Jerome C. Wakefield - Böcker

The Loss of Sadness argues that the increased prevalence of major depressive disorder is due not to a genuine rise in mental disease, but to the way that normal human sadness has been 'pathologised' since 1980. That year saw the publication of the landmark third edition of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), which has since become a dominant force behind our current understanding of mental illness overall. As concerns at least major depression, the authors argue that the DSM's definition of the condition is too broad and that as a result virtually all research and clinical approaches to the condition have been based on a flawed understanding about it. The social, political, and scientific implications of this are far-reaching - from the overselling of antidepressants to treat ordinary sadness, as Big Pharma exploits the DSM for its own purposes; to intrusive and expensive depression screening programs at all levels of society, as well-meaning but misguided initiatives translate the DSM into simple terms to catch any whiff of depressive pathology in our midst; and funded research into the 'epidemic' of depression, which advances the field very litttle and the public even less. Ultimately, the definition of depression that is in operation today has formed the basis for an entire system of social control (e.g. community-wide screening initiatives, intrusive public health policy) that benefits psychiatry, primary care providers, and the pharmaceutical and insurance industries by turning everyone else into a potential consumer of services, needed or not. The authors do recognise that depression is a devastating illness that affects some people. Their chief concern is with the use of this diagnosis as a catch-all for anyone who has experienced sadness for more than a few weeks at a time. The result is a pointed yet nuanced critique of modern psychiatry that will stir controversy of the sort that will reacquaint us with sadness as a primary human emotion and that could productively influence the way that depression the actual illness is characterised in the future.

Depression has become the single most commonly treated mental disorder, amid claims that one out of ten Americans suffer from this disorder every year and 25% succumb at some point in their lives. Warnings that depressive disorder is a leading cause of worldwide disability have been accompanied by a massive upsurge in the consumption of antidepressant medication, widespread screening for depression in clinics and schools, and a push to diagnose depression early, on the basis of just a few symptoms, in order to prevent more severe conditions from developing. In The Loss of Sadness, Allan V. Horwitz and Jerome C. Wakefield argue that, while depressive disorder certainly exists and can be a devastating condition warranting medical attention, the apparent epidemic in fact reflects the way the psychiatric profession has understood and reclassified normal human sadness as largely an abnormal experience. With the 1980 publication of the landmark third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), mental health professionals began diagnosing depression based on symptoms-such as depressed mood, loss of appetite, and fatigue-that lasted for at least two weeks. This system is fundamentally flawed, the authors maintain, because it fails to take into account the context in which the symptoms occur. They stress the importance of distinguishing between abnormal reactions due to internal dysfunction and normal sadness brought on by external circumstances. Under the current DSM classification system, however, this distinction is impossible to make, so the expected emotional distress caused by upsetting events-for example, the loss of a job or the end of a relationship-could lead to a mistaken diagnosis of depressive disorder. Indeed, it is this very mistake that lies at the root of the presumed epidemic of major depression in our midst. In telling the story behind this phenomenon, the authors draw on the 2,500-year history of writing about depression, including studies in both the medical and social sciences, to demonstrate why the DSM's diagnosis is so flawed. They also explore why it has achieved almost unshakable currency despite its limitations. Framed within an evolutionary account of human health and disease, The Loss of Sadness presents a fascinating dissection of depression as both a normal and disordered human emotion and a sweeping critique of current psychiatric diagnostic practices. The result is a potent challenge to the diagnostic revolution that began almost thirty years ago in psychiatry and a provocative analysis of one of the most significant mental health issues today.

In this close reading of Freudian theory, Jerome C. Wakefield reconstructs Freud’s argument for the Oedipal theory of the psychoneuroses, placing the case of Little Hans into a philosophy-of-science context and critically rethinking the epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis.Wakefield logically evaluates four central Freudian arguments: the "undirected anxiety" argument which contends that Hans suffered from anxiety before he developed his horse phobia; the "day the horse fell down" argument where, engaging in some scholarly detective work, Wakefield resolves a century-old dispute between behaviorists and psychoanalysts about when Hans witnessed a frightening horse accident; the "N=1 sexual repression" argument that the trajectory of Hans’s sexual desires matches the Oedipal theory’s predictions; and lastly, the "detailed symptom characteristics" argument that the Oedipal theory is needed to understand otherwise inexplicable details of Hans’s symptoms. Wakefield demonstrates that, although Freud’s arguments are brilliantly conceived, he misread the facts of the Hans case and failed to support the Oedipal theory as judged by his own stated evidential standards. However, this failure creates an opportunity for renewed consideration of psychoanalysis’s distinctive contribution: the understanding of an individual’s unique meaning system and confrontation with meanings outside of focal awareness in order to reshape an individual’s fate.This book will be of interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists alike, and will prove essential for scholars working in the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy of science, and the history of psychiatry.

