Motsamai Molefe – författare

This book analyzes the concepts of moral status and human dignity in African philosophy and applies them to the moral problems associated with death.

The book first challenges the criticism and rejection of moral status in African philosophy and then continues to consider how moral personhood is defined in African ethical theories, investigating which entities have full moral status or moral personhood and are therefore worthy of full ethical consideration. It then applies this theory to the problems associated with death. In the medical context, will an African theory of moral status permit or forbid euthanasia? Do we have moral obligations towards dead human bodies? Overall, the book provides an important African axiological contribution to debates on global ethics and moral philosophy.

Providing an important overview of the ethical problems associated with the biological fact of death, this book will be of interest to researchers across the fields of philosophy and African studies.

This book analyzes the concepts of moral status and human dignity in African philosophy and applies them to the moral problems associated with death.

The book first challenges the criticism and rejection of moral status in African philosophy and then continues to consider how moral personhood is defined in African ethical theories, investigating which entities have full moral status or moral personhood and are therefore worthy of full ethical consideration. It then applies this theory to the problems associated with death. In the medical context, will an African theory of moral status permit or forbid euthanasia? Do we have moral obligations towards dead human bodies? Overall, the book provides an important African axiological contribution to debates on global ethics and moral philosophy.

Providing an important overview of the ethical problems associated with the biological fact of death, this book will be of interest to researchers across the fields of philosophy and African studies.

This book provides a philosophical exposition of Ubuntu ethics, which it does by explaining the saying ‘a person is a person through other persons’. Written by one of the world’s leading scholars of African philosophy, the book first argues that the focus on umuntu (or, a person) in Ubuntu ethics as intrinsically valuable makes ethical humanism and human dignity vitally important. The book then goes on to consider the role of virtue ethics in driving an ideal of moral perfectionism. This, in turn, provides the basis for what a good society should be: a needs-based political theory. Providing an important guide through Ubuntu ethics as a moral system constructed in terms of moral perfectionism, it will be an important read for researchers of African philosophy, and of the philosophy of virtue ethics and moral perfectionism more generally.

This book provides a philosophical exposition of Ubuntu ethics, which it does by explaining the saying ‘a person is a person through other persons’. Written by one of the world’s leading scholars of African philosophy, the book first argues that the focus on umuntu (or, a person) in Ubuntu ethics as intrinsically valuable makes ethical humanism and human dignity vitally important. The book then goes on to consider the role of virtue ethics in driving an ideal of moral perfectionism. This, in turn, provides the basis for what a good society should be: a needs-based political theory. Providing an important guide through Ubuntu ethics as a moral system constructed in terms of moral perfectionism, it will be an important read for researchers of African philosophy, and of the philosophy of virtue ethics and moral perfectionism more generally.

This book explores the salient ethical idea of personhood in African philosophy. It is a philosophical exposition that pursues the ethical and political consequences of the normative idea of personhood as a robust or even foundational ethical category. Personhood refers to the moral achievements of the moral agent usually captured in terms of a virtuous character, which have consequences for both morality and politics. The aim is not to argue for the plausibility of the ethical and political consequences of the idea of personhood. Rather, the book showcases some of the moral-political content and consequences of the account it presents.

This book articulates an African conception of dignity in light of the salient axiological category of personhood in African cultures. The idea of personhood embodies a moral system for evaluating human lives exuding with virtue or ones that are morally excellent. This book argues that this idea of personhood embodies an under-explored conception of dignity, which accounts for it in terms of our capacity for the virtue of sympathy. It then proceeds to apply this personhood-based conception of dignity to bioethical questions, specifically, those of abortion and euthanasia. Regarding abortion, it concludes that it is impermissible since foetuses possess partial moral status. Regarding euthanasia, it argues that it is permissible for reasons revolving around avoiding the reversing of personhood. It also, though, minimally, touches on the questions regarding the mentally disabled and animals, to which it assigns lower moral status.

This book focuses on the domains of moral philosophy, political philosophy, and political theory within African philosophy. At the heart of the volume is a call to imagine African political philosophy as embodying a needs-based political vision. While discourses in African political philosophy have fixated on the normative framework of human rights law to articulate demands for social and global justice, this book charts a new frontier in African political thought by turning from ‘rights’ to ‘needs.’ The authors aim to re-orient discourses in African philosophy beyond the impasse of rights-based confrontations to shift the conversation toward needs as a cornerstone of African political theory.