Nicholas J. Wheeler – författare

The extent to which humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate practice in post-cold war international society is the subject of this book. It maps the changing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention by comparing the international response to cases of humanitarian intervention in the cold war and post-cold war periods. Crucially, the book examines how far international society has recognised humanitarian intervention as a legitimate exception to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention and non-use of force. While there are studies of each case of intervention-in East Pakistan, Cambodia, Uganda, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo-there is no single work that examines them comprehensively in a comparative framework. Each chapter tells a story of intervention that weaves together a study of motives, justifications and outcomes. The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is contested by the ''pluralist'' and ''solidarist'' wings of the English school, and the book charts the stamp of these conceptions on state practice. Solidarism lacks a full-blown theory of humanitarian intervention and the book supplies one. This theory is employed to assess the humanitarian qualifications of the cases of intervention analysed in the book, and this normative assessment is then compared to the moral practices of states. A key focus is to examine how far humanitarian intervention as a legitimate practice is present in the diplomatic dialogue of states. In exploring how far there has been a change of norm in the society of states in the 1990s, the book defends the broad based constructivist claim that state actions will be constrained if they cannot be legitimated, and that new norms enable new practices but do not determine these. The book concludes by considering how far contemporary practices of humanitarian intervention support a new solidarism, and how far this resolves the traditional conflict between order and justice in international society.

How can two states with enemy relations transform their relationship? Nicholas Wheeler argues that the discipline of International Relations has not done a good job of answering this question because its focus has been on the state and the individual levels of analysis. In this ground-breaking book, he argues for the importance of a new level of analysis in trust research the interpersonal relationships between state leaders. In doing so, he makes two key contributions. Firstly, developing a new theory of interpersonal trust that can be applied to the international level, and secondly, showing how this theory contributes to the literature on signalling in IR. The theory of interpersonal trust developed in the book provides a novel response to the central problem identified by signalling theory in IR: whether the receivers of signals interpret them in the way intended by their senders. The author argues that, in fact, trust between two leaders is causally prior to the accurate interpretation of the signals they send with the aim of communicating peaceful intent. Trust, therefore, does away with the problem of the ambiguity of signal interpretation. He goes on to examine exactly how a new relationship of trust emerges between two leaders who represent states with enemy relations: through face-to-face interaction and the crucial process of bonding between them that this makes possible. This powerful new theory of interpersonal trust is applied to three cases: the personal interactions between US and Soviet leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in ending the Cold War; the face-to-face interactions between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in reducing conflict between India and Pakistan in 1998-1999; and the interactions in 2009-10 between Barack Obama and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that failed to achieve a breakthrough in US-Iran nuclear relations.

How can two states with enemy relations transform their relationship? Nicholas Wheeler argues that the discipline of International Relations has not done a good job of answering this question because its focus has been on the state and the individual levels of analysis. In this ground-breaking book, he argues for the importance of a new level of analysis in trust research the interpersonal relationships between state leaders. In doing so, he makes two key contributions. Firstly, developing a new theory of interpersonal trust that can be applied to the international level, and secondly, showing how this theory contributes to the literature on signalling in IR. The theory of interpersonal trust developed in the book provides a novel response to the central problem identified by signalling theory in IR: whether the receivers of signals interpret them in the way intended by their senders. The author argues that, in fact, trust between two leaders is causally prior to the accurate interpretation of the signals they send with the aim of communicating peaceful intent. Trust, therefore, does away with the problem of the ambiguity of signal interpretation. He goes on to examine exactly how a new relationship of trust emerges between two leaders who represent states with enemy relations: through face-to-face interaction and the crucial process of bonding between them that this makes possible. This powerful new theory of interpersonal trust is applied to three cases: the personal interactions between US and Soviet leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in ending the Cold War; the face-to-face interactions between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in reducing conflict between India and Pakistan in 1998-1999; and the interactions in 2009-10 between Barack Obama and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that failed to achieve a breakthrough in US-Iran nuclear relations.

Interpersonal Diplomacy offers a pioneering theory of how emotional connection and trust between world leaders can shape the outcomes of international crises, especially those involving nuclear weapons. Drawing on microsociological theory, particularly Randall Collins' theory of interaction rituals, Holmes and Wheeler show how interpersonal dynamics-such as emotional energy, mutual focus of attention, and bodily co-presence-can foster social bonds that transform adversarial relationships. Challenging dominant structural and psychological explanations of crisis diplomacy, the book demonstrates that leader-to-leader interactions can decisively alter the trajectory of high-stakes confrontations. Through rich case studies-including the relationship between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during the Berlin Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis, and the interpersonal diplomacy between Indian and Pakistani leaders Rajiv Gandhi, Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto, and V.P. Singh, the authors trace how trust was built, tested, and sometimes thwarted. It also explores how leaders may use written communication or virtual technologies to replicate elements of face-to-face diplomacy in contexts where physical meetings are not possible. Timely and theoretically innovative, the book provides scholars and practitioners with a new framework for understanding how human relationships shape the prospects for peace and the future of international order.

Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What military plans were there for using it? This neglected dimension of British nuclear policy is assessed in detail for the first time, using confidential records - including those of the Chiefs of Staff - which have become available for the entire post-war decade.The emergence and evolution of British strategic ideas about nuclear deterrence and targeting are documented and analysed by Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, who also argue that British thinking was distinctive and made a much more substantial impact on nuclear strategy than American accounts would suggest. They reveal that, from a perspective unique to British circumstances and traditions, British officials made a significant contribution to early thinking about nuclear weapons.This study covers the early shift from a 'countervalue' to a damage limitation targeting posture, the assessment of the Soviet threat, the impact of the Korean War, the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, the decision to manufacture a hydrogen weapon in 1954, and the inter-service rivalries in the mid-1950s about the nature and size of the British strategic force. As well as providing a survey of British thinking, it is unusual in its focus on strategic comparisons between Britain and the United States.

The extent to which humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate practice in post-cold war international society is the subject of this book. It maps the changing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention by comparing the international response to cases of humanitarian intervention in the cold war and post-cold war periods. Crucially, the book examines how far international society has recognised humanitarian intervention as a legitimate exception to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention and non-use of force. While there are studies of each case of intervention - in East Pakistan, Cambodia, Uganda, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo - there is no single work that examines them comprehensively in a comparative framework. Each chapter tells a story of intervention that weaves together a study of motives, justifications and outcomes. The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is contested by the 'pluralist' and 'solidarist' wings of the English school, and the book charts the stamp of these conceptions on state practice. Solidarism lacks a full-blown theory of humanitarian intervention and the book supplies one. A key focus is to examine how is humanitarian intervention legitimate in present diplomatic dialogues. In exploring how far there has been a change of norm in the society of states in the 1990s, the book defends the broad based constructivist claim that state actions will be constrained if they cannot be legitimated, and that new norms enable new practices but do not determine these. The book concludes by considering how far contemporary practices of humanitarian intervention support a new solidarism, and how far this resolves the traditional conflict between order and justice in international society.

The extent to which humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate practice in post-cold war international society is the subject of this book. It maps the changing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention by comparing the international response to cases of humanitarian intervention in the cold war and post-cold war periods. Crucially, the book examines how far international society has recognised humanitarian intervention as a legitimate exception to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention and non-use of force. While there are studies of each case of intervention-in East Pakistan, Cambodia, Uganda, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo-there is no single work that examines them comprehensively in a comparative framework. Each chapter tells a story of intervention that weaves together a study of motives, justifications and outcomes. The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is contested by the 'pluralist' and 'solidarist' wings of the English school, and the book charts the stamp of these conceptions on state practice. Solidarism lacks a full-blown theory of humanitarian intervention and the book supplies one. This theory is employed to assess the humanitarian qualifications of the cases of intervention analysed in the book, and this normative assessment is then compared to the moral practices of states. A key focus is to examine how far humanitarian intervention as a legitimate practice is present in the diplomatic dialogue of states. In exploring how far there has been a change of norm in the society of states in the 1990s, the book defends the broad based constructivist claim that state actions will be constrained if they cannot be legitimated, and that new norms enable new practices but do not determine these. The book concludes by considering how far contemporary practices of humanitarian intervention support a new solidarism, and how far this resolves the traditional conflict between order and justice in international society.

How can two states with enemy relations transform their relationship? Nicholas Wheeler argues that the discipline of International Relations has not done a good job of answering this question because its focus has been on the state and the individual levels of analysis. In this ground-breaking book, he argues for the importance of a new level of analysis in trust research the interpersonal relationships between state leaders. In doing so, he makes two key contributions. Firstly, developing a new theory of interpersonal trust that can be applied to the international level, and secondly, showing how this theory contributes to the literature on signalling in IR.The theory of interpersonal trust developed in the book provides a novel response to the central problem identified by signalling theory in IR: whether the receivers of signals interpret them in the way intended by their senders. The author argues that, in fact, trust between two leaders is causally prior to the accurate interpretation of the signals they send with the aim of communicating peaceful intent. Trust, therefore, does away with the problem of the ambiguity of signal interpretation. He goes on to examine exactly how a new relationship of trust emerges between two leaders who represent states with enemy relations: through face-to-face interaction and the crucial process of bonding between them that this makes possible. This powerful new theory of interpersonal trust is applied to three cases: the personal interactions between US and Soviet leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in ending the Cold War; the face-to-face interactions between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in reducing conflict between India and Pakistan in 1998-1999; and the interactions in 2009-10 between Barack Obama and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that failed to achieve a breakthrough in US-Iran nuclear relations.

