Liora Lazarus – författare

This volume aims to provoke reflection on the English conception and treatment of prisoners' rights, through juxtaposition with the conception of prisoners' rights in Germany. First, the German and English understandings of prisoners' legal status are examined; secondly these understandings are placed against the background of broader social, political, and legal factors; and thirdly, the methodological problems of comparative law are addressed.English and German approaches to prisoners' rights present illuminating contrasts. In England, despite significant judicial activity in the development of a jurisprudence of prisoners' rights, protection of prisoners' rights remains partial and equivocal. Many aspects of prison life are left within the realm of executive discretion. This equivocal commitment to rights in England is juxtaposed with Germany's highly articulated rights culture and its ambitious system of prisoners' rights protection under the Prison Act 1976. The German Prison Act sets out foundational principles of prison administration, affords prisoners positive rights, defines the limitations of prisoners' constitutional rights, and provides prisoners with recourse to a Prison Court. Moreover, these rights and principles have been developed and refined in a substantial body of prison law jurisprudence over the last thirty years.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Coalition Government’s failure to win parliamentary approval for armed intervention in Syria in 2013, mark a period of increased scrutiny of the process by which the UK engages in armed conflict. For much of the media and civil society there now exists a constitutional convention which mandates that the Government consults Parliament before commencing hostilities. This is celebrated as representing a redistribution of power from the executive towards a more legitimate, democratic institution. This book offers a critical inquiry into Parliament’s role in the war prerogative since the beginning of the twentieth century, evaluating whether the UK’s decisions to engage in conflict meet the recognised standards of good governance: accountability, transparency and participation. The analysis reveals a number of persistent problems in the decision-making process, including Parliament’s lack of access to relevant information, government ‘legalisation’ of parliamentary debates which frustrates broader discussions of political legitimacy, and the skewing of debates via the partial public disclosure of information based upon secret intelligence. The book offers solutions to these problems to reinvigorate parliamentary discourse and to address government withholding of classified information. It is essential reading for anyone interested in war powers, the relationship between international law and domestic politics, and the role of the Westminster Parliament in questions of national security.

Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law explores the impact that oxymoronic ‘permanent’ states of emergency have on the validity and effectiveness of constitutional norms and, ultimately, constituent power. It challenges the idea that many constitutional orders are facing permanent states of emergency due to the ‘objective nature’ of threats facing modern states today, arguing instead that the nature of a threat depends upon the subjective assessment of the decision-maker. In light of this, it further argues that robust judicial scrutiny and review of these decisions is required to ensure that the temporariness of the emergency is a legal question and that the validity of constitutional norms is not undermined by their perpetual suspension. It does this by way of a narrower conception of the rule of law than standard accounts in favour of judicial review of emergency powers in the literature, which tend to be based on the normative value of human rights. In so doing it seeks to refute the fundamental constitutional challenge posed by Carl Schmitt: that all state power cannot be constrained by law.

This book is about judicial reasoning in human rights cases. The aim is to explore the question: how is it that notionally universal norms are reasoned by courts in such significantly different ways? What is the shape of this reasoning; which techniques are common across the transnational jurisprudence; and which are particular? The book, comprising contributions by a team of world-leading human rights scholars, moves beyond simply addressing the institutional questions concerning courts and human rights, which often dominate discussions of this kind, seeking instead a deeper examination of the similarities and divergence of reasonings by different courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. These differences, while partly influenced by institutional concerns, cannot be attributed to them alone. This book explores the diverse and rich underlying spectrum of human rights reasoning, as a distinctive and particular form of legal reasoning, evident in the case studies across the selected jurisdictions.

This book explores the implications of freedom as a non-domination-oriented view for understanding EU security regulation and its constitutional implications. At a time when the European borders are under pressure and with the refugee and migration crisis, which escalated in 2015, the idea of exploring a constitutional theory for the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) might seem to be a utopian project. This appears especially true in the light of the increased threat of terrorism in Europe (and on a global scale) and where the expanding EU security agenda is often advanced through the administrative law path, in contrast to the constitutional trajectory. Add to this the prolonged financial crisis, which continues to cast a long shadow on the future development of EU integration, and which suggests that Europe needs to ‘re-invent itself’ beyond the sphere of economics. Therefore, it is precisely because of the current uncertainties regarding the progress of the EU and the constitutional law project that a constitutional take on the AFSJ is of particular importance. The book investigates the meaning of non-domination and the idea of justice and justification in the area of EU security regulation. In doing so, it focuses on the development of an AFSJ, what it means, and why it represents a fascinating example of contemporary constitutional law with interacting layers of security regulation, human rights law and transnational legal theory at its core.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Coalition Government’s failure to win parliamentary approval for armed intervention in Syria in 2013, mark a period of increased scrutiny of the process by which the UK engages in armed conflict. For much of the media and civil society there now exists a constitutional convention which mandates that the Government consults Parliament before commencing hostilities. This is celebrated as representing a redistribution of power from the executive towards a more legitimate, democratic institution. This book offers a critical inquiry into Parliament’s role in the war prerogative since the beginning of the twentieth century, evaluating whether the UK’s decisions to engage in conflict meet the recognised standards of good governance: accountability, transparency and participation. The analysis reveals a number of persistent problems in the decision-making process, including Parliament’s lack of access to relevant information, government ‘legalisation’ of parliamentary debates which frustrates broader discussions of political legitimacy, and the skewing of debates via the partial public disclosure of information based upon secret intelligence. The book offers solutions to these problems to reinvigorate parliamentary discourse and to address government withholding of classified information. It is essential reading for anyone interested in war powers, the relationship between international law and domestic politics, and the role of the Westminster Parliament in questions of national security.

Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law explores the impact that oxymoronic ‘permanent’ states of emergency have on the validity and effectiveness of constitutional norms and, ultimately, constituent power. It challenges the idea that many constitutional orders are facing permanent states of emergency due to the ‘objective nature’ of threats facing modern states today, arguing instead that the nature of a threat depends upon the subjective assessment of the decision-maker. In light of this, it further argues that robust judicial scrutiny and review of these decisions is required to ensure that the temporariness of the emergency is a legal question and that the validity of constitutional norms is not undermined by their perpetual suspension. It does this by way of a narrower conception of the rule of law than standard accounts in favour of judicial review of emergency powers in the literature, which tend to be based on the normative value of human rights. In so doing it seeks to refute the fundamental constitutional challenge posed by Carl Schmitt: that all state power cannot be constrained by law.

This book addresses the various ways in which modern approaches to the protection of national security have impacted upon the constitutional order of the United Kingdom. It outlines and assesses the constitutional significance of the three primary elements of the United Kingdom’s response to the possibility of terrorism and other phenomena that threaten the security of the state: the body of counter-terrorism legislation that has grown up in the last decade and a half; the evolving law of investigatory powers; and, to the extent relevant to the domestic constitution, the law and practice governing international military action and co-operation. Following on from this, the author demonstrates that considerations of national security – as a good to be protected and promoted in contemporary Britain – are reflected not merely in the existence of discrete bodies of law by which it is protected at home and abroad, but simultaneously and increasingly leaked into other areas of public law. Elements of the constitution which are not directly and inherently linked to national security nevertheless become (by both accident and design) implicated in the state’s national security endeavours, with significant and at times far-reaching consequences for the constitutional order generally. A renewed and strengthened concern for national security since September 2001 has, it is argued, dragged into its orbit a variety of constitutional phenomena and altered them in its image, giving rise to what we might call a national security constitution.

This book explores the implications of freedom as a non-domination-oriented view for understanding EU security regulation and its constitutional implications. At a time when the European borders are under pressure and with the refugee and migration crisis, which escalated in 2015, the idea of exploring a constitutional theory for the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) might seem to be a utopian project. This appears especially true in the light of the increased threat of terrorism in Europe (and on a global scale) and where the expanding EU security agenda is often advanced through the administrative law path, in contrast to the constitutional trajectory. Add to this the prolonged financial crisis, which continues to cast a long shadow on the future development of EU integration, and which suggests that Europe needs to ‘re-invent itself’ beyond the sphere of economics. Therefore, it is precisely because of the current uncertainties regarding the progress of the EU and the constitutional law project that a constitutional take on the AFSJ is of particular importance. The book investigates the meaning of non-domination and the idea of justice and justification in the area of EU security regulation. In doing so, it focuses on the development of an AFSJ, what it means, and why it represents a fascinating example of contemporary constitutional law with interacting layers of security regulation, human rights law and transnational legal theory at its core.

This book examines the constitutional treatment of national security in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These four states share their Commonwealth heritage and are members, alongside the USA, of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance. The book takes a comparative approach to the institutions through which, and tools with which, these four states seek to protect their national security against the threats of both terrorism and hostile state activity and how they have evolved over time. It identifies and examines the various specialised institutions, inside and outside of legislatures, which have grown up to oversee the exercise of public power for national security purposes while maintaining the required secrecy. It argues that the extent of the borrowing and sharing between these jurisdictions in the domain of national security, now and in the past, permits us to talk about a Commonwealth model of national security constitutionalism.

This book examines the constitutional treatment of national security in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These four states share their Commonwealth heritage and are members, alongside the USA, of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance. The book takes a comparative approach to the institutions through which, and tools with which, these four states seek to protect their national security against the threats of both terrorism and hostile state activity and how they have evolved over time. It identifies and examines the various specialised institutions, inside and outside of legislatures, which have grown up to oversee the exercise of public power for national security purposes while maintaining the required secrecy. It argues that the extent of the borrowing and sharing between these jurisdictions in the domain of national security, now and in the past, permits us to talk about a Commonwealth model of national security constitutionalism.

This book is about judicial reasoning in human rights cases. The aim is to explore the question: how is it that notionally universal norms are reasoned by courts in such significantly different ways? What is the shape of this reasoning; which techniques are common across the transnational jurisprudence; and which are particular? The book, comprising contributions by a team of world-leading human rights scholars, moves beyond simply addressing the institutional questions concerning courts and human rights, which often dominate discussions of this kind, seeking instead a deeper examination of the similarities and divergence of reasonings by different courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. These differences, while partly influenced by institutional concerns, cannot be attributed to them alone. This book explores the diverse and rich underlying spectrum of human rights reasoning, as a distinctive and particular form of legal reasoning, evident in the case studies across the selected jurisdictions.