Justin Bronk – författare

Airpower remains the cornerstone of NATO’s military advantage, so maintaining the ability to win air superiority over peer opponents in a conflict is key to long-term deterrence stability in both Europe and the Pacific. This Whitehall Paper examines the various modernisation and future capability development efforts being undertaken within NATO, and analyses the major threat systems and overall modernisation trends of the West’s main peer-competitors – Russia and China.

US airpower capability development efforts are increasingly focused on countering the growing challenge from the Chinese military in the Pacific. To meet this challenge, the Pentagon is planning to transform the way it operates across all domains over the next 15 years. New platforms, weapons systems and increasing automation of command and control threaten to leave NATO allies behind.

Current acquisition and modernisation plans of European air forces may eventually close the capability gap with current US theatre entry standard capabilities, but by then the US will have leapt ahead once more. Furthermore, many of the airpower capabilities which the US is pursuing for the Pacific theatre are significantly less relevant for the demands of deterrence against Russia in Europe. Given continuing dependence on US enablers on the part of other NATO members, a significant divergence in capability plans threatens to undermine crucial Alliance interoperability if not recognised and managed early.

Airpower remains the cornerstone of NATO’s military advantage, so maintaining the ability to win air superiority over peer opponents in a conflict is key to long-term deterrence stability in both Europe and the Pacific. This Whitehall Paper examines the various modernisation and future capability development efforts being undertaken within NATO, and analyses the major threat systems and overall modernisation trends of the West’s main peer-competitors – Russia and China.

US airpower capability development efforts are increasingly focused on countering the growing challenge from the Chinese military in the Pacific. To meet this challenge, the Pentagon is planning to transform the way it operates across all domains over the next 15 years. New platforms, weapons systems and increasing automation of command and control threaten to leave NATO allies behind.

Current acquisition and modernisation plans of European air forces may eventually close the capability gap with current US theatre entry standard capabilities, but by then the US will have leapt ahead once more. Furthermore, many of the airpower capabilities which the US is pursuing for the Pacific theatre are significantly less relevant for the demands of deterrence against Russia in Europe. Given continuing dependence on US enablers on the part of other NATO members, a significant divergence in capability plans threatens to undermine crucial Alliance interoperability if not recognised and managed early.

This book provides a comprehensive account of the use of airpower in the first year of the Ukraine conflict.

Airpower has been central to political, military, and public debates from the outset of the Russo‑Ukrainian war. After having started with whether the US and NATO should attempt to establish a No‑Fly Zone over Ukraine to protect the civilian population, the international discussion soon focused on the underperformance of Russian airpower. The fact that the initial contest for air superiority over Ukraine ended in an uneasy state of mutual denial came as a surprise to Western analysts, who suspected Kyiv would fall within a relatively short period of time. The surprise and relief that it did not only fueled urgent and ongoing discussions on how NATO nations could support the Ukrainian war effort. Regardless of nationality, age, level of education, or ethnicity, the near‑daily footage of Russian missiles, bombs and drones hitting residential areas and bombarding infrastructure to deprive an entire population of electricity and water has been emotionally imprinted on generations who have only known peace. Why the Russians have used airpower with such brutality, and how Ukraine and its allies have defended against this threat, is an important topic to understand even outside a specialist military audience. The aim of this book, therefore, is to provide an analysis on why the air war over Ukraine unfolded as it did during the first year of the war.

This book will be of much interest to students of air power, military and strategic studies, Russian and eastern European politics, and International Relations.

This book provides a comprehensive account of the use of airpower in the first year of the Ukraine conflict.

Airpower has been central to political, military, and public debates from the outset of the Russo‑Ukrainian war. After having started with whether the US and NATO should attempt to establish a No‑Fly Zone over Ukraine to protect the civilian population, the international discussion soon focused on the underperformance of Russian airpower. The fact that the initial contest for air superiority over Ukraine ended in an uneasy state of mutual denial came as a surprise to Western analysts, who suspected Kyiv would fall within a relatively short period of time. The surprise and relief that it did not only fueled urgent and ongoing discussions on how NATO nations could support the Ukrainian war effort. Regardless of nationality, age, level of education, or ethnicity, the near‑daily footage of Russian missiles, bombs and drones hitting residential areas and bombarding infrastructure to deprive an entire population of electricity and water has been emotionally imprinted on generations who have only known peace. Why the Russians have used airpower with such brutality, and how Ukraine and its allies have defended against this threat, is an important topic to understand even outside a specialist military audience. The aim of this book, therefore, is to provide an analysis on why the air war over Ukraine unfolded as it did during the first year of the war.

This book will be of much interest to students of air power, military and strategic studies, Russian and eastern European politics, and International Relations.

This Whitehall Paper provides an in-depth analysis of Russia’s Ground Forces, including airborne and naval troops. It examines their role in Russian foreign policy, reforms to units’ equipment and operational roles, performance during combat operations against Ukraine, and current unit deployment locations and purposes in the Central, Southern and Western Military Districts.

Russia perceives itself as operating from a position of weakness and surrounded by superior NATO forces. It is pursuing a programme of military reform, both in terms of equipment and structures. The Russian Ground Forces are being geared towards fighting in aggressive, short, sharp and complex operations into enemy territory, as well as being streamlined to increase readiness levels and deployability at short notice.

However, operations against Ukraine have required force generation efforts from almost every Russian Ground Forces formation, including those in the Far East, which is evidence that the Kremlin’s ability to sustain even a moderate tempo of operations in the medium term is limited. Furthermore, chronic undermanning and morale issues remain, which will be exacerbated by the political decision to re-establish division-scale formations. In addition, Western sanctions and Russia’s difficult economic situation are severely hampering efforts to extend equipment reforms across the whole force.

Russian Ground Forces should not be seen by the West as an unstoppable colossus. However, the West must not ignore the unmistakable Russian efforts to prepare for offensive, high-tempo operations against NATO, and the formidable political will that will use them if given the opportunity.