Robert Alexy – författare

Law's Ideal Dimension provides a comprehensive account in English of renowned legal theorist Robert Alexy's understanding of jurisprudence, as expanded upon from his publications A Theory of Legal Argumentation (OUP 1989), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 1985), and The Argument from Injustice (OUP 1992).The collection is divided into three parts. Part One concerns the nature of law: it explores its real and ideal dimensions and how the ideal dimension of law is sometimes employed but does not play a systematically important role. Part Two discusses constitutional rights, human rights, and proportionality. It defends the construction of constitutional rights as principles against objections raised by the rule construction and elaborates on the nature of constitutional rights as well as the mathematical balancing of those rights. Part Three concerns the relation between argumentation, correctness, and law. The author concludes this volume with a biographical reflection.

Law''s Ideal Dimension provides a comprehensive account in English of renowned legal theorist Robert Alexy''s understanding of jurisprudence, as expanded upon from his publications A Theory of Legal Argumentation (OUP 1989), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 1985), and The Argument from Injustice (OUP 1992).The collection is divided into three parts. Part One concerns the nature of law: it explores its real and ideal dimensions and how the ideal dimension of law is sometimes employed but does not play a systematically important role. Part Two discusses constitutional rights, human rights, and proportionality. It defends the construction of constitutional rights as principles against objections raised by the rule construction and elaborates on the nature of constitutional rights as well as themathematical balancing of those rights. Part Three concerns the relation between argumentation, correctness, and law. The author concludes this volume with a biographical reflection.

In any country where there is a Bill of Rights, constitutional rights reasoning is an important part of the legal process. As more and more countries adopt Human Rights legislation and accede to international human rights agreements, and as the European Union introduces its own Bill of Rights, judges struggle to implement these rights consistently and sometimes the reasoning behind them is lost. Examining the practice in other jurisdictions can be a valuable guide. Robert Alexy's classic work, available now for the first time in English reconstructs the reasoning behind the jurisprudence of the German Basic Law and in doing so provides a theory of general application to all jurisdictions where judges wrestle with rights adjudication. In considering the features of constitutional rights reasoning, the author moves from the doctrine of proportionality, procedural rights and the structure and scope of constitutional rights, to general rights of liberty and equality and the problem of horizontal effect. A new postscript written for the English edition considers critiques of the Theory since it first appeared in 1985, focusing in particular on the discretion left to legislatures and in an extended introduction the translator argues that the theory may be used to clarify the nature of legal reasoning in the context of rights under the British Constitution. This book will be of central interest to all legal and constitutional theorists and human rights scholars.

At the heart of this book is the age-old question of how law and morality are related. The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first, conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law. While the conceptual argument alone is too limited to establish a sufficiently strong connection between law and morality, and the normative argument alone fails to address the nature of law, the two arguments together support a nonpositivistic concept of law, toppling legal positivism qua comprehensive theory of law.The author makes his case within a conceptual framework of five distinctions that can be variously combined to represent a multiplicity of presuppositions or perspectives underlying the enquiry into the relationship of law and morality. In this context, it can indeed be shown that there are perspectives that bespeak solely a positivistic concept of law. The decisive point, however, is that there is a perspective, necessary to the law, that necessarily presupposes a nonpositivistic concept of law. This is the perspective of a participant in the legal system, asking for the correct answer to a legal question in this legal system. The participant-thesis is demonstrated by appeal to Gustav Radbruch's formula (extreme injustice is not law) and to the judge's balancing of principles in deciding a concrete case. The author arrives at a concept of law that systematically links classical elements of legal positivism - authoritative issuance and social efficacy - with the desideratum of nonpositivistic legal theory, correctness of content.

Law's Ideal Dimension provides a comprehensive account in English of renowned legal theorist Robert Alexy's understanding of jurisprudence, as expanded upon from his publications A Theory of Legal Argumentation (OUP 1989), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 1985), and The Argument from Injustice (OUP 1992).The collection is divided into three parts. Part One concerns the nature of law: it explores its real and ideal dimensions and how the ideal dimension of law is sometimes employed but does not play a systematically important role. Part Two discusses constitutional rights, human rights, and proportionality. It defends the construction of constitutional rights as principles against objections raised by the rule construction and elaborates on the nature of constitutional rights as well as the mathematical balancing of those rights. Part Three concerns the relation between argumentation, correctness, and law. The author concludes this volume with a biographical reflection.

