Peter J. Wallison – författare

Every federal campaign finance reform law enacted since 1971_ostensibly intended to keep politicians honest and limit the influence of contributors_has in reality protected incumbents by reducing the funds available to challengers. Although the courts have struck down many of the most egregious incumbent-protection measures enacted by Congress, important ones still remain_particularly restrictions on what political parties can spend in support of their candidates. These restrictions explain why reelection rates for incumbents are so high_up to 98 percent in recent years_despite record-low approval ratings for Congress. The most effective way to change this pro-incumbent system is to lift the restrictions on political parties, allowing them to become both the principal vehicles for political fundraising and the principal sources of campaign funds for their candidates. This would improve funding resources for challengers, strengthen the parties, reduce the appearance of corruption inherent in the current candidate-centered fundraising system, and ultimately strengthen American democracy. In Better Parties, Better Government: A Realistic Program for Campaign Finance Reform, Peter J.Wallison and Joel M. Gora guide us through the complex tangle of laws, rules, regulations, exceptions, exemptions, and safe harbors that constitute our current campaign finance regime, and explain how to reform the system with a single change: ending the restrictions on spending by political parties in support of their candidates. This single reform will make elections more competitive, improve the candidate and policy choices available to voters, and thereby transform American politics.

In The Administrative State Before the Supreme Court: Perspectives on the Nondelegation Doctrine, leading scholars consider a revival of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine—the separation-of-powers principle that bars Congress from transferring its legislative powers to the administrative agencies. Although the nondelegation doctrine has lain dormant since 1935, some Supreme Court justices have recently called for its return. As the Supreme Court takes up the doctrine in current cases, this volume makes a timely contribution to our understanding of the separation of powers and the Constitution.

In The Administrative State Before the Supreme Court: Perspectives on the Nondelegation Doctrine, leading scholars consider a revival of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine—the separation-of-powers principle that bars Congress from transferring its legislative powers to the administrative agencies. Although the nondelegation doctrine has lain dormant since 1935, some Supreme Court justices have recently called for its return. As the Supreme Court takes up the doctrine in current cases, this volume makes a timely contribution to our understanding of the separation of powers and the Constitution.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have aggressively used their government support to achieve extraordinarily high profitability and domination of the residential mortgage market.

Peter J. Wallison is the only member of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to release a formal dissent to the FCIC’s official report on the causes of the financial crisis. Wallison, codirector of financial policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, argues that the FCIC’s report fails to address the cause of the deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards that led to the housing bubble widely accepted as the key factor in destabilizing the American economy. Wallison’s Dissent to the Majority Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reveals that government-mandated subprime loans, not greedy investors, were the force behind the deterioration in underwriting standards. This dissent is a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the causes of the financial crisis—and to prevent future economic collapse.

This timely study focuses on how the government-constructed narratives surrounding the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the 2008 financial crisis shaped the policymaking that led to the Dodd-Frank Act. The book shows that every major provision of the act can be traced directly to that narrative, which ignored the government’s own role and focused entirely on the errors of the private sector. In the next Congress, whether or not the Republicans are in control of the House and Senate, there will be a concerted effort to make changes in—or even repeal—the Dodd-Frank Act. The essays in this book, originally published by AEI as Financial Services Outlooks, and the accompanying commentary provide a thorough backgrounder for anyone interested in financial policy.

The 2008 financial crisis--like the Great Depression--was a world-historical event. What caused it will be debated for years, if not generations. The conventional narrative is that the financial crisis was caused by Wall Street greed and insufficient regulation of the financial system. That narrative produced the Dodd-Frank Act, the most comprehensive financial-system regulation since the New Deal. There is evidence, however, that the Dodd-Frank Act has slowed the recovery from the recession. If insufficient regulation caused the financial crisis, then the Dodd-Frank Act will never be modified or repealed; proponents will argue that doing so will cause another crisis. A competing narrative about what caused the financial crisis has received little attention. This view, which is accepted by almost all Republicans in Congress and most conservatives, contends that the crisis was caused by government housing policies. This book extensively documents this view. For example, it shows that in June 2008, before the crisis, 58 percent of all US mortgages were subprime or other low-quality mortgages.Of these, 76 percent were on the books of government agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. When these mortgages defaulted in 2007 and 2008, they drove down housing prices and weakened banks and other mortgage holders, causing the crisis. After this book is published, no one will be able to claim that the financial crisis was caused by insufficient regulation, or defend Dodd-Frank, without coming to terms with the data this book contains.