Nomy Arpaly - Böcker

Joining the ancient debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. The book makes the claim that acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue amount to nothing more than acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good, correctly conceived. In Praise of Desire shows that a desire-centered moral psychology can be richer than philosophers commonly think, accommodating the full complexity of moral life.

Conventional thinking about the mind - dating back to Aristotle - envisions the emotions as being directed and, to a larger extent, determined by rational thought. This picture emerges from a model of the psyche as being divided into two components, one rational and the other irrational. The rational component is where we make our decisions, and when we act we do so on the basis of rational deliberation. Yet how is it that we sometimes perform rational acts in our best interests without having formally decided to do so? Nomy Arpaly argues that the conventional picture of rationality used by most philosophers and psychologists is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave. Both common sense observations and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and also often act irrationally with deliberation. She uses the example of Huckleberry Finn, who intuits that he should free Jim from slavery despite the recognition that it would be "wrong" to do so. By questioning our ability to understand our own motivations, Arpaly attempts to develop a more "realistic" conception of moral agency than the view currently being touted by contemporary etchicists and action theorists. Offering a fresh and provocative perspective on moral responsibility, autonomy, rationality and the self, Unprincipled Virtue breaks new ground in the highly contested issue of human agency.

Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.

Joining the ancient debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue amount to nothing more than acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good, correctly conceived.Reason, understood as the power to deliberate about what to think and do, is shown not to be the basis for our ability to act for reasons. Reason is rather the ability to perform certain mental actions which help us to become settled about what to think or do, and these actions are in turn motivated by desire. Thus reason is, if not a slave of the passions, then at least a useful tool deployed by desiring agents.If desire were merely an impulse to act, then a moral psychology built on intrinsic desires might be unpromising. But intrinsic desire is much more than an impulse to act. Intrinsic desires are a natural kind, states of the brain which contingently but commonly cause impulses to act, as well as causing a rich array of feelings and cognitive effects (on attention, learning, and more). Understood in this way, intrinsic desires are more central to agency, good will, and virtue than any mere impulse could be.In Praise of Desire shows that a desire-centered moral psychology can be richer than philosophers commonly think, accommodating the full complexity of moral life.