Law's Ideal Dimension provides a comprehensive account in English of renowned legal theorist Robert Alexy's understanding of jurisprudence, as expanded upon from his publications A Theory of Legal Argumentation (OUP 1989), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 1985), and The Argument from Injustice (OUP 1992).The collection is divided into three parts. Part One concerns the nature of law: it explores its real and ideal dimensions and how the ideal dimension of law is sometimes employed but does not play a systematically important role. Part Two discusses constitutional rights, human rights, and proportionality. It defends the construction of constitutional rights as principles against objections raised by the rule construction and elaborates on the nature of constitutional rights as well as the mathematical balancing of those rights. Part Three concerns the relation between argumentation, correctness, and law. The author concludes this volume with a biographical reflection.

At the heart of this book is the age-old question of how law and morality are related. The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first, conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law. While the conceptual argument alone is too limited to establish a sufficiently strong connection between law and morality, and the normative argument alone fails to address the nature of law, the two arguments together support a nonpositivistic concept of law, toppling legal positivism qua comprehensive theory of law.The author makes his case within a conceptual framework of five distinctions that can be variously combined to represent a multiplicity of presuppositions or perspectives underlying the enquiry into the relationship of law and morality. In this context, it can indeed be shown that there are perspectives that bespeak solely a positivistic concept of law. The decisive point, however, is that there is a perspective, necessary to the law, that necessarily presupposes a nonpositivistic concept of law. This is the perspective of a participant in the legal system, asking for the correct answer to a legal question in this legal system. The participant-thesis is demonstrated by appeal to Gustav Radbruch's formula (extreme injustice is not law) and to the judge's balancing of principles in deciding a concrete case. The author arrives at a concept of law that systematically links classical elements of legal positivism - authoritative issuance and social efficacy - with the desideratum of nonpositivistic legal theory, correctness of content.

What is to be understood by 'rational legal argument'? To what extent can legal reasoning be rational? Is the demand for rationality in legal affairs justified? And what are the criteria of rationality in legal reasoning? The answer to these questions is not only of interest to legal theorists and philosophers of law. They are pressing issues for practising lawyers, and a matter of concern for every citizen active in the public arena. Not only the standing of academic law as a scientific discipline, but also the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the possibility of rational legal argumentation.A theory of legal reasoning which tries to answer these questions pre-supposes a theory of general practical reasoning. This theory is the subject matter of the first two parts of the book. The result is a theory of general practical discourse which rests on insights of both Anglo-Saxon and German philosophy. It forms the basis of the theory of rational legal discourse, which is developed in the third part of this book.

In any country where there is a Bill of Rights, constitutional rights reasoning is an important part of the legal process. As more and more countries adopt Human Rights legislation and accede to international human rights agreements, and as the European Union introduces its own Bill of Rights, judges struggle to implement these rights consistently and sometimes the reasoning behind them is lost. Examining the practice in other jurisdictions can be a valuable guide. Robert Alexy's classic work reconstructs the reasoning behind the jurisprudence of the German Basic Law and in doing so provides a theory of general application to all jurisdictions where judges wrestle with rights adjudication. In considering the features of constitutional rights reasoning, the author moves from the doctrine of proportionality, procedural rights and the structure and scope of constitutional rights, to general rights of liberty and equality and the problem of horizontal effect. A postscript written for the English edition considers critiques of the Theory since it first appeared in 1985, focusing in particular on the discretion left to legislatures and in an extended introduction the translator argues that the theory may be used to clarify the nature of legal reasoning in the context of rights under the British Constitution. This book will be of central interest to all legal and constitutional theorists and human rights scholars.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy’s principles theory, which has initially defined ‘legal principles’ as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ‘ideal ought’. Poscher’s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy’s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate's two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte’s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy''s principles theory, which has initially defined ''legal principles'' as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ''ideal ought''. Poscher''s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy''s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate''s two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte''s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy''s principles theory, which has initially defined ''legal principles'' as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ''ideal ought''. Poscher''s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy''s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate''s two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte''s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy’s principles theory, which has initially defined ‘legal principles’ as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ‘ideal ought’. Poscher’s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy’s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate's two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte’s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

