Ralf Poscher – författare

Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. As such, their use in legal texts is virtually inevitable. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and places judges in the position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these ideals. In borderlinecases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value.In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the last two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes "soritical " vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. There is a vast literature that discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differencesbetween the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy that are grouped under the heading of "vagueness ", let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena.Bringing together leading scholars working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, this book fosters a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars by examining how philosophers conceive vagueness in law from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness. The chapters of the book are organized into three parts. The first part addresses the import of different theories of vagueness for the law, referring to a wide range oftheories from supervaluationist to contextualist and semantic realist accounts in order to address the question of whether the law can learn from engaging with philosophical discussions of vagueness. The second part of the book examines different vagueness phenomena. The contributions in part 2suggest that the greater awareness to different vagueness phenomena can make lawyers aware of specific issues and solutions so far overlooked. The third part deals with the pragmatic aspects of vagueness in law, providing answers to the question of how to deal with vagueness in law and with the professional, political, moral, and ethical issues such vagueness gives rise to.

Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. As such, their use in legal texts is virtually inevitable. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and places judges in the position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these ideals. In borderlinecases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value.In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the last two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes "soritical " vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. There is a vast literature that discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differencesbetween the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy that are grouped under the heading of "vagueness ", let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena.Bringing together leading scholars working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, this book fosters a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars by examining how philosophers conceive vagueness in law from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness. The chapters of the book are organized into three parts. The first part addresses the import of different theories of vagueness for the law, referring to a wide range oftheories from supervaluationist to contextualist and semantic realist accounts in order to address the question of whether the law can learn from engaging with philosophical discussions of vagueness. The second part of the book examines different vagueness phenomena. The contributions in part 2suggest that the greater awareness to different vagueness phenomena can make lawyers aware of specific issues and solutions so far overlooked. The third part deals with the pragmatic aspects of vagueness in law, providing answers to the question of how to deal with vagueness in law and with the professional, political, moral, and ethical issues such vagueness gives rise to.

Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. As such, their use in legal texts is virtually inevitable. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and places judges in the position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these ideals. In borderline cases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value.In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the last two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes "soritical " vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. There is a vast literature that discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differences between the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy that are grouped under the heading of "vagueness ", let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena.Bringing together leading scholars working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, this book fosters a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars by examining how philosophers conceive vagueness in law from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness. The chapters of the book are organized into three parts. The first part addresses the import of different theories of vagueness for the law, referring to a wide range of theories from supervaluationist to contextualist and semantic realist accounts in order to address the question of whether the law can learn from engaging with philosophical discussions of vagueness. The second part of the book examines different vagueness phenomena. The contributions in part 2 suggest that the greater awareness to different vagueness phenomena can make lawyers aware of specific issues and solutions so far overlooked. The third part deals with the pragmatic aspects of vagueness in law, providing answers to the question of how to deal with vagueness in law and with the professional, political, moral, and ethical issues such vagueness gives rise to.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy’s principles theory, which has initially defined ‘legal principles’ as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ‘ideal ought’. Poscher’s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy’s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate's two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte’s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy''s principles theory, which has initially defined ''legal principles'' as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ''ideal ought''. Poscher''s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy''s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate''s two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte''s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy''s principles theory, which has initially defined ''legal principles'' as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ''ideal ought''. Poscher''s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy''s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate''s two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte''s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

This collective work provides a chronological and up-to-date reconstruction of the three-round debate between Robert Alexy and Ralf Poscher.The debate represents the German development of an enduring jurisprudential controversy over the concept and adjudicatory role of legal principles, classically addressed by HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Alexy’s principles theory, which has initially defined ‘legal principles’ as optimisation requirements, currently argues that they express an ‘ideal ought’. Poscher’s critique challenges the soundness of Alexy’s principles theory by questioning its ontological and epistemological commitments. As legal principles are directly related to constitutional rights, the Alexy-Poscher debate has significant implications for constitutional adjudication. For instance, proportionality analysis – which incorporates a highly controversial balancing test – and the legitimate boundaries of judicial power, hinge on the debate's two opposing views. Yet despite the centrality and pervasiveness of this topic, German contributions to the theoretical and practical impact of legal principles remain generally overlooked by English-speaking scholars. Concluding with David Duarte’s critical and meticulous assessment of the debate, this collection bridges that important scholarly gap. Whether or not conversant in the debate on legal principles, legal researchers and advanced law students with interdisciplinary interests in jurisprudence and constitutional law will find in this book a timely and distinctive introduction to leading developments in German legal thinking.

