Keith L Dougherty - Böcker

Winning presidential elections isn’t just about the ballot box; it is shaped by the rules of the “apportionment game.” Shifting Seats uncovers the gritty history of how politicians fought for greater legislative influence and how those decisions determined control of Congress—and sometimes the presidency. Moving beyond abstract debates, Keith L. Dougherty takes readers inside high-stakes bargaining from the Founding era, the Antebellum period, and post–Civil War struggles over representation. Within these periods, Dougherty models how legislators manipulated the building blocks of apportionment—including metrics, ratios, House sizes, and rounding methods—to maximize their state’s proportion of seats. He explains how a 1920s stalemate fixed the House’s size at 435 members and created the automatic system in use today. Bridging the gap between political history and formal theory, the book identifies the long-term mechanisms that stabilize or disrupt distributions of power. Further, it shows how different apportionment methods could have flipped some presidential elections. By connecting these clashes to our current polarized climate, Shifting Seats explains why some apportionment rules endure while others fail, revealing the hidden mechanics that continue to dictate the balance of power in Washington today.

Winning presidential elections isn’t just about the ballot box; it is shaped by the rules of the “apportionment game.” Shifting Seats uncovers the gritty history of how politicians fought for greater legislative influence and how those decisions determined control of Congress—and sometimes the presidency. Moving beyond abstract debates, Keith L. Dougherty takes readers inside high-stakes bargaining from the Founding era, the Antebellum period, and post–Civil War struggles over representation. Within these periods, Dougherty models how legislators manipulated the building blocks of apportionment—including metrics, ratios, House sizes, and rounding methods—to maximize their state’s proportion of seats. He explains how a 1920s stalemate fixed the House’s size at 435 members and created the automatic system in use today. Bridging the gap between political history and formal theory, the book identifies the long-term mechanisms that stabilize or disrupt distributions of power. Further, it shows how different apportionment methods could have flipped some presidential elections. By connecting these clashes to our current polarized climate, Shifting Seats explains why some apportionment rules endure while others fail, revealing the hidden mechanics that continue to dictate the balance of power in Washington today.

Rather than focusing on why the states did not contribute to the national government under the Articles of Confederation, Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation asks why they, in fact, did - even when they should not have been expected to contribute. Why did states pay large portions of their requisitions to the federal government when problems of collective action and the lack of governmental incentives suggest that they should not have? Using original data on Continental troop movements and federal debt holdings within each state, in this 2001 book, Dougherty shows that states contributed to the national government when doing so produced local gains. Such a theory stands in stark contrast to the standard argument that patriotism and civic duty encouraged state cooperation. Material incentives and local interests bound the union together and explained the push for constitutional reform more than the common pursuit of mutual goals.