Este volumen reúne veinte ensayos sobre la teoría de los principios escritos en las últimas cuatro décadas. Dieciocho de estos artículos han aparecido después de mis tres libros: La teoría de la argumentación jurídica, publicado por primera vez en 1978; La teoría de los derechos fundamentales, publicado por primera vez en 1985; y El concepto y la validez del derecho, publicado por primera vez en 1992.Esta colección de ensayos se caracteriza por dos propiedades. Por un lado, en las últimas décadas he tratado de especificar la teoría de los principios y defenderla de numerosos ataques. Con referencia a La teoría de los derechos fundamentales, esto podría denominarse el aspecto interno o analítico. Por otro lado, mis esfuerzos estaban dirigidos a unir la teoría de los principios con la teoría de la argumentación jurídica y el análisis del concepto de derecho con el objeto de lograr un sistema del derecho y del estado democrático constitucional. Este segundo aspecto corresponde al aspecto externo o sistemático.

"La Teoría de la argumentación jurídica" de Robert Alexy, publicada por primera vez en 1978 y traducida luego a varios idiomas, es, sin duda, una de las obras más influyentes en la cultura jurídica de las últimas décadas. Las razones no son difíciles de hallar. El libro, escrito en un estilo claro, aborda con profundidad filosófica un problema central de la práctica jurídica: el de la fundamentación de las decisiones jurídicas y, en particular, de las judiciales. Puede decirse que, junto con el libro de Neil MacCormick (Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory) publicado también en esa misma fecha, constituye la principal aportación de lo que se ha venido a llamar la "teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica".Robert Alexy estudió Derecho y Filosofía en Göttingen, donde se graduó en 1976 con la tesis sobre la Teoría de la Argumentación Jurídica, publicada en su idioma original en 1978. En 1984, logró su habilitación como profesor en la Universidad Georg August de Göttingen, con su trabajo sobre Teoría de los Derechos Fundamentales, que también fue publicado por el Centro de Estudios Constitucionales de España. Desde 1986 ocupa la cátedra de Derecho Público y Filosofía del Derecho en la Universidad Christian Albrecht de Kiel. Entre su amplia producción traducida al castellano figuran, además de las dos obras señaladas: El concepto y la validez del Derecho (2004); La institucionalización de la justicia (2005); Una discusión sobre la teoría del Derecho, con J. Raz y Eugenio Bulygin (2007); Tres escritos sobre derechos fundamentales y la teoría de los principios (2003); Teoría del discurso y derechos humanos (2003); Derecho y razón práctica (2006).

En el trabajo principal de este libro- Josep Raz se ocupa de estas cuestiones, y su postura es rebatida en dos ensayos de Robert Alexy y Eugenio Bulygin, que tienen visiones diferentes sobre el particular. El libro resultará de interés, no sólo para filósofos del derecho, sino también para aquellos que estén preocupados, en el ámbito de la filosofía en general por la relación entre el análisis filosófico y el análisis conceptual. El libro contiene además un estudio preliminar que, a través de un repaso de las distintas perspectivas sobre la relación entre análisis filosófico y análisis conceptual, busca poner al alcance del lector las herramientas teóricas necesarias para abordar la discusión.

Inledning: Aleksander Peczenik

En esta obra Alexy desarrolla su fundamentación de las decisiones judiciales o teoría de la argumentación jurídica. Su concepción es eminentemente racional y parte de la teoría del discurso de Habermas, en el intento de lograr un modelo de argumentación jurídica que corresponda al Estado constitucional democrático. La singularidad del punto de vista que aquí expone radica en que considera la argumentación jurídica como un caso especial del discurso práctico general.

Adentrándose en la disertación acerca de los derechos fundamentales, se entenderán estos como principios de optimización que ordenan en su mayoría la relación jurídica fáctica, lo que permitirá entender que no existen derechos absolutos, que es imprescindible su interacción y que la intervención del Estado se legitima mientras se respete el principio de proporcionalidad.