In this close reading of Freudian theory, Jerome C. Wakefield reconstructs Freud’s argument for the Oedipal theory of the psychoneuroses, placing the case of Little Hans into a philosophy-of-science context and critically rethinking the epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis.Wakefield logically evaluates four central Freudian arguments: the "undirected anxiety" argument which contends that Hans suffered from anxiety before he developed his horse phobia; the "day the horse fell down" argument where, engaging in some scholarly detective work, Wakefield resolves a century-old dispute between behaviorists and psychoanalysts about when Hans witnessed a frightening horse accident; the "N=1 sexual repression" argument that the trajectory of Hans’s sexual desires matches the Oedipal theory’s predictions; and lastly, the "detailed symptom characteristics" argument that the Oedipal theory is needed to understand otherwise inexplicable details of Hans’s symptoms. Wakefield demonstrates that, although Freud’s arguments are brilliantly conceived, he misread the facts of the Hans case and failed to support the Oedipal theory as judged by his own stated evidential standards. However, this failure creates an opportunity for renewed consideration of psychoanalysis’s distinctive contribution: the understanding of an individual’s unique meaning system and confrontation with meanings outside of focal awareness in order to reshape an individual’s fate.This book will be of interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists alike, and will prove essential for scholars working in the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy of science, and the history of psychiatry.

In Attachment, Sexuality, Power, Jerome C. Wakefield challenges established views of Freudian psychoanalysis by applying Foucault’s concept of ‘power/knowledge’ to Freud’s case of Little Hans, illuminating the role that Oedipal theory has played in reorganizing intimate family relationships.Combining close examination of the Hans case with accounts of the history of marriage and psychology of co-sleeping, this book argues that the Oedipal theory achieved prominence because its implications for family dynamics supported changing social values. Wakefield identifies a previously overlooked reason for Hans’s anxiety—his father attempted to protect Hans from his supposed Oedipal desires by separating Hans from his mother. Thus, Wakefield argues, the father’s exercise of power based on his belief in Oedipal theory, not an actual Oedipus complex, caused Hans’s vulnerability to anxiety—revealing the theory’s potential to cause harm by distancing children from their parents, even as such distancing made the theory socially appealing.This book’s novel and carefully documented articulation of the mechanisms of power by which Oedipal theory exerts its influence on family life will be of interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists alike, and essential for scholars in the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy of science and the history of psychiatry.

In Attachment, Sexuality, Power, Jerome C. Wakefield challenges established views of Freudian psychoanalysis by applying Foucault’s concept of ‘power/knowledge’ to Freud’s case of Little Hans, illuminating the role that Oedipal theory has played in reorganizing intimate family relationships.Combining close examination of the Hans case with accounts of the history of marriage and psychology of co-sleeping, this book argues that the Oedipal theory achieved prominence because its implications for family dynamics supported changing social values. Wakefield identifies a previously overlooked reason for Hans’s anxiety—his father attempted to protect Hans from his supposed Oedipal desires by separating Hans from his mother. Thus, Wakefield argues, the father’s exercise of power based on his belief in Oedipal theory, not an actual Oedipus complex, caused Hans’s vulnerability to anxiety—revealing the theory’s potential to cause harm by distancing children from their parents, even as such distancing made the theory socially appealing.This book’s novel and carefully documented articulation of the mechanisms of power by which Oedipal theory exerts its influence on family life will be of interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists alike, and essential for scholars in the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy of science and the history of psychiatry.

In Foucault Versus Freud, Jerome C. Wakefield offers a novel analysis of one of the great intellectual clashes of our times, the attack on Sigmund Freud's influential sexual theories by the eminent French philosopher and historian of ideas Michel Foucault.Starting from Foucault's question, "What makes the psychoanalytic theory of incest acceptable to the bourgeois family?", and drawing on Foucault's relatively unexplored published lectures as well as his celebrated History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Wakefield evaluates Foucault's argument that there is a continuity between the two-century medical anti-masturbation crusade and Freud's theory, providing the reader with an accessible introduction to Foucault's conceptual innovations including power/knowledge, the deployment of sexuality, and the use of surveillance and confession as tactics in medicalizing sexuality and reshaping family life.Rather than allowing the argument to stay at the evidentially uncertain level one often finds in Foucault's writings, Wakefield undertakes close readings of both Freud's "seduction-theory" texts and later Oedipal-period texts to test whether Foucault's provocative arguments find support or disconfirmation. Despite identifying weaknesses in Foucault's position, Wakefield argues that a careful look at Freud's sexual theories through Foucault's theoretical lens changes forever the way one sees Freud's theory—and has the potential to help psychoanalysis move forward in a constructive way.This book is written to be understandable for those who are not steeped in philosophy or familiar with Foucault's philosophy, offering a lucid introduction to Foucault's ideas and his clash with Freud that will be of interest to clinicians, students, and scholars alike.

