Jonathan Bendor – författare

In "Bounded Rationality and Politics", Jonathan Bendor considers two schools of behavioral economics - the first guided by Tversky and Kahneman's work on heuristics and biases, which focuses on the mistakes people make in judgment and choice; the second as described by Gerd Gigerenzer's program on fast and frugal heuristics, which emphasizes the effectiveness of simple rules of thumb. Finding each of these radically incomplete, Bendor's illuminating analysis proposes Herbert Simon's pathbreaking work on bounded rationality as a way to reconcile the inconsistencies between the two camps. Bendor shows that Simon's theory turns on the interplay between the cognitive constraints of decision makers and the complexity of their tasks.

In "Bounded Rationality and Politics", Jonathan Bendor considers two schools of behavioral economics - the first guided by Tversky and Kahneman's work on heuristics and biases, which focuses on the mistakes people make in judgment and choice; the second as described by Gerd Gigerenzer's program on fast and frugal heuristics, which emphasizes the effectiveness of simple rules of thumb. Finding each of these radically incomplete, Bendor's illuminating analysis proposes Herbert Simon's pathbreaking work on bounded rationality as a way to reconcile the inconsistencies between the two camps. Bendor shows that Simon's theory turns on the interplay between the cognitive constraints of decision makers and the complexity of their tasks.

Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government challenges the conventional wisdom that efficiency in public administration is best achieved by eliminating duplication. Drawing on real-world examples, including the infamous failure of the American rescue expedition to Iran, this book makes a compelling case for the value of redundancy in government systems. Just as engineers build redundancy into complex machinery to ensure reliability in the face of inevitable failures, the authors argue that similar principles should guide public administration. In this framework, redundancy—whether in equipment or overlapping agency responsibilities—is not wasteful but essential for effective governance.The book delves into theoretical perspectives from scholars such as Martin Landau and William Niskanen, who propose that duplication can enhance reliability and foster healthy competition among agencies, driving greater efficiency. Using case studies in the areas of weapons, water management, and welfare programs, Parallel Systems demonstrates that redundancy is neither an anomaly nor a flaw in the American bureaucratic system. Instead, it is a pragmatic response to the unpredictability of complex government operations. This work is a thought-provoking exploration of how rethinking redundancy can lead to more resilient and effective public administration.This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.

Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government challenges the conventional wisdom that efficiency in public administration is best achieved by eliminating duplication. Drawing on real-world examples, including the infamous failure of the American rescue expedition to Iran, this book makes a compelling case for the value of redundancy in government systems. Just as engineers build redundancy into complex machinery to ensure reliability in the face of inevitable failures, the authors argue that similar principles should guide public administration. In this framework, redundancy—whether in equipment or overlapping agency responsibilities—is not wasteful but essential for effective governance.The book delves into theoretical perspectives from scholars such as Martin Landau and William Niskanen, who propose that duplication can enhance reliability and foster healthy competition among agencies, driving greater efficiency. Using case studies in the areas of weapons, water management, and welfare programs, Parallel Systems demonstrates that redundancy is neither an anomaly nor a flaw in the American bureaucratic system. Instead, it is a pragmatic response to the unpredictability of complex government operations. This work is a thought-provoking exploration of how rethinking redundancy can lead to more resilient and effective public administration.This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.

In Bounded Rationality and Politics, Jonathan Bendor considers two schools of behavioral economics—the first guided by Tversky and Kahneman’s work on heuristics and biases, which focuses on the mistakes people make in judgment and choice; the second as described by Gerd Gigerenzer’s program on fast and frugal heuristics, which emphasizes the effectiveness of simple rules of thumb. Finding each of these radically incomplete, Bendor’s illuminating analysis proposes Herbert Simon’s pathbreaking work on bounded rationality as a way to reconcile the inconsistencies between the two camps. Bendor shows that Simon’s theory turns on the interplay between the cognitive constraints of decision makers and the complexity of their tasks.

Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies - most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors - politicians as well as voters - are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later. Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and voters' choices of candidates. These models predict substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner significant vote shares.Overall, the behavioral theory and its models produce macroimplications consistent with the data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A computational model accompanies the book and can be used as a tool for further research.