Margaret M. Blair – författare

Intangibles are harder to measure, harder to quantify, often more difficult to manage, evaluate, and account for than tangible assets. There is no common language for sharing information about intangible sources of value, and the language used tends to be descriptive rather than quantitative and concrete. Unseen Wealth stresses the importance of developing standards for identifying, measuring, and accounting for intangible assets, and recommends actions to government and business for improving the quality and quantity of available information about intangible investments. The book articulates a three-pronged set of reforms to help companies construct better business and reporting models, improve the quality of financial reporting, and clarify intellectual property right laws. Unseen Wealth was developed by the Brookings Task Force on Intangibles, which includes business leaders, consultants, accounting professionals, economists, intellectual property lawyers, and policy analysts.

Most scholarship on corporate governance in the last two decades has focused on the relationships between shareholders and managers or directors. Neglected in this vast literature is the role of employees in corporate governance. Yet ""human capital,"" embodied in the employees, is rapidly becoming the most important source of value for corporations, and outside the United States, employees often have a significant formal role in corporate governance. This volume turns the spotlight on the neglected role of employees by analyzing many of the formal and informal ways that employees are actually involved in the governance of corporations, in U.S. firms and in large corporations in Germany and Japan. Examining laws and contexts, the essays focus on the framework for understanding employees' role in the firm and the implications for corporate governance. They explore how and why the special legal institutions in German and Japanese firms by which employees are formally involved in corporate governance came into being, and the impact these institutions have on firms and on their ability to compete. They also consider theoretical and empirical questions about employee share ownership. The result of a conference at Columbia University, the volume includes essays by Theodor Baums, Margaret M. Blair, David Charny, Greg Dow, Bernd Frick, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Nobuhiro Hiwatari, Katharina Pistor, Louis Putterman, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, and Michael L. Wachter. Margaret M. Blair is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and author of Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century (Brookings, 1995). Mark J. Roe, professor of business regulation and director of the Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, is the author of Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, 1996).

Human capital and organizational capital are increasingly important as a source of value in many firms. But even as this is happening, organizational forms and employment relationships appear to be changing in ways that reduce loyalty and commitment and encourage mobility on the part of employees. Are these changes consistent in ways that contradict traditional theory and wisdom, or is the corporate sector getting a temporary boost in earnings by restructuring and cutting payrolls; but failing to make necessary new investments in human capital?The essays in this book provide intriguing new evidence on these questions. The contributors quantify the degree to which job stability is declining, and the costs of job loss to long-term workers; provide historical perspective on today's workplace changes; explore the reasons why work is being reorganized and decisionmaking tasks are being pushed downward; examine the rationale for and effect of equity-based compensation systems, both in old industries and in the newest high-tech sectors; and assess the ""state of the art"" of measuring and accounting for investments in human capital.This book is the result of a joint Brookings-MIT conference. In addition to the editors, authors include Eileen Appelbaum, Laurie Bassi, Avner Ben-Ner, Peter Berg, Joseph Blasi, Timothy Bresnahan, Eric Brynjolfsson, Allen Burns, Peter Cappelli, Greg Dow, Lorin Hitt, Douglas Kruse, Baruch Lev, Julia Liebeskind, Jonathon Low, Daniel McMurrer, Louis Putterman, Charles Schultze, and Anthony Siesfeld.

Who should be allowed to call the shots in the boardrooms of U. S. Corporations? And what difference does it make for their growth and profitability? In the last decade, these issues have moved to the center of policy debates about the time horizons and competitiveness of U.S. companies. This book is an indispensable guide through the historical, legal, and institutional background for these corporate governance debates. It explains three broad views on the relationship among the governance, performance, and competitiveness of corporations, and examines the intellectual history, politics, and empirical evidence behind each argument. It also considers the effect that two trends will have on corporate governance: the growth and power of public employees' pension funds and the increase in the economic activity that comes from specialized services and customized production.Blair asserts that companies need to experiment with different governance arrangements, such as choosing directors to represent particular constituencies, or making more radical arrangements like leveraged buyouts or worker-owned companies. Public policy should encourage, or at least not impede, such experimentation.

Corporations are the productive engine of market economies. Yet the rules by which the wealth generated by corporations gets divided between the providers of financial capital and the providers of human capital are poorly understood.In this colloquium, a group of economists, social scientists, lawyers, labor relations specialists, business executives, and executives of financial institutions debate questions about the allocation of risks, returns, and rights in corporations that were raised in Margaret Blair's prior book, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (Brookings, 1995).In addition to Margaret Blair, participants include Bernard Aidinoff, Amatai Etzioni, Ronald Gilson, Martin Ginsburg, Mark Goyder, Oliver Hart, Bruce Householder, Tony Jackson, Bevis Longstreth, Jonathan Low, Bruce MacLaury, Ira Millstein, Nell Minow, Charles Rossotti, Charles Schultze, Kenneth West, and Sidney Winter. Roswell Perkins, of the New York law firm of Debevoise & Plimpton, served as moderator.

