P. Kivy – författare

As the title of this book was meant to suggest, its subject is the way we talk about (and write about) works of art: or, rather, one of the ways, namely, the way we describe works of art for critical purposes. Be­ cause I wished to restrict my subject matter in this way, I have made a sharp, and no doubt largely artificial distinction between describing and evaluating. And I must, at the outset, guard against a misreading of this distinction to which I have left myself open. In distinguishing between evaluative and descriptive aesthetic judgments, I am not saying that when I assert "X is p," where p is a "descriptive" term like "unified," or "delicate," or "garish," I may not at the same time be evaluating X too; and I am not saying that when I make the obviously "evaluative" assertion "X is good," I may not be describing X. Clearly, if I say "X is unified" I am evaluating X in that unity is a good-making feature of works of art; and as it is correct in English at least to call an evaluation a description, I do not want to suggest that if an assertion is evaluative, it cannot be de­ scriptive (although there have been many philosophers who have thought this indeed to be the case).

The past few years have seen a revival of interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy. His moral theory has been studied by D. D. Raphael (The Moral Sense) and his entire philosophical position by S. A. Grave (The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense). Prior to both, A. D. Woozley gave us the first modern reprint of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man - in fact the first edition of any work by Reid to appear in print since the Philosophical Works was edited in the nineteenth century by Sir William Hamilton. But Reid's aesthetic philosophy has not received its due. Woozley, in abridging the Essays, omitted the whole final essay, "On Taste," which is the only extended work on aesthetic theory that Reid ever published. Raphael, being interested primarily in Reid's moral theory, understand­ ably, treated aesthetics only as it was related to morality. And Grave, although he did present a short and very cogent resume of Reid's aes­ thetic position, obviously found himself drawn to other elements of Reid's philosophy. There are, of course, some accounts of Reid's aes­ thetic theory to be found in the various studies of eighteenth-century British aesthetics and criticism. None, however, appears to me to do any kind of justice to the philosophical questions which Reid treats in his aesthetics and philosophy of art.

THE SENSE OF BEAUTY: A FIRST APPROXIMATION It is generally acknowledged that during the first half of the eighteenth century a profound change was wrought in the theory of art and natural beauty. To this period we owe the establishment of the modem system of the arts. 1 In England, the notion of a separate and autonomous disci­ pline devoted solely to art and to beauty came into being through the concept of "aesthetic disinterestedness. " 2 In addition, emphasis in the theory of art shifted from object to subject - from the work of art to the perceiver and critic. Focal point for this change was the sense of beauty which, in concert with the moral sense of the British school, represented a dominant force in Enlightenment value theory. It is Francis Hutcheson who, more than anyone else, can be thought of as the founder and principal spokesman of this philosophical coterie. If the aesthetic sense was instrumental in the transfer of interest, in the philosophy of art, from object to perceiver, the aesthetic and moral senses together were no less important in a parallel transference of value judgment from the rational to the sensate.

As the title of this book was meant to suggest, its subject is the way we talk about (and write about) works of art: or, rather, one of the ways, namely, the way we describe works of art for critical purposes. Be­ cause I wished to restrict my subject matter in this way, I have made a sharp, and no doubt largely artificial distinction between describing and evaluating. And I must, at the outset, guard against a misreading of this distinction to which I have left myself open. In distinguishing between evaluative and descriptive aesthetic judgments, I am not saying that when I assert "X is p," where p is a "descriptive" term like "unified," or "delicate," or "garish," I may not at the same time be evaluating X too; and I am not saying that when I make the obviously "evaluative" assertion "X is good," I may not be describing X. Clearly, if I say "X is unified" I am evaluating X in that unity is a good-making feature of works of art; and as it is correct in English at least to call an evaluation a description, I do not want to suggest that if an assertion is evaluative, it cannot be de­ scriptive (although there have been many philosophers who have thought this indeed to be the case).

The past few years have seen a revival of interest in Thomas Reid''s philosophy. His moral theory has been studied by D. D. Raphael (The Moral Sense) and his entire philosophical position by S. A. Grave (The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense). Prior to both, A. D. Woozley gave us the first modern reprint of Reid''s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man - in fact the first edition of any work by Reid to appear in print since the Philosophical Works was edited in the nineteenth century by Sir William Hamilton. But Reid''s aesthetic philosophy has not received its due. Woozley, in abridging the Essays, omitted the whole final essay, "On Taste," which is the only extended work on aesthetic theory that Reid ever published. Raphael, being interested primarily in Reid''s moral theory, understand­ ably, treated aesthetics only as it was related to morality. And Grave, although he did present a short and very cogent resume of Reid''s aes­ thetic position, obviously found himself drawn to other elements of Reid''s philosophy. There are, of course, some accounts of Reid''s aes­ thetic theory to be found in the various studies of eighteenth-century British aesthetics and criticism. None, however, appears to me to do any kind of justice to the philosophical questions which Reid treats in his aesthetics and philosophy of art.