Jack Watling – författare

Using hard power in the context of an expanding set of threats is complex, expensive and risky. European medium powers, especially, must make tough choices on the future capabilities, roles and equipment of their armed forces, as well as their ability to act independently of alliance partners. Decision Points: Rationalising the Armed Forces of European Medium Powers examines these trade-offs and calls for policymakers to approach each key decision on the future of their country’s armed forces with a clearer sense of the consequences for the state’s foreign policy.

Using hard power in the context of an expanding set of threats is complex, expensive and risky. European medium powers, especially, must make tough choices on the future capabilities, roles and equipment of their armed forces, as well as their ability to act independently of alliance partners. Decision Points: Rationalising the Armed Forces of European Medium Powers examines these trade-offs and calls for policymakers to approach each key decision on the future of their country’s armed forces with a clearer sense of the consequences for the state’s foreign policy.

A new era of great power competition places a strategic premium on the efficiency with which states can pursue their aims. There is therefore likely to be an expanded scope for partnered operations. Partner force capacity building has a long history, with very mixed results, yet there is little historical memory in the institutions tasked with carrying it out. War by Others’ Means uses archival research, interviews with practitioners, and observation of capacity building to understand why states undertake it, how they should select, train and equip their partners, and how they should manage the generation and withdrawal of trainers.

A new era of great power competition places a strategic premium on the efficiency with which states can pursue their aims. There is therefore likely to be an expanded scope for partnered operations. Partner force capacity building has a long history, with very mixed results, yet there is little historical memory in the institutions tasked with carrying it out. War by Others’ Means uses archival research, interviews with practitioners, and observation of capacity building to understand why states undertake it, how they should select, train and equip their partners, and how they should manage the generation and withdrawal of trainers.

The British military spent 20 years fighting in Afghanistan. Considering the UK’s achievements against its objectives, defeat seems the most accurate description of the campaign’s outcome. How institutions respond to and learn from failure is a good measure of their effectiveness. But Britain''s war in Afganistan also saw considerable tactical and operational learning to solve complex problems. Not only are some of the solutions valuable, but the processes by which they were derived bear study. The question is whether these lessons will be retained. This Whitehall Paper delves into some of the many valuable and hard-won lessons that can be derived from a study of British operations in Afganistan, beginning a conversation as to their relevance for future British miliatry undertakings.

The British military spent 20 years fighting in Afghanistan. Considering the UK’s achievements against its objectives, defeat seems the most accurate description of the campaign’s outcome. How institutions respond to and learn from failure is a good measure of their effectiveness. But Britain''s war in Afganistan also saw considerable tactical and operational learning to solve complex problems. Not only are some of the solutions valuable, but the processes by which they were derived bear study. The question is whether these lessons will be retained. This Whitehall Paper delves into some of the many valuable and hard-won lessons that can be derived from a study of British operations in Afganistan, beginning a conversation as to their relevance for future British miliatry undertakings.