Keith DeRose – författare
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8 produkter
8 produkter
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2009475 kr
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It''s an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we''ll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varyingstandards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standards that govern whether such claims are true always the same? And what are the implications for epistemology if these truth-conditions for knowledge claims shift with context? Contextualism, the view that theepistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary with context, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favor of the view and against its "invariantist" rivals, and responding to themost pressing objections facing contextualism.
E-bok
Engelska, 2011475 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
It''s an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we''ll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varyingstandards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standards that govern whether such claims are true always the same? And what are the implications for epistemology if these truth-conditions for knowledge claims shift with context? Contextualism, the view that theepistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary with context, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favor of the view and against its "invariantist" rivals, and responding to themost pressing objections facing contextualism.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2018872 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary with context, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. This volume presents, develops, and defends contextualist solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinarystandards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we''ve lost the lottery. Why it seems that we don''t know that they''re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work.The Appearance of Ignorance is the companion volume to Keith DeRose''s 2009 title The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 1.
E-bok
Engelska, 2018872 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary with context, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. This volume presents, develops, and defends contextualist solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinarystandards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we''ve lost the lottery. Why it seems that we don''t know that they''re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work.The Appearance of Ignorance is the companion volume to Keith DeRose''s 2009 title The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 1.
Häftad, Engelska, 1999
1 261 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Recently, new life has been breathed into the ancient philosophical topic of scepticism. It has been the subject of some of the best and most provocative work in contemporary philosophy by both today's top epistemologists and also by the world's leading philosophers working in other areas of the discipline. This book collects the most important contributions to each of the major approaches to scepticism that have dominated the recent discussion. It features essays by Anthony Brueckner, Keith DeRose, Fred Dretske, Graeme Forbes, Christopher Hill, David Lewis, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Hilary Putnam, Ernest Sosa, Gail Stine, Barry Stroud, Peter Unger, and Ted Warfield,
Inbunden, Engelska, 2009
1 012 kr
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It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standards that govern whether such claims are true always the same? And what are the implications for epistemology if these truth-conditions for knowledge claims shift with context? Contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary with context, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favor of the view and against its "invariantist" rivals, and responding to the most pressing objections facing contextualism.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2018
1 156 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary with context, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. This volume presents, develops, and defends contextualist solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we've lost the lottery. Why it seems that we don't know that they're false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work.The Appearance of Ignorance is the companion volume to Keith DeRose's 2009 title The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 1.
Häftad, Engelska, 2011
504 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standards that govern whether such claims are true always the same? And what are the implications for epistemology if these truth-conditions for knowledge claims shift with context? Contextualism is the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet, in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true, do vary with context. This has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favor of the view and against its "invariantist" rivals, and responding to the most pressing objections facing contextualism.