Michaela Hailbronner – författare

German constitutionalism has gained a central place in the global comparative debate, but what underpins it remains imperfectly understood. Its distinctive conception of the rule of law and the widespread support for its powerful Constitutional Court are typically explained in one of two ways: as a story of change in reaction to National Socialism, or as the continuation of an older nineteenth-century line of constitutional thought that emphasizes the function ofconstitutional law as a constraint on state power. But while both narratives account for some important features, their explanatory value is ultimately overrated.This book adopts a broader comparative perspective to understand the rise of the German Constitutional Court. It interprets the particular features of German constitutional jurisprudence and the Court''s strength as a reconciliation of two different legal paradigms: first, a hierarchical legal culture as described by Mirjan Damaska, building on Max Weber, as opposed to a more co-ordinate understanding of legal authority such as prevails in the United States, and secondly, the turn towards atransformative understanding of constitutionalism, as it is today most often associated with countries such as South Africa and India.Using post-war legal history and sociological and empirical research in addition to case law, this book demonstrates how German constitutionalism has harmonized the frequently conflicting demands of these two legal paradigms, resulting in a distinctive type of constitutional reasoning, at once open, pragmatic, formalist, and technical, which this book labels Value Formalism. Value Formalism, however, also comes with serious drawbacks, such as a lack of institutional self-reflection in theCourt''s jurisprudence and a closure of constitutional discourse to laymen, whom it excludes from the realm of legitimate interpreters.

German constitutionalism has gained a central place in the global comparative debate, but what underpins it remains imperfectly understood. Its distinctive conception of the rule of law and the widespread support for its powerful Constitutional Court are typically explained in one of two ways: as a story of change in reaction to National Socialism, or as the continuation of an older nineteenth-century line of constitutional thought that emphasizes the function ofconstitutional law as a constraint on state power. But while both narratives account for some important features, their explanatory value is ultimately overrated.This book adopts a broader comparative perspective to understand the rise of the German Constitutional Court. It interprets the particular features of German constitutional jurisprudence and the Court''s strength as a reconciliation of two different legal paradigms: first, a hierarchical legal culture as described by Mirjan Damaska, building on Max Weber, as opposed to a more co-ordinate understanding of legal authority such as prevails in the United States, and secondly, the turn towards atransformative understanding of constitutionalism, as it is today most often associated with countries such as South Africa and India.Using post-war legal history and sociological and empirical research in addition to case law, this book demonstrates how German constitutionalism has harmonized the frequently conflicting demands of these two legal paradigms, resulting in a distinctive type of constitutional reasoning, at once open, pragmatic, formalist, and technical, which this book labels Value Formalism. Value Formalism, however, also comes with serious drawbacks, such as a lack of institutional self-reflection in theCourt''s jurisprudence and a closure of constitutional discourse to laymen, whom it excludes from the realm of legitimate interpreters.

Comparative constitutionalism emerged in its current form against the backdrop of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. As that backdrop recedes into the past, it is being replaced by a more multi-polar and confusing world, and the current state of the discipline of comparative constitutionalism reflects this fragmentation and uncertainty. This has opened up space for new, more varied, and increasingly critical voices seeking to improve the project of democratic constitutionalism. But it also raises questions: What of the past, if anything, is worth preserving? Which more recent parts should be defining of the field?In this context, this book asks which are - or should be - the canonical texts of comparative constitutionalism. The theoretical scope of the contributions is broad and ambitious, selecting primary material from beyond the existing textbooks to engage the concept of a canon. This framework provides significant insights about inclusion and exclusion, and proposes candidates for canonical and anti-canonical materials. The result is a wide-ranging discussion, among many voices, of how particular judgments and other primary texts have shaped or should shape our understanding of central elements of democratic constitutionalism from a comparative law perspective. This book is not a prescription of one universal understanding, but a broader conversation about the field and the future of constitutional democracy.

German constitutionalism has gained a central place in the global comparative debate, but what underpins it remains imperfectly understood. Its distinctive conception of the rule of law and the widespread support for its powerful Constitutional Court are typically explained in one of two ways: as a story of change in reaction to National Socialism, or as the continuation of an older nineteenth-century line of constitutional thought that emphasizes the function of constitutional law as a constraint on state power. But while both narratives account for some important features, their explanatory value is ultimately overrated.This book adopts a broader comparative perspective to understand the rise of the German Constitutional Court. It interprets the particular features of German constitutional jurisprudence and the Court's strength as a reconciliation of two different legal paradigms: first, a hierarchical legal culture as described by Mirjan Damaska, building on Max Weber, as opposed to a more co-ordinate understanding of legal authority such as prevails in the United States, and secondly, the turn towards a transformative understanding of constitutionalism, as it is today most often associated with countries such as South Africa and India.Using post-war legal history and sociological and empirical research in addition to case law, this book demonstrates how German constitutionalism has harmonized the frequently conflicting demands of these two legal paradigms, resulting in a distinctive type of constitutional reasoning, at once open, pragmatic, formalist, and technical, which this book labels Value Formalism. Value Formalism, however, also comes with serious drawbacks, such as a lack of institutional self-reflection in the Court's jurisprudence and a closure of constitutional discourse to laymen, whom it excludes from the realm of legitimate interpreters.

Arguments from failure - arguments that an institution must expand its powers because another institution is failing in some way 'to do its job' - are commonplace. From structural reform litigation, where courts sometimes assume administrative or legislative functions, to the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the UN General Assembly, to the recent bill quashing British subpostmasters' convictions - such arguments are offered in justification for unorthodox exercises of public power. But in spite of their popularity, we lack a good understanding of these arguments in legal terms. This is partly because failure itself is a highly malleable concept and partly because arguments from failure blur into other more familiar legal doctrines about implied powers or emergencies. We can do better. We should recognize arguments from failure as a distinct concept of public law and understand that contemporary constitutional theory offers us tools to evaluate such arguments in different settings This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.