Jeremy Stocker – författare

This book describes and analyses two iconic figures in twentieth-century naval history: the German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and the Russian Admiral Sergei Gorshkov.

It examines the men, what they thought and wrote about seapower, the fleets they created and the strategic consequences of what they did. More broadly, it draws on the respective histories of the post-1897 Imperial German Navy and the post-1956 Soviet Navy to examine the continental bid for large-scale seapower. The work argues that both individuals built navies that did not, and could not, fulfil the objectives for which they were created. Drawing on the legacies of both men, the book also develops some wider ideas about the creation of large navies by continental states, with cautionary lessons for today’s emerging powers, India and China. Both admirals have received book-length biographies, but this is the first attempt at a comparative study and the first to draw broader strategic lessons from their respective attempts as continental navalists to challenge maritime states.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and International Relations.

This book describes and analyses two iconic figures in twentieth-century naval history: the German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and the Russian Admiral Sergei Gorshkov.

It examines the men, what they thought and wrote about seapower, the fleets they created and the strategic consequences of what they did. More broadly, it draws on the respective histories of the post-1897 Imperial German Navy and the post-1956 Soviet Navy to examine the continental bid for large-scale seapower. The work argues that both individuals built navies that did not, and could not, fulfil the objectives for which they were created. Drawing on the legacies of both men, the book also develops some wider ideas about the creation of large navies by continental states, with cautionary lessons for today’s emerging powers, India and China. Both admirals have received book-length biographies, but this is the first attempt at a comparative study and the first to draw broader strategic lessons from their respective attempts as continental navalists to challenge maritime states.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and International Relations.

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain''s strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life-extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century.  The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government''s decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain''s strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life-extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century.  The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government''s decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.