Mark Balaguer – författare
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19 produkter
19 produkter
E-bok
Engelska, 1998462 kr
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In this deft and vigorous book, Mark Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism (ie., the view that abstract, or non-spatio-temporal, mathematical objects exist, and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects). Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible positions. In Part I, he shows that the former is defensible by introducing a novel version of platonism, which he calls full-blooded platonism, or FBP. He argues that if platonists endorse FBP, they can then solve all of the problems traditionally associated with their view, most notably the two Benacerrafian problems (that is, the epistemological problem and the non-uniqueness problem). In Part II, Balaguer defends anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, chief among them the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Balaguer''s version of fictionalism bears similarities to Hartry Field''s, but the arguments Balaguer uses to defend this view are very different. Parts I and II of this book taken together clearly establish that we do not have any good argument for or against platonism. In Part III, Balaguer extends his conclusions, arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument for or against platonism, but that we could never have such an argument, and indeed, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether platonism is correct (ie., whether there exist any abstract objects). This lucid and accessibly written book breaks new ground in its area of engagement and makes vital reading for both specialists and anyone else interested in the philosophy of mathematics or metaphysics in general.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20211 073 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question. (More specifically, Mark Balaguer argues that there''s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects--or material objects of any other kind.) Second, Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions--call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.--such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows: non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there''s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can''t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that''s metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn''t say anything about reality and, if it''s true, isn''t made true by reality
E-bok
Engelska, 20211 073 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question. (More specifically, Mark Balaguer argues that there''s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects--or material objects of any other kind.) Second, Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions--call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.--such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows: non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there''s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can''t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that''s metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn''t say anything about reality and, if it''s true, isn''t made true by reality
Inbunden, Engelska, 1998
725 kr
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Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument for or against platonism, but that we could never have such an argument and, indeed, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether platonism is correct.
Häftad, Engelska, 2001
740 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
In this deft and vigorous book, Mark Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism (i.e., the view that abstract, or non-spatio-temporal, mathematical objects exist, and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects). Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible positions. In Part I, he shows that the former is defensible by introducing a novel version of platonism, which he calls full-blooded platonism, or FBP. He argues that if platonists endorse FBP, they can then solve all of the problems traditionally associated with their view, most notably the two Benacerrafian problems (that is, the epistemological problem and the non-uniqueness problem).In Part II, Balaguer defends anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, chief among them the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Balaguer's version of fictionalism bears similarities to Hartry Field's, but the arguments Balaguer uses to defend this view are very different. Parts I and II of this book taken together clearly establish that we do not have any good argument for or against platonism. In Part III, Balaguer extends his conclusions, arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument for or against platonism, but that we could never have such an argument, and indeed, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether platonism is correct (ie., whether there exist any abstract objects). This lucid and accessibly written book breaks new ground in its area of engagement and makes vital reading for both specialists and anyone else interested in the philosophy of mathematics or metaphysics in general.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 1998462 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
In this deft and vigorous book, Mark Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism (ie., the view that abstract, or non-spatio-temporal, mathematical objects exist, and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects). Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible positions. In Part I, he shows that the former is defensible by introducing a novel version of platonism, which he calls full-blooded platonism, or FBP. He argues that if platonists endorse FBP, they can then solve all of the problems traditionally associated with their view, most notably the two Benacerrafian problems (that is, the epistemological problem and the non-uniqueness problem). In Part II, Balaguer defends anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, chief among them the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Balaguer''s version of fictionalism bears similarities to Hartry Field''s, but the arguments Balaguer uses to defend this view are very different. Parts I and II of this book taken together clearly establish that we do not have any good argument for or against platonism. In Part III, Balaguer extends his conclusions, arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument for or against platonism, but that we could never have such an argument, and indeed, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether platonism is correct (ie., whether there exist any abstract objects). This lucid and accessibly written book breaks new ground in its area of engagement and makes vital reading for both specialists and anyone else interested in the philosophy of mathematics or metaphysics in general.
