failure to perform is also called "causing a train wreck. " A person or organization who is disorganized may be labelled a "train wreck. " It is therefore not surprising that the public perception of the safety of railroads centers on images of twisted metal and burning tank cars, and a general feeling that these events occur quite often. After a series of railroad accidents, such as occurred in the winter of 1996 or the summer of 1997, there are inevitable calls that government "should do something.