Kenneth A. Schultz - Böcker
Visar alla böcker från författaren Kenneth A. Schultz. Handla med fri frakt och snabb leverans.
3 produkter
3 produkter
708 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
With a framework based on interests, interactions and institutions, World Politics gives students an accessible analytical approach to understand international relations. In the Fifth Edition, two new guest contributors—Stephanie Rickard and Susan Hyde—offer cutting-edge analysis of current issues, including the global coronavirus pandemic and trade war between the United States and China. When assigned with InQuizitive and brand new News Analysis activities, students can apply the framework to global and current events.
Del 76 - Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Inbunden, Engelska, 2001
1 245 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
In this book, first published in 2001, Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.
Del 76 - Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Häftad, Engelska, 2001
428 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
In this book, first published in 2001, Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.