- Nyhet
Inbunden, Engelska, 2026
946 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist and that there are no past or future objects. In How to Be a Presentist, Mark Balaguer defends presentism against numerous objections, most notably, the ontological-commitment objection, the truthmaking objection, and the special-relativity objection. More specifically, this book argues that (i) presentists can respond to the ontological-commitment objection by endorsing a very general and systematic error theory about much of our ordinary and scientific discourse about the past and future; that (ii) presentists can plausibly and defensibly respond to the truthmaking objection by rejecting the relevant truthmaking principles; and that (iii) presentists can respond to the special-relativity objection not by endorsing the existence of a privileged frame of reference but by relativizing their view.In addition to defending presentism against objections, Balaguer argues for two other substantive theses. First, he argues for the metaphilosophical (and anti-metaphysical) view that the question of whether presentism is true is an ordinary empirical question about the nature of physical reality and that this question can't be settled by a priori philosophical arguments. Second, Balaguer argues that presentists should reject the existence of time, times (including the present time), and temporal passage. From this it follows that presentists should reject standard versions of the A-theory—which is surprising because it's widely believed that presentism entails the A-theory.The version of presentism developed in this book is a metaphysically thin, ontologically parsimonious view that can be thought of as an ordinary empirical hypothesis—a profoundly different view from other versions of presentism in the literature.
E-bok
Engelska, 2026895 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist and that there are no past or future objects. In How to Be a Presentist, Mark Balaguer defends presentism against numerous objections, most notably, the ontological-commitment objection, the truthmaking objection, and the special-relativity objection. More specifically, this book argues that (i) presentists can respond to the ontological-commitment objection by endorsing a very general and systematic error theory about much of our ordinary and scientific discourse about the past and future; that (ii) presentists can plausibly and defensibly respond to the truthmaking objection by rejecting the relevant truthmaking principles; and that (iii) presentists can respond to the special-relativity objection not by endorsing the existence of a privileged frame of reference but by relativizing their view. In addition to defending presentism against objections, Balaguer argues for two other substantive theses. First, he argues for the metaphilosophical (and anti-metaphysical) view that the question of whether presentism is true is an ordinary empirical question about the nature of physical reality and that this question can't be settled by a priori philosophical arguments. Second, Balaguer argues that presentists should reject the existence of time, times (including the present time), and temporal passage. From this it follows that presentists should reject standard versions of the A-theory which is surprising because it's widely believed that presentism entails the A-theory. The version of presentism developed in this book is a metaphysically thin, ontologically parsimonious view that can be thought of as an ordinary empirical hypothesis a profoundly different view from other versions of presentism in the literature.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2026895 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist and that there are no past or future objects. In How to Be a Presentist, Mark Balaguer defends presentism against numerous objections, most notably, the ontological-commitment objection, the truthmaking objection, and the special-relativity objection. More specifically, this book argues that (i) presentists can respond to the ontological-commitment objection by endorsing a very general and systematic error theory about much of our ordinary and scientific discourse about the past and future; that (ii) presentists can plausibly and defensibly respond to the truthmaking objection by rejecting the relevant truthmaking principles; and that (iii) presentists can respond to the special-relativity objection not by endorsing the existence of a privileged frame of reference but by relativizing their view. In addition to defending presentism against objections, Balaguer argues for two other substantive theses. First, he argues for the metaphilosophical (and anti-metaphysical) view that the question of whether presentism is true is an ordinary empirical question about the nature of physical reality and that this question can't be settled by a priori philosophical arguments. Second, Balaguer argues that presentists should reject the existence of time, times (including the present time), and temporal passage. From this it follows that presentists should reject standard versions of the A-theory which is surprising because it's widely believed that presentism entails the A-theory. The version of presentism developed in this book is a metaphysically thin, ontologically parsimonious view that can be thought of as an ordinary empirical hypothesis a profoundly different view from other versions of presentism in the literature.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2021
1 333 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question. (More specifically, Mark Balaguer argues that there's no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects--or material objects of any other kind.) Second, Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions--call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.--such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows: non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there's no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can't be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that's metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn't say anything about reality and, if it's true, isn't made true by reality
E-bok
Engelska, 2012278 kr
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An argument that the problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.
In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will.
The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he argues that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the libertarian question reduces to a question about indeterminacy—in particular, to a straightforward empirical question about whether certain neural events in our heads are causally undetermined in a certain specific way; in other words, Balaguer argues that the right kind of indeterminacy would bring with it all of the other requirements for libertarian free will. Finally, he argues that because there is no good evidence as to whether or not the relevant neural events are undetermined in the way that''s required, the question of whether human beings possess libertarian free will is a wide-open empirical question.
E-bok
Engelska, 2014225 kr
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A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it.
In our daily life, it really seems as though we have free will, that what we do from moment to moment is determined by conscious decisions that we freely make. You get up from the couch, you go for a walk, you eat chocolate ice cream. It seems that we''re in control of actions like these; if we are, then we have free will. But in recent years, some have argued that free will is an illusion. The neuroscientist (and best-selling author) Sam Harris and the late Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner, for example, claim that certain scientific findings disprove free will. In this engaging and accessible volume in the Essential Knowledge series, the philosopher Mark Balaguer examines the various arguments and experiments that have been cited to support the claim that human beings don''t have free will. He finds them to be overstated and misguided.
