R. Lanier Anderson – författare

The Poverty of Conceptual Truth is based on a simple idea. Kant''s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors—an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flowfrom a logically perspicuous relation of ''containment'' among concepts. That is, all truths would be ''analytic,'' in Kant''s sense. Kant''s distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of naturalscience, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant''s predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on theexpressive poverty of conceptual truth.To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant''s distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant''s long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant''s famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique ofPure Reason.

The Poverty of Conceptual Truth is based on a simple idea. Kant''s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors--an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flow from a logically perspicuous relation of ''containment'' among concepts. That is, all truths would be ''analytic,'' in Kant''s sense. Kant''s distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of natural science, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant''s predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on the expressive poverty of conceptual truth.To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant''s distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant''s long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant''s famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason.

The Poverty of Conceptual Truth is based on a simple idea. Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors--an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flow from a logically perspicuous relation of 'containment' among concepts. That is, all truths would be 'analytic,' in Kant's sense. Kant's distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of natural science, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant's predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on the expressive poverty of conceptual truth.To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant's distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant's long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant's famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason.

The Poverty of Conceptual Truth is based on a simple idea. Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors--an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flow from a logically perspicuous relation of 'containment' among concepts. That is, all truths would be 'analytic,' in Kant's sense. Kant's distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of natural science, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant's predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on the expressive poverty of conceptual truth.To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant's distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant's long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant's famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Friendship has been a central topic for philosophical reflection ever since philosophy itself was born in the circle of friends who gathered around Socrates to follow his probing examinations of how we should live.In this outstanding collection, which takes its lead from the work of Alexander Nehamas, a distinguished roster of contributors examines the many dimensions of the philosophy of friendship. They broaden the discussion beyond common questions about friendship obligations and their relation to the claims of morality to explore a much wider set of issues, including:friendship in the context of Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Kant, Goethe, William James, and Nietzschethe darker side of friendship and “frenemies”friendship in literature and film, including André Aciman’s Call Me by Your Name and Andrey Zvyagintsev’s The Return dogs and friendshipfriendship and aesthetic judgmentNehamas’s own distinctive analogy between the value of friendship and the value of beauty.Friendship: Philosophical Explorations will be of interest to those in philosophy studying and researching ethics and aesthetics, as well as students and scholars in related disciplines such as literature and film.

Friendship has been a central topic for philosophical reflection ever since philosophy itself was born in the circle of friends who gathered around Socrates to follow his probing examinations of how we should live.In this outstanding collection, which takes its lead from the work of Alexander Nehamas, a distinguished roster of contributors examines the many dimensions of the philosophy of friendship. They broaden the discussion beyond common questions about friendship obligations and their relation to the claims of morality to explore a much wider set of issues, including:friendship in the context of Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Kant, Goethe, William James, and Nietzschethe darker side of friendship and “frenemies”friendship in literature and film, including André Aciman’s Call Me by Your Name and Andrey Zvyagintsev’s The Return dogs and friendshipfriendship and aesthetic judgmentNehamas’s own distinctive analogy between the value of friendship and the value of beauty.Friendship: Philosophical Explorations will be of interest to those in philosophy studying and researching ethics and aesthetics, as well as students and scholars in related disciplines such as literature and film.

Friendship has been a central topic for philosophical reflection ever since philosophy itself was born in the circle of friends who gathered around Socrates to follow his probing examinations of how we should live.In this outstanding collection, which takes its lead from the work of Alexander Nehamas, a distinguished roster of contributors examines the many dimensions of the philosophy of friendship. They broaden the discussion beyond common questions about friendship obligations and their relation to the claims of morality to explore a much wider set of issues, including: friendship in the context of Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Kant, Goethe, William James, and Nietzsche the darker side of friendship and "e;frenemies"e; friendship in literature and film, including Andre Aciman's Call Me by Your Name and Andrey Zvyagintsev's The Return dogs and friendship friendship and aesthetic judgment Nehamas's own distinctive analogy between the value of friendship and the value of beauty. Friendship: Philosophical Explorations will be of interest to those in philosophy studying and researching ethics and aesthetics, as well as students and scholars in related disciplines such as literature and film.