M.V. Slors – författare

"The Diachronic Mind" makes an original contribution to philosophical debate on the nature of personal identity and the reducibility of the mind. It traces traditional problems facing psychological continuity theories of personal identity to the ease with which theorists of personal identity adopt and apply a sometimes naive physicalism about the mind. This novel diagnosis opens that way to new solutions to traditional problems in the debate on the psychological criterion of personal identity. Through these solutions, an unorthodox version of nonreductive physicalism about the mind-brain relation is developed that avoids the recurrent epiphenomenalism objection to such positions. The book is written in a style that presupposes no more than an elementary knowledge of philosophy. It is intended for students and professional philosophers alike.

This volume is the result of an interdisciplinary exchange between philosophers of identity, moral philosophers, philosophers of education, moral psychologists, and post-modern deconstructivists on the subject of personal and moral identity. The contributions to the first part of the book reflect on the implications of discussions in philosophy of identity for moral theory and the view of moral identity. In the second part the focus shifts to the philosophical and psychological perspectives on the concepts of self, personal and moral identity and their interrelation. It is argued that both perspectives are needed for giving an account of the emergence of moral identity as part of someone's development into a mature person. The contributions to the third part absorb the criticism of (de)constructivist theories on essentialist conceptions of personal and social identity. This book will be of interest for philosophers and psychologists active in research on identity, self, (moral) development, and related areas.

The Diachronic Mind makes an original contribution to current philosophical debates on the nature of personal identity and the reducibility of the mind. It traces traditional problems facing psychological continuity theories of personal identity to the ease with which theorists of personal identity adopt and apply a sometimes naive physicalism about the mind. This novel diagnosis opens that way to new solutions to traditional problems in the debate on the psychological criterion of personal identity. Through these solutions, an unorthodox version of nonreductive physicalism about the mind-brain relation is developed that avoids the recurrent epiphenomenalism objection to such positions. The book is written in a crisp style that presupposes no more than an elementary knowledge of philosophy. It is intended for students and professional philosophers alike.

This volume is the result of an interdisciplinary exchange between philosophers of identity, moral philosophers, philosophers of education, moral psychologists, and post-modern deconstructivists on the subject of personal and moral identity. This interdisciplinary character makes the book special, compared to other publications on the subject. The contributions to the first part of the book reflect on the implications of discussions in philosophy of identity for moral theory and the view of moral identity. In the second part the focus shifts to the philosophical and psychological perspectives on the concepts of self, personal and moral identity and their interrelation. It is argued that both perspectives are needed for giving an account of the emergence of moral identity as part of someone's development into a mature person. The contributions to the third part absorb the criticism of (de)constructivist theories on essentialist conceptions of personal and social identity. This book will be of interest for philosophers and psychologists active in research on identity, self, (moral) development, and related areas.

The subject of personal and moral identity is at the centre of interest, not only of academic research within disciplines such as philosophy and psychology, but also of everyday thinking. This is why the Neth­ erlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy and the Institute for Ethics of the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam took the initiative to bring together scholars from various disciplines, interested in the subject. The expert-seminar on ''Personal and Moral Identity'' took place from 12-14 January 1999. Financial contributions from the Vrije Universiteit, the Dutch Scientific Organisation (NWO) and the Royal Dutch Academy for the Sciences (KNA W) made the event possible. The chapters in this book either go back to papers presented at the seminar or were written afterwards by participants, inspired by the discussions that took place during the seminar. We are very grateful to Dr. Hendrik Hutter for his assistance in editing the texts and making the manuscript camera-ready. December 2001, The Editors. 1 Introduction Albert W. Musschenga Although scholars studying the identity of persons usually address diverging issues and have different research agendas, there is a grow­ ing awareness that one may benefit from insights and results present in other disciplines dealing with that subject. This explains the enthu­ siastic responses to the invitation of the Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy and the Institute for Ethics of the Vrije Universiteit to participate in a seminar on ''Personal and Moral Identity''.