In The New Politics of Public Policy, Marc Landy and Martin Levin bring together a group of leading experts to challenge the view of the Bush-Reagan era as one characterised by policy gridlock. They demonstrate that there were a surprising number of impressive policy outcomes and that many were not in the least "conservative." The number and scope of these innovations, they argue, refute the conventional wisdom that the policy process in those years was biased against change, dominated by obstructionary interests, and characterised by incrementalism. The authors examine the most important arenas of modem domestic policy reform - health, entitlements, environment, and taxation as well as the changes that have taken place in the key policy-making institutions of Congress, the executive branch, the states, and the courts. They provide in-depth investigations of the 1986 and 1990 immigration Reforrn Acts, the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Aid to Children with Special Needs, the Superfund, and the Clean Air Act.They show how changes in Congressional structure affect the representation of interests, deliberation, and the resolution of conflict and how these effects, in turn, influence the passage of legislation. They explain how the replacement of on-budget funding by mandates requiring others to pay has made it easier to enact expensive laws and regulations. Most importantly, they demonstrate that a new politics of public policy has emerged - one characterised by a competition for novel ideas, a lowering of the legitimacy barrier regarding governmental intervention, and a broader understanding of rights.

Promoting competition has been a leading theme of public policy over the past 30 years. In the United States, the movement began in the 1970s with efforts to rewrite the rules for aviation, trucking, and telecommunications. Since then, many other industries have come in for similar treatment, with banking, securities, agriculture, and energy heading the list. This trend is often described as ""deregulation,"" but ""market design"" is a better term. Promoting competition is not just about removing legal controls and then getting out of the way. It also requires that policymakers consciously design new markets, often with significant rules and regulations to promote efficiency. In Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics and Economics of Regulatory Reform, leading experts from academia, government, and the private sector evaluate more than a dozen efforts at market design. The contributors to this volume analyze a broad range of sectors, including airlines, electricity, education, and pensions. They examine developments in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan, as well as the United States. In each case, the authors ask three critical questions: Can markets be designed? How significant are the impediments to competition found in different sectors? And how do the politics of market design shape the policies that result? Taken together, these chapters help explain why few recent cases of market design have proven to be as unambiguously successful or as relatively uncontroversial as the deregulation of trucking, airlines, and telecommunications. They also provide valuable lessons for future participants in the never-ending process of market construction and redesign. Rich in analysis and detail, Creating Competitive Markets is essential reading for anyone interested in regulatory politics and policy. Contributors include John Cioffi (University of California-Riverside), Darius Gaskins (Norbridge, Inc.), Jacob Hacker (Yale University), Udi Helman (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), Frederick Hess (American Enterprise Institute), Edward Iacobucci (University of Toronto), Alan Jacobs (University of British Columbia), Michael Levine (New York University), Jonathan Macey (Yale University), Richard O'Neill (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), Eric Patashnik (University of Virginia), Andrew Rich (City College of New York), Peter Schuck (Yale University), Steven Teles (Yale University), Michael Trebilcock (University of Toronto), Steven Vogel (University of California-Berkeley), Graham Wilson (University of Wisconsin), and Ralph A. Winter (University of British Columbia).

In The New Politics of Public Policy, Marc Landy and Martin Levin bring together a group of leading experts to challenge the view of the Bush-Reagan era as one characterised by policy gridlock. They demonstrate that there were a surprising number of impressive policy outcomes and that many were not in the least "conservative." The number and scope of these innovations, they argue, refute the conventional wisdom that the policy process in those years was biased against change, dominated by obstructionary interests, and characterised by incrementalism. The authors examine the most important arenas of modem domestic policy reform - health, entitlements, environment, and taxation as well as the changes that have taken place in the key policy-making institutions of Congress, the executive branch, the states, and the courts. They provide in-depth investigations of the 1986 and 1990 immigration Reforrn Acts, the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Aid to Children with Special Needs, the Superfund, and the Clean Air Act.They show how changes in Congressional structure affect the representation of interests, deliberation, and the resolution of conflict and how these effects, in turn, influence the passage of legislation. They explain how the replacement of on-budget funding by mandates requiring others to pay has made it easier to enact expensive laws and regulations. Most importantly, they demonstrate that a new politics of public policy has emerged - one characterised by a competition for novel ideas, a lowering of the legitimacy barrier regarding governmental intervention, and a broader understanding of rights.

Promoting competition has been a leading theme of public policy over the past 30 years. In the United States, the movement began in the 1970s with efforts to rewrite the rules for aviation, trucking, and telecommunications. Since then, many other industries have come in for similar treatment, with banking, securities, agriculture, and energy heading the list. This trend is often described as ""deregulation,"" but ""market design"" is a better term. Promoting competition is not just about removing legal controls and then getting out of the way. It also requires that policymakers consciously design new markets, often with significant rules and regulations to promote efficiency. In Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics and Economics of Regulatory Reform, leading experts from academia, government, and the private sector evaluate more than a dozen efforts at market design. The contributors to this volume analyze a broad range of sectors, including airlines, electricity, education, and pensions. They examine developments in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan, as well as the United States. In each case, the authors ask three critical questions: Can markets be designed? How significant are the impediments to competition found in different sectors? And how do the politics of market design shape the policies that result? Taken together, these chapters help explain why few recent cases of market design have proven to be as unambiguously successful or as relatively uncontroversial as the deregulation of trucking, airlines, and telecommunications. They also provide valuable lessons for future participants in the never-ending process of market construction and redesign. Rich in analysis and detail, Creating Competitive Markets is essential reading for anyone interested in regulatory politics and policy. Contributors include John Cioffi (University of California-Riverside), Darius Gaskins (Norbridge, Inc.), Jacob Hacker (Yale University), Udi Helman (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), Frederick Hess (American Enterprise Institute), Edward Iacobucci (University of Toronto), Alan Jacobs (University of British Columbia), Michael Levine (New York University), Jonathan Macey (Yale University), Richard O'Neill (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), Eric Patashnik (University of Virginia), Andrew Rich (City College of New York), Peter Schuck (Yale University), Steven Teles (Yale University), Michael Trebilcock (University of Toronto), Steven Vogel (University of California-Berkeley), Graham Wilson (University of Wisconsin), and Ralph A. Winter (University of British Columbia).