In Foucault Versus Freud, Jerome C. Wakefield offers a novel analysis of one of the great intellectual clashes of our times, the attack on Sigmund Freud's influential sexual theories by the eminent French philosopher and historian of ideas Michel Foucault.Starting from Foucault's question, "What makes the psychoanalytic theory of incest acceptable to the bourgeois family?", and drawing on Foucault's relatively unexplored published lectures as well as his celebrated History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Wakefield evaluates Foucault's argument that there is a continuity between the two-century medical anti-masturbation crusade and Freud's theory, providing the reader with an accessible introduction to Foucault's conceptual innovations including power/knowledge, the deployment of sexuality, and the use of surveillance and confession as tactics in medicalizing sexuality and reshaping family life.Rather than allowing the argument to stay at the evidentially uncertain level one often finds in Foucault's writings, Wakefield undertakes close readings of both Freud's "seduction-theory" texts and later Oedipal-period texts to test whether Foucault's provocative arguments find support or disconfirmation. Despite identifying weaknesses in Foucault's position, Wakefield argues that a careful look at Freud's sexual theories through Foucault's theoretical lens changes forever the way one sees Freud's theory—and has the potential to help psychoanalysis move forward in a constructive way.This book is written to be understandable for those who are not steeped in philosophy or familiar with Foucault's philosophy, offering a lucid introduction to Foucault's ideas and his clash with Freud that will be of interest to clinicians, students, and scholars alike.

This book consists of a focused and systematic analysis of Freud’s implicit argument for unconscious mental states.

Does the mind consist only of conscious experiences, or do mental states extend beyond awareness to unconscious brain states with genuine representational content? This second volume in Jerome C. Wakefield’s trilogy immerses readers in one of the most enduring debates in intellectual history—the multi-century dispute over unconscious mental states. Beginning with Descartes’ consciousness criterion and Leibniz’s divisibility argument, Wakefield reconstructs successive rounds of argument through Locke, Mill, and others, culminating in a dialectical confrontation between Freud and William James and a novel argument for the importance of dreams in the debate.Building on Volume 1’s analysis of Freud’s conceptual and theoretical arguments, this book examines the empirical dimension: whether phenomena such as memory, unnoticed mental states, gaps in reasoning, post-hypnotic suggestion, and dreams demonstrate unconscious mentation. Wakefield situates Freud’s position within the philosophy-of-mind tradition and shows how Freud’s synthesis helped pivot psychology from Cartesianism to a representational view of mind that underpins modern cognitive science.Combining historical depth with analytic rigor, this volume clarifies what was at stake, what was established, and what remains unresolved—namely, the missing criterion for unconscious representation. Essential reading for scholars and advanced students in philosophy of mind, psychoanalysis, and the history of psychology, it also sets the stage for Volume 3’s engagement with post-Freudian analytic philosophy.

This book consists of a focused and systematic analysis of Freud’s implicit argument for unconscious mental states.

Den nutida epidemin av depressionsdiagnoser grundar sig i den psykiatriska professionens klassificering av normal sorg som onormal sjukdom. Författarna hävdar att diagnossystemet enligt DSM är bristfälligt eftersom det inte tar hänsyn till det sammanhang där symptomen uppstått och inte ger någon möjlighet att skilja ut depressiv störning från normala reaktioner på traumatiska livsomständigheter. naturliga reaktioner på förlust av arbete, dödsfall i familjen, skilsmässa eller andra separationer blir btetraktade som depressiv sjukdom. I DEN FÖRLORADE SORGSENHETEN ges bakgrunden till detta fenomen genom grundlig analys av bla. medicinsk, sociologisk och antropologisk forskning De undersöker också varför diagnossystemet har kommit att få en sådan spridning trots dess uppenbara bristewr och felslut.

The World Health Organization states that depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide, and predicts that by 2030 the epidemic of depression raging across the world will be the single biggest contributor to the overall burden of disease of all health conditions. Yet this gloomy picture masks a number of paradoxes concerning the diagnosis and cultural interpretation of depression that appear to challenge the claimed prevalence rates on which it is based. This book’s essays by some of the world’s leading researchers and scholars on depression explores these anomalies in detail from multidisciplinary and multicultural perspectives, and in doing so reshapes the debate on the nature of depression that is currently under way in the US and abroad. At the book’s core is the exploration from the multiple perspectives of a key dilemma: is the epidemic of depression real or is it just apparent? In particular, could it be the result of criteria laid down in the official American classification system of mental disorders, the DSM, interacting with cultural changes to reshape our view of melancholy, pathologizing what were formerly normal symptoms of grief or intense sadness? The debate over the DSM's conception of depression has an international relevance, with the WHO’s upcoming revisions to its International Classification of Diseases requiring coordination with the DSM. This collection of perspectives has an unprecedented international dimension, as scholars from Europe and around the world join US academics to explore a central and controversial element of contemporary psychiatric diagnosis - and one that has enormous practical implications for the future of mental health care and how we view our emotions. The book’s accessible essays will make it useful to scholars, practitioners, and students across a wide range of disciplines.