Who should be allowed to call the shots in the boardrooms of U. S. Corporations? And what difference does it make for their growth and profitability? In the last decade, these issues have moved to the center of policy debates about the time horizons and competitiveness of U.S. companies. This book is an indispensable guide through the historical, legal, and institutional background for these corporate governance debates. It explains three broad views on the relationship among the governance, performance, and competitiveness of corporations, and examines the intellectual history, politics, and empirical evidence behind each argument. It also considers the effect that two trends will have on corporate governance: the growth and power of public employees' pension funds and the increase in the economic activity that comes from specialized services and customized production.Blair asserts that companies need to experiment with different governance arrangements, such as choosing directors to represent particular constituencies, or making more radical arrangements like leveraged buyouts or worker-owned companies. Public policy should encourage, or at least not impede, such experimentation.

Corporations are the productive engine of market economies. Yet the rules by which the wealth generated by corporations gets divided between the providers of financial capital and the providers of human capital are poorly understood.In this colloquium, a group of economists, social scientists, lawyers, labor relations specialists, business executives, and executives of financial institutions debate questions about the allocation of risks, returns, and rights in corporations that were raised in Margaret Blair's prior book, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (Brookings, 1995).In addition to Margaret Blair, participants include Bernard Aidinoff, Amatai Etzioni, Ronald Gilson, Martin Ginsburg, Mark Goyder, Oliver Hart, Bruce Householder, Tony Jackson, Bevis Longstreth, Jonathan Low, Bruce MacLaury, Ira Millstein, Nell Minow, Charles Rossotti, Charles Schultze, Kenneth West, and Sidney Winter. Roswell Perkins, of the New York law firm of Debevoise & Plimpton, served as moderator.

Human capital and organizational capital are increasingly important as a source of value in many firms. But even as this is happening, organizational forms and employment relationships appear to be changing in ways that reduce loyalty and commitment and encourage mobility on the part of employees. Are these changes consistent in ways that contradict traditional theory and wisdom, or is the corporate sector getting a temporary boost in earnings by restructuring and cutting payrolls; but failing to make necessary new investments in human capital?The essays in this book provide intriguing new evidence on these questions. The contributors quantify the degree to which job stability is declining, and the costs of job loss to long-term workers; provide historical perspective on today's workplace changes; explore the reasons why work is being reorganized and decisionmaking tasks are being pushed downward; examine the rationale for and effect of equity-based compensation systems, both in old industries and in the newest high-tech sectors; and assess the ""state of the art"" of measuring and accounting for investments in human capital.This book is the result of a joint Brookings-MIT conference. In addition to the editors, authors include Eileen Appelbaum, Laurie Bassi, Avner Ben-Ner, Peter Berg, Joseph Blasi, Timothy Bresnahan, Eric Brynjolfsson, Allen Burns, Peter Cappelli, Greg Dow, Lorin Hitt, Douglas Kruse, Baruch Lev, Julia Liebeskind, Jonathon Low, Daniel McMurrer, Louis Putterman, Charles Schultze, and Anthony Siesfeld.

Most scholarship on corporate governance in the last two decades has focused on the relationships between shareholders and managers or directors. Neglected in this vast literature is the role of employees in corporate governance. Yet ""human capital,"" embodied in the employees, is rapidly becoming the most important source of value for corporations, and outside the United States, employees often have a significant formal role in corporate governance. This volume turns the spotlight on the neglected role of employees by analyzing many of the formal and informal ways that employees are actually involved in the governance of corporations, in U.S. firms and in large corporations in Germany and Japan. Examining laws and contexts, the essays focus on the framework for understanding employees' role in the firm and the implications for corporate governance. They explore how and why the special legal institutions in German and Japanese firms by which employees are formally involved in corporate governance came into being, and the impact these institutions have on firms and on their ability to compete. They also consider theoretical and empirical questions about employee share ownership. The result of a conference at Columbia University, the volume includes essays by Theodor Baums, Margaret M. Blair, David Charny, Greg Dow, Bernd Frick, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Nobuhiro Hiwatari, Katharina Pistor, Louis Putterman, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, and Michael L. Wachter. Margaret M. Blair is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and author of Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century (Brookings, 1995). Mark J. Roe, professor of business regulation and director of the Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, is the author of Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, 1996).