Leo Zaibert – författare

Discussions of punishment typically assume that punishment is criminal punishment carried out by the State. Punishment is, however, a richer phenomenon and it occurs in many contexts. This book contains a general account of punishment which overcomes the difficulties of competing accounts. Recognizing punishment's manifoldness is valuable not merely in contributing to conceptual clarity, but in that this recognition sheds light on the complicated problem of punishment's justification. Insofar as they narrowly presuppose that punishment is criminal punishment, most apparent solutions to the tension between consequentialism and retributivism are rather unenlightening if we attempt to apply them in other contexts. Moreover, this presupposition has given rise to an unwieldy variety of accounts of retributivism which are less helpful in contexts other than criminal punishment. Treating punishment comprehensibly helps us to better understand how it differs from similar phenomena, and to carry on the discussion of its justification fruitfully.

The titular example of Patricia, a woman who kills her husband, illustrates this book’s powerful theory of culpability. Depending on Patricia’s mental state and beliefs, her degree of guilt for killing her husband will vary. If, for example, she set fire to her apartment fully intending to kill her husband, we would deem her more blameworthy that if the fire was an unavoidable accident. Culpability, the author argues, is commonly confused with other issues such as responsibility, accountability, and liability. Yet it is concerned exclusively with the intentional mental states we have at the time that we act. Zaibert also offers a history of the theory of culpability, and gives a fascinating analysis of the beliefs and emotions associated with blaming others.

The age-old debate about what constitutes just punishment has become deadlocked. Retributivists continue to privilege desert over all else, and consequentialists continue to privilege punishment's expected positive consequences, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, over all else. In this important intervention into the debate, Leo Zaibert argues that despite some obvious differences, these traditional positions are structurally very similar, and that the deadlock between them stems from the fact they both oversimplify the problem of punishment. Proponents of these positions pay insufficient attention to the conflicts of values that punishment, even when justified, generates. Mobilizing recent developments in moral philosophy, Zaibert offers a properly pluralistic justification of punishment that is necessarily more complex than its traditional counterparts. An understanding of this complexity should promote a more cautious approach to inflicting punishment on individual wrongdoers and to developing punitive policies and institutions.

This book provides close examination of ontology and the work of Professor Barry Smith, one of the most prolific philosophers of the modern day.

Discussions of punishment typically assume that punishment is criminal punishment carried out by the State. Punishment is, however, a richer phenomenon and it occurs in many contexts. This book contains a general account of punishment which overcomes the difficulties of competing accounts. Recognizing punishment's manifoldness is valuable not merely in contributing to conceptual clarity, but in that this recognition sheds light on the complicated problem of punishment's justification. Insofar as they narrowly presuppose that punishment is criminal punishment, most apparent solutions to the tension between consequentialism and retributivism are rather unenlightening if we attempt to apply them in other contexts. Moreover, this presupposition has given rise to an unwieldy variety of accounts of retributivism which are less helpful in contexts other than criminal punishment. Treating punishment comprehensibly helps us to better understand how it differs from similar phenomena, and to carry on the discussion of its justification fruitfully.

The age-old debate about what constitutes just punishment has become deadlocked. Retributivists continue to privilege desert over all else, and consequentialists continue to privilege punishment's expected positive consequences, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, over all else. In this important intervention into the debate, Leo Zaibert argues that despite some obvious differences, these traditional positions are structurally very similar, and that the deadlock between them stems from the fact they both oversimplify the problem of punishment. Proponents of these positions pay insufficient attention to the conflicts of values that punishment, even when justified, generates. Mobilizing recent developments in moral philosophy, Zaibert offers a properly pluralistic justification of punishment that is necessarily more complex than its traditional counterparts. An understanding of this complexity should promote a more cautious approach to inflicting punishment on individual wrongdoers and to developing punitive policies and institutions.

This book provides close examination of ontology and the work of Professor Barry Smith, one of the most prolific philosophers of the modern day.

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct?The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct?The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.