S. Pejovich – författare

To understand recent developments in Eastern Europe requires a method of analysis that is capable of internalizing into a theoretical framework (i) the logical premises deduced from the costs of transactions and incentive structures generated by various institutions and (ii) the evidence for refutable implications of those premises. The economics of property rights is such a theory. It expands the scope of the ability of economic analysis to explain a wide range of institutional structures and provides empirical corroboration of its logical implications. The economics of property rights is, then, an effective scholarly instrument that offers more significant understanding of the three current issues in the area of comparative economic studies: (i) evaluating the performance of alternative institutional arrangements, (ii) explaining the failure of socialist institutions in Eastern Europe, and (iii) identifying the costs (political as well as economic) of institutional reforms in that part of the world. In that sense, the book is both timely and relevant. In the late 1980s East Europeans crossed the threshold of fear and forced their leaders to abandon Marxism. With that theory of history dead and buried, the cost of current sacrifices in the pursuit of socialism has risen relative to the present value of its expected future benefits.

In the late 1980s, the field of comparative economics and NATO faced a similar problem: the threat of obsolescence. A predictable reaction of those who had made major investments in both comparative economics and NATO was to look for a new job. It was time to say: comparative economic systems are dead, long live comparative economic systems. The purpose of this book is to redirect study of what we called comparative economic systems toward analysis of the development of institutions and the effects of alternative institutional arrangements on economic performance. To that end, the book internalizes into a theoretical framework (1) the effects of alternative property rights on the costs of transactions and incentives structures, (2) the effects of the costs of transactions and incentives on economic behavior, and (3) the evidence for refutable implications of those effects. Analysis here focuses on the issues, propositions and conclusions that lend themselves to the only known scientific test: empirical verification. Thus, this book is not about what socialism or capitalism could have been, should have been, or should be. Nor is it an ode to capitalism. Its purpose is not to assert that capitalism is a better economic system than socialism. The history of this century and the market for institutions have done that. My purpose is to explain what is it that makes the institutions of capitalism better in terms of economic outcome than all other alternatives that have been tried since the beginning of recorded history.

It was Lenin''s genius to recognize the importance of [socialist] system with all the trappings of embellishing the democracy. If the people want a constitution. give them one. and even include the bill of rights. If they want a parliament, give them that too. And a system of courts. If they want a federal system create that myth as well. Above all, let them have e 1 ecti ons, for the act of voti ng is what the common man most clearly associates with democracy. Give them all these, but make sure that they have no effect on how things are run. - G. Warren Nutter Most research by Western scholars has emphasized macroeconomics (and to a considerable extent still does) as the method of analysis and growth rates as a standard for evaluating the performance of different economies. In the early 1960s Nutter raised questions about the reported growth rates in socialist states, the importance of growth policies for human welfare, and the abil ity of macroeconomi cs to enhance our understandi ng of soci a 1 and economic processes. In his work, Nutter used the standard price theory adjusted to incorporate the incentive effects of property rights in resources. He was casti gated for defyi ng the traditi ona 1 wi sdom. Not surprisingly, history has validated Nutter''s theoretical framework and his conclusions.

In the late 1980s, the field of comparative economics and NATO faced a similar problem: the threat of obsolescence. A predictable reaction of those who had made major investments in both comparative economics and NATO was to look for a new job. It was time to say: comparative economic systems are dead, long live comparative economic systems. The purