Jeroen Temperman – författare

The scope of Artificial Intelligence's (AI) hold on modern life is only just beginning to be fully understood. Academics, professionals, policymakers, and legislators are analysing the effects of AI in the legal realm, notably in human rights work. Artificial Intelligence technologies and modern human rights have lived parallel lives for the last sixty years, and they continue to evolve with one another as both fields take shape.Human Rights and Artificial Intelligence explores the effects of AI on both the concept of human rights and on specific topics, including civil and political rights, privacy, non-discrimination, fair procedure, and asylum. Second- and third-generation human rights are also addressed. By mapping this relationship, the book clarifies the benefits and risks for human rights as new AI applications are designed and deployed.Its granular perspective makes Human Rights and Artificial Intelligence a seminal text on the legal ramifications of machine learning. This expansive volume will be useful to academics and professionals navigating the complex relationship between AI and human rights.

The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliges state parties to prohibit any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination or violence. This book traces the origins of this provision and proposes an actus reus for this offence. The question of whether hateful incitement is a prohibition per se or also encapsulates a fundamental 'right to be protected against incitement' is extensively debated. Also addressed is the question of how to judge incitement. Is mens rea required to convict someone of advocating hatred, and if so, for what degree of intent? This analysis also includes the paramount question if and to what extent content and/or context factors ought to be decisive. The author extensively engages with comparative domestic law and compares the workings of the UN Human Rights Committee with those of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the European Court of Human Rights.

The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliges state parties to prohibit any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination or violence. This book traces the origins of this provision and proposes an actus reus for this offence. The question of whether hateful incitement is a prohibition per se or also encapsulates a fundamental 'right to be protected against incitement' is extensively debated. Also addressed is the question of how to judge incitement. Is mens rea required to convict someone of advocating hatred, and if so, for what degree of intent? This analysis also includes the paramount question if and to what extent content and/or context factors ought to be decisive. The author extensively engages with comparative domestic law and compares the workings of the UN Human Rights Committee with those of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the European Court of Human Rights.

The tension between blasphemy laws and the freedom of expression in modern times is a key area of debate within legal academia and beyond. With contributions by leading scholars, this volume compares blasphemy laws within a number of Western liberal democracies and debates the legitimacy of these laws in the twenty-first century. Including comprehensive and up-to-date comparative country studies, this book considers the formulation of blasphemy bans, relevant jurisprudential interpretations, the effect on society, and the ensuing convictions and penalties where applicable. It provides a useful historical analysis by discussing the legal-political rationales behind the recent abolition of blasphemy laws in some Western states. Contributors also consider the challenges to the tenability of blasphemy laws in a selection of well-balanced theoretical chapters. This book is essential reading for scholars working within the fields of human rights law, philosophy and sociology of religion, and comparative politics.

The tension between blasphemy laws and the freedom of expression in modern times is a key area of debate within legal academia and beyond. With contributions by leading scholars, this volume compares blasphemy laws within a number of Western liberal democracies and debates the legitimacy of these laws in the twenty-first century. Including comprehensive and up-to-date comparative country studies, this book considers the formulation of blasphemy bans, relevant jurisprudential interpretations, the effect on society, and the ensuing convictions and penalties where applicable. It provides a useful historical analysis by discussing the legal-political rationales behind the recent abolition of blasphemy laws in some Western states. Contributors also consider the challenges to the tenability of blasphemy laws in a selection of well-balanced theoretical chapters. This book is essential reading for scholars working within the fields of human rights law, philosophy and sociology of religion, and comparative politics.

This book examines the question of how the mode of state–religion identification affects the state’s scope for compliance with human rights law. It presents a human rights-based assessment of the various modes of state–religion identification and of the various forms of state practice that surround and characterize these different state–religion models. A close assessment of norms of human rights law substantiates that, although human rights law on the face of it is seemingly neutral to the issue of state–religion identification, legal principles can be extrapolated that have a profound bearing on the question of legitimacy of the possible diverse relationships that may exist between the state and religion. A range of thematic case studies on, among other issues, Establishment of Religion & the ‘Equal Religious Rights of Others’, Religion & Freedom of Expression, Religion & Political Rights, Religion & Educational Rights, Religion & Freedom of Association and Religion & Equal Employment Opportunities, demonstrates that existing regimes of positive state identification with religion are not devoid of forms of institutionalised discrimination and de facto practices of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief (or lack thereof). At the same time, it is observed by the author that in some secular or separationist states the ideals of state secularism and separationism have come to be considered ends in themselves. This has given rise to situations where the principles of secularism and separationism are construed so as to impose illegitimate limits on the activities of religions or illegitimate limits on the individual manifestation of certain beliefs. This book makes a case for the recognition of a state duty to remain impartial with respect to religion or belief in all regards so as to comply with people’s fundamental right to be governed, at all times, in a religiously neutral manner.

Increasingly, debates about religious symbols in the public space are reformulated as human rights questions and put before national and international judges. Particularly in the area of education, legitimate interests are manifold and often collide. Children’s educational and religious rights, parental liberties vis-à-vis their children, religious traditions, state obligations in the area of public school education, the state neutrality principle, and the professional rights and duties of teachers are all principles that may warrant priority attention. Each from their own discipline and perspective––ranging from legal (human rights) scholars, (legal) philosophers, political scientists, comparative law scholars, and country-specific legal experts––these experts contribute to the question of whether in the present-day pluralist state there is room for state symbolism (e.g. crucifixes in classroom) or personal religious signs (e.g. cross necklaces or kirpans) or attire (e.g. kippahs or headscarves) in the public school classroom.