¿Es relevante la comprensión de un valor moral en la comprensión del derecho? La tesis de la pretensión de corrección del derecho es una de las vías establecidas por Robert Alexy para argumentar por qué considera que es así. A partir de ella busca mostrar uno de los sentidos en los que el derecho está vinculado de manera intrínseca a un valor moral. Y cómo, de este modo, dar cuenta del tipo de vínculo intrínseco entre derecho y moral es una tarea principal de la filosofía del derecho. Eugenio Bulygin mantiene la tesis contraria. Considera que el valor moral que el derecho tenga o deje de tener es algo contextual y contingente. Eso hace que los contextuales y contingentes vínculos del derecho con la moral excedan el ámbito de la filosofía del derecho. El debate entre Alexy y Bulygin sobre la pretensión de corrección del derecho se desarrolló a lo largo de casi tres décadas. En la primera edición de este libro del año 2001 se incluyeron las dos primeras rondas del debate. En esta segunda edición se incluye el último intercambio entre los autores, más un prefacio de Robert Alexy. Queda así a disposición un material valioso para la identificación de lo que está en cuestión en la discusión

¿Es relevante la comprensión de un valor moral en la comprensión del derecho? La tesis de la pretensión de corrección del derecho es una de las vías establecidas por Robert Alexy para argumentar por qué considera que es así. A partir de ella busca mostrar uno de los sentidos en los que el derecho está vinculado de manera intrínseca a un valor moral. Y cómo, de este modo, dar cuenta del tipo de vínculo intrínseco entre derecho y moral es una tarea principal de la filosofía del derecho. Eugenio Bulygin mantiene la tesis contraria. Considera que el valor moral que el derecho tenga o deje de tener es algo contextual y contingente. Eso hace que los contextuales y contingentes vínculos del derecho con la moral excedan el ámbito de la filosofía del derecho. El debate entre Alexy y Bulygin sobre la pretensión de corrección del derecho se desarrolló a lo largo de casi tres décadas. En la primera edición de este libro del año 2001 se incluyeron las dos primeras rondas del debate. En esta segunda edición se incluye el último intercambio entre los autores, más un prefacio de Robert Alexy. Queda así a disposición un material valioso para la identificación de lo que está en cuestión en la discusión

Este libro reune las voces mas lucidas de la filosofia analitica del derecho contemporaneo -desde Alemania hasta Latinoamerica- en un dialogo transatlantico sin concesiones. En un escenario juridico cada vez mas dominado por consignas superficiales y discursos prefabricados, que oscila entre el moralismo ambiguo y el decisionismo arbitrario, esta obra despliega las herramientas logicas para someter el fenomeno juridico a analisis conceptual implacable. El trabajo que se propone aca es riguroso: desde los fundamentos linguisticos y normativos del derecho (con Hart, Dworkin y Wittgenstein como faros criticos) hasta los dilemas eticos de Nuremberg que desafiaron los limites entre derecho y moral. Los capitulos, van mas alla del analisis teorico: son como conversaciones profundas con los grandes pensadores del derecho el iusmoralismo, el positivismo, la logica de los sistemas juridicos, etc. que interrogan la propia legitimidad del derecho en tiempos de crisis institucional. Lo que emerge es un manifiesto metodologico: solo el rigor analitico, aplicado sin dogmatismos, puede devolver al derecho su precision conceptual perdida. Esta obra no es solo un tratado; es un llamado a rearmar la tecnica juridica con las herramientas de la filosofia mas exigente. Un libro para juristas que no temen pensar. Jose L. Cusi-Alanoca

Este libro reune las voces mas lucidas de la filosofia analitica del derecho contemporaneo -desde Alemania hasta Latinoamerica- en un dialogo transatlantico sin concesiones. En un escenario juridico cada vez mas dominado por consignas superficiales y discursos prefabricados, que oscila entre el moralismo ambiguo y el decisionismo arbitrario, esta obra despliega las herramientas logicas para someter el fenomeno juridico a analisis conceptual implacable. El trabajo que se propone aca es riguroso: desde los fundamentos linguisticos y normativos del derecho (con Hart, Dworkin y Wittgenstein como faros criticos) hasta los dilemas eticos de Nuremberg que desafiaron los limites entre derecho y moral. Los capitulos, van mas alla del analisis teorico: son como conversaciones profundas con los grandes pensadores del derecho el iusmoralismo, el positivismo, la logica de los sistemas juridicos, etc. que interrogan la propia legitimidad del derecho en tiempos de crisis institucional. Lo que emerge es un manifiesto metodologico: solo el rigor analitico, aplicado sin dogmatismos, puede devolver al derecho su precision conceptual perdida. Esta obra no es solo un tratado; es un llamado a rearmar la tecnica juridica con las herramientas de la filosofia mas exigente. Un libro para juristas que no temen pensar. Jose L. Cusi-Alanoca