Luke C. Sheahan – författare

First Amendment rights are hailed as the hallmark of the US constitutional system, protecting religious liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. But among these rights, freedom of association holds a tenuous position, as demonstrated in the 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, which upheld a public university's policy requiring groups seeking official recognition to accept all students regardless of their status or beliefs. This demotion of freedom of association has broad ramifications for the constitutional status of voluntary associations in civil society, Luke C. Sheahan suggests. His book offers a cogent explanation of how this came about, why it matters, and what might be done about it.Sheahan's argument centers upon what he calls the 'First Amendment Dichotomy' in the Court's theoretical framework: an understanding of the state and the individual as the two analytically exclusive units of constitutional analysis. Why Associations Matter traces this dichotomy through Supreme Court jurisprudence culminating in Martinez, revealing a pattern of free association treated only as an individual right of expressive association derived from the Speech Clause alone. Sheahan then draws on the political sociology of Robert Nisbet to make a case for recognizing the social importance of associations and institutions that cannot be reduced to their individual members or subsumed into the state for purposes of constitutional analysis.Translating the sociological qualities of associations into jurisprudential categories, Why Associations Matter provides practical advice for protecting freedom of association through the judiciary and the legislature - and guaranteeing this fundamental right its proper place in American society.

First Amendment rights are hailed as the hallmark of the US constitutional system, protecting religious liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. But among these rights, freedom of association holds a tenuous position, as demonstrated in the 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, which upheld a public university’s policy requiring groups seeking official recognition to accept all students regardless of their status or beliefs. This demotion of freedom of association has broad ramifications for the constitutional status of voluntary associations in civil society, Luke C. Sheahan suggests. His book offers a cogent explanation of how this came about, why it matters, and what might be done about it.Sheahan’s argument centers upon what he calls the “First Amendment Dichotomy” in the Court’s theoretical framework: an understanding of the state and the individual as the two analytically exclusive units of constitutional analysis. Why Associations Matter traces this dichotomy through Supreme Court jurisprudence culminating in Martinez, revealing a pattern of free association treated only as an individual right of expressive association derived from the Speech Clause alone. Sheahan then draws on the political sociology of Robert Nisbet to make a case for recognizing the social importance of associations and institutions that cannot be reduced to their individual members or subsumed into the state for purposes of constitutional analysis.Translating the sociological qualities of associations into jurisprudential categories, Why Associations Matter provides practical advice for protecting freedom of association through the judiciary and the legislature—and guaranteeing this fundamental right its proper place in American society.

This book explores controversies surrounding free speech and open inquiry (FSOI) in various regions of the Anglophone world. The authors argue that the past decade has seen a noticeable erosion of FSOI across the globe, aided and abetted by university clerisies and state apparatuses. These groups’ policing of language and pandering to cancel culture, the authors argue, have narrowed the Overton window to the point of reinvigorating the push for blasphemy law within liberal democracies themselves and impeding certain avenues scientific research. While most books on the subject discuss the American constitutional context of the First Amendment, this book considers free speech in the wider context of other Anglo countries. It also includes scholars from a variety of disciplines whose approaches will not only be ideologically distinct, but demonstrate a diversity of disciplinary approaches and concerns.

This book explores controversies surrounding free speech and open inquiry (FSOI) in various regions of the Anglophone world. The authors argue that the past decade has seen a noticeable erosion of FSOI across the globe, aided and abetted by university clerisies and state apparatuses. These groups’ policing of language and pandering to cancel culture, the authors argue, have narrowed the Overton window to the point of reinvigorating the push for blasphemy law within liberal democracies themselves and impeding certain avenues scientific research. While most books on the subject discuss the American constitutional context of the First Amendment, this book considers free speech in the wider context of other Anglo countries. It also includes scholars from a variety of disciplines whose approaches will not only be ideologically distinct, but demonstrate a diversity of disciplinary approaches and concerns.

This two-volume set addresses freedom of association, one of the central liberties associated with classical liberalism. The concept of freedom of association has been largely neglected by political and moral philosophers over the past several centuries, despite the fact that the freedom to associate with fellow citizens (and non-citizens) is an implication of almost every version of liberalism capaciously considered.  These two volumes take freedom of association seriously both as a theoretical concept and as an integral part of any genuine liberal regime. This first volume considers freedom of association from a theoretical perspective. It considers the freedom of association in conversation with negative liberty, moral pluralism, communitarianism, polycentric democracy, and republicanism.

This two-volume set addresses freedom of association, one of the central liberties associated with classical liberalism. The concept of freedom of association has been largely neglected by political and moral philosophers over the past several centuries, despite the fact that the freedom to associate with fellow citizens (and non-citizens) is an implication of almost every version of liberalism capaciously considered.  These two volumes take freedom of association seriously both as a theoretical concept and as an integral part of any genuine liberal regime. This first volume considers freedom of association from a theoretical perspective. It considers the freedom of association in conversation with negative liberty, moral pluralism, communitarianism, polycentric democracy, and republicanism.

This two-volume set addresses freedom of association, one of the central liberties associated with classical liberalism. The concept of freedom of association has been largely neglected by political and moral philosophers over the past several centuries, despite the fact that the freedom to associate with fellow citizens (and non-citizens) is an implication of almost every version of liberalism capaciously considered. These two volumes take freedom of association seriously both as a theoretical concept and as an integral part of any genuine liberal regime. This second volume considers freedom of association from an applied perspective. It considers the freedom of association in conversation with various theorists (including Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Tocqueville) and in the context of specific case studies.