This open access book offers a clear and concise overview of leading conceptions of data protection and privacy, exploring their social value through philosophical theorisations and European and US-American legal perspectives.Featuring prominent experts and emerging scholars, the book presents diverse understandings to showcase the multifaceted interests and values embedded in the concepts of data protection and privacy. It links philosophical and legal perspectives on privacy to historical and contemporary rights struggles. The book also addresses privacy challenges posed by the digital revolution, including advances in AI, and recent efforts to safeguard privacy.Aimed at scholars, researchers, and students in law and philosophy, the book covers key theoretical and legal positions on privacy and data protection. Legal practitioners will find insights into landmark EU and US constitutional decisions, such as the German Constitutional Court’s Census Decision and Carpenter v United States. Additionally, it is valuable for anyone seeking to understand the legal and philosophical foundations of globally influential regulations like the GDPR and the AI Act.The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY NC ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law.

Das bewahrte Konzept:In nun schon 41. Auflage lehrt der Band die Grundrechte in der Breite und Tiefe, in der sie Gegenstand der Ersten Juristischen Prufung sind. Alle fur die Falllosung in Ausbildung und Prufung wichtigen Themen der allgemeinen Grundrechtslehren, samtliche Grundrechte sowie die Verfassungsbeschwerde als das einschlagige Verfahrensrecht werden anhand von Fallen behandelt. Aktuelle Entwicklungen wie die wachsende Bedeutung der uberstaatlichen Grundrechte und die grundrechtliche Schutzfunktion sind ebenfalls eingehend dargestellt. Im Aufbau folgen die Ausfuhrungen sowie die Losungen der Eingangsfalle einem einheitlichen Aufbauschema, das dem Klausurentraining dient. Das ebook enthalt den vollstandigen Text des Buches direkt verlinkt mit nach didaktischen Gesichtspunkten ausgewahlten, fur die Grundrechtsauslegung wegweisenden Entscheidungen des BVerfG. Der Leser gelangt so mit einem "e;Klick"e; aus dem Text unmittelbar zu den in dem ebook enthaltenen Urteilen. Grundrechtsrechtsprechung und -literatur wurden zudem eingehend uberarbeitet und auf den Stand von Juli 2025 gebracht.

Das bewährte Konzept:In nun schon 40. Auflage lehrt der Band die Grundrechte in der Breite und Tiefe, in der sie Gegenstand der Ersten Juristischen Prüfung sind. Alle für die Falllösung in Ausbildung und Prüfung wichtigen Themen der allgemeinen Grundrechtslehren, sämtliche Grundrechte sowie die Verfassungsbeschwerde als das einschlägige Verfahrensrecht werden anhand von Fällen behandelt. Aktuelle Entwicklungen wie die wachsende Bedeutung der überstaatlichen Grundrechte und die grundrechtliche Schutzfunktion sind ebenfalls eingehend dargestellt. Im Aufbau folgen die Ausführungen sowie die Lösungen der Eingangsfälle einem einheitlichen Aufbauschema, das dem Klausurentraining dient.Das ebook enthält den vollständigen Text des Buches direkt verlinkt mit nach didaktischen Gesichtspunkten ausgewählten, für die Grundrechtsauslegung wegweisenden Entscheidungen des BVerfG. Der Leser gelangt so mit einem "Klick" aus dem Text unmittelbar zu den in dem ebook enthaltenen Urteilen.Grundrechtsrechtsprechung und -literatur wurden zudem eingehend überarbeitet und auf den Stand von Juli 2024 gebracht.

Ralf Poscher entwickelt eine Theorie und Dogmatik der Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte gegen staatliche Freiheitseingriffe, die das Abwehrrecht trotz seiner konstitutionellen Ursprünge und den dunklen Seiten seiner Geschichte auch für moderne, demokratisch organisierte Gesellschaften freiheits- und staatstheoretisch anschlußfähig macht. Den Schlüssel für eine Fortentwicklung des Abwehrrechts sieht er in der Betonung seiner Reflexivität. Indem das Abwehrrecht das Staat-Bürger-Verhältnis regelt, dient es auch der staatlichen Regelung gesellschaftlicher Konflikte und durchdringt reflexiv die Rechtsbeziehung innerhalb der Gesellschaft. Das hier entfaltete Modell der Grundrechte vermag zu erklären, warum das Abwehrrecht trotz aller theoretischen Kritik weiterhin in der Praxis - auch international - die zentrale Grundrechtsfunktion ausmacht.