There is a stark contradiction between the theory of universal human rights and the everyday practice of human wrongs. This timely volume investigates whether human rights abuses are a result of the failure of governments to live up to a universal human rights standard, or whether the search for moral universals is a fundamentally flawed enterprise which distracts us from the task of developing rights in the context of particular ethical communities. In the first part of the book chapters by Ken Booth, Jack Donnelly, Chris Brown, Bhikhu Parekh and Mary Midgley explore the philosophical basis of claims to universal human rights. In the second part, Richard Falk, Mary Kaldor, Martin Shaw, Gil Loescher, Georgina Ashworth and Andrew Hurrell reflect on the role of the media, global civil society, states, migration, non-governmental organisations, capitalism, and schools and universities in developing a global human rights culture.

There is a stark contradiction between the theory of universal human rights and the everyday practice of human wrongs. This timely volume investigates whether human rights abuses are a result of the failure of governments to live up to a universal human rights standard, or whether the search for moral universals is a fundamentally flawed enterprise which distracts us from the task of developing rights in the context of particular ethical communities. In the first part of the book chapters by Ken Booth, Jack Donnelly, Chris Brown, Bhikhu Parekh and Mary Midgley explore the philosophical basis of claims to universal human rights. In the second part, Richard Falk, Mary Kaldor, Martin Shaw, Gil Loescher, Georgina Ashworth and Andrew Hurrell reflect on the role of the media, global civil society, states, migration, non-governmental organisations, capitalism, and schools and universities in developing a global human rights culture.

Military intervention to protect civilians in danger has emerged as a key challenge for the West. This book explores the West's reaction to these challenges and some of the limits on its actions.

The central argument set out in this Element is that the combination of a perceived radical change in the threat environment post 9/11, and the new capabilities afforded by the long silent reach of the drone, have put pressure on the previously accepted legal frameworks justifying the use of force. This has resulted in disagreements - both articulated and unarticulated - in how the Western allies should respond to both the legal and operational innovations in the use of force that drones have catalysed. The Element focuses on the responses of the UK, France, and Germany to these developments in the context of the changing US approach to the use of force. Locating itself at the interface of international law and politics, this is the first attempt to look at the interplay between technological innovations, legal justifications, and inter-alliance politics in the context of the use of armed drones.

The central argument set out in this Element is that the combination of a perceived radical change in the threat environment post 9/11, and the new capabilities afforded by the long silent reach of the drone, have put pressure on the previously accepted legal frameworks justifying the use of force. This has resulted in disagreements - both articulated and unarticulated - in how the Western allies should respond to both the legal and operational innovations in the use of force that drones have catalysed. The Element focuses on the responses of the UK, France, and Germany to these developments in the context of the changing US approach to the use of force. Locating itself at the interface of international law and politics, this is the first attempt to look at the interplay between technological innovations, legal justifications, and inter-alliance politics in the context of the use of armed drones.

The language of special responsibilities is ubiquitous in world politics, with policymakers and commentators alike speaking and acting as though particular states have, or ought to have, unique obligations in managing global problems. Surprisingly, scholars are yet to provide any in-depth analysis of this fascinating aspect of world politics. This path-breaking study examines the nature of special responsibilities, the complex politics that surround them and how they condition international social power. The argument is illustrated with detailed case-studies of nuclear proliferation, climate change and global finance. All three problems have been addressed by an allocation of special responsibilities, but while this has structured politics in these areas, it has also been the subject of ongoing contestation. With a focus on the United States, this book argues that power must be understood as a social phenomenon and that American power varies significantly across security, economic and environmental domains.

The language of special responsibilities is ubiquitous in world politics, with policymakers and commentators alike speaking and acting as though particular states have, or ought to have, unique obligations in managing global problems. Surprisingly, scholars are yet to provide any in-depth analysis of this fascinating aspect of world politics. This path-breaking study examines the nature of special responsibilities, the complex politics that surround them and how they condition international social power. The argument is illustrated with detailed case-studies of nuclear proliferation, climate change and global finance. All three problems have been addressed by an allocation of special responsibilities, but while this has structured politics in these areas, it has also been the subject of ongoing contestation. With a focus on the United States, this book argues that power must be understood as a social phenomenon and that American power varies significantly across security, economic and environmental domains.

Military intervention to protect civilians in danger has emerged as a key challenge for the West. This book explores the West''s reaction to these challenges and some of the limits on its actions.

Military intervention to protect civilians in danger has emerged as a key challenge for the West. This book explores the West''s reaction to these challenges and some of the limits on its actions.