Balaguer discusses determinism, the view that every physical event is predetermined, or completely caused by prior events. He describes several philosophical and scientific arguments against free will, including one based on Benjamin Libet''s famous neuroscientific experiments, which allegedly show that our conscious decisions are caused by neural events that occur before we choose. He considers various religious and philosophical views, including the philosophical pro-free-will view known as compatibilism. Balaguer concludes that the anti-free-will arguments put forward by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists simply don''t work. They don''t provide any good reason to doubt the existence of free will. But, he cautions, this doesn''t necessarily mean that we have free will. The question of whether we have free will remains an open one; we simply don''t know enough about the brain to answer it definitively.
Häftad, Engelska, 2014
190 kr
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A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it.In our daily life, it really seems as though we have free will, that what we do from moment to moment is determined by conscious decisions that we freely make. You get up from the couch, you go for a walk, you eat chocolate ice cream. It seems that we're in control of actions like these; if we are, then we have free will. But in recent years, some have argued that free will is an illusion. The neuroscientist (and best-selling author) Sam Harris and the late Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner, for example, claim that certain scientific findings disprove free will. In this engaging and accessible volume in the Essential Knowledge series, the philosopher Mark Balaguer examines the various arguments and experiments that have been cited to support the claim that human beings don't have free will. He finds them to be overstated and misguided.Balaguer discusses determinism, the view that every physical event is predetermined, or completely caused by prior events. He describes several philosophical and scientific arguments against free will, including one based on Benjamin Libet's famous neuroscientific experiments, which allegedly show that our conscious decisions are caused by neural events that occur before we choose. He considers various religious and philosophical views, including the philosophical pro-free-will view known as compatibilism. Balaguer concludes that the anti-free-will arguments put forward by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists simply don't work. They don't provide any good reason to doubt the existence of free will. But, he cautions, this doesn't necessarily mean that we have free will. The question of whether we have free will remains an open one; we simply don't know enough about the brain to answer it definitively.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2023284 kr
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This Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and (b) it''s not clear that the truth of these modal claims is compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that there''s only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true.
Häftad, Engelska, 2023
238 kr
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This Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and (b) it's not clear that the truth of these modal claims is compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that there's only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true.
E-bok
Engelska, 2023284 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and (b) it''s not clear that the truth of these modal claims is compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that there''s only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true.
Häftad, Spanska, 2021
161 kr
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E-bok
Spanska, 202184 kr
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Un filósofo considera si los argumentos científicos y filosóficos contra el libre albedrío son razón suficiente para renunciar a nuestra fe en él.En nuestra vida diaria, realmente pareciera que tenemos libre albedrío, que lo que hacemos de un momento a otro está determinado por decisiones conscientes que tomamos libremente. Te levantas del sofá, sales a caminar, comes helado de chocolate. Pareciera que tenemos el control de acciones como estas; si lo tenemos, entonces gozamos de libre albedrío. Pero en los últimos años, algunos han argumentado que el libre albedrío es una ilusión. El neurocientífico (y autor de best-sellers) Sam Harris y el fallecido psicólogo de Harvard Daniel Wegner, por ejemplo, afirman que ciertos hallazgos científicos refutan el libre albedrío. En este atractivo y accesible volumen de la serie Conocimientos esenciales, el filósofo Mark Balaguer examina los diversos argumentos y experimentos que se han citado para respaldar la afirmación de que los seres humanos no tienen libre albedrío y que él considera exagerados y equivocados.Balaguer discute el determinismo, la visión de que todo evento físico está predeterminado o es causado completamente por eventos anteriores. Describe varios argumentos filosóficos y científicos contra el libre albedrío, incluido uno basado en los famosos experimentos neurocientíficos de Benjamin Libet, que supuestamente muestran que nuestras decisiones conscientes son causadas por eventos neuronales que ocurren antes de que elijamos. Considera varios puntos de vista religiosos y filosóficos, incluido el compatibilismo. Balaguer concluye que los argumentos en contra del libre albedrío presentados por filósofos, psicólogos y neurocientíficos simplemente no funcionan. No proporcionan ninguna buena razón para dudar de su existencia. Pero, advierte, que eso tampoco significa necesariamente que lo tengamos. La pregunta de si tenemos libre albedrío sigue abierta; simplemente no sabemos lo suficiente sobre el cerebro para poder responderla definitivamente.
Häftad, Engelska, 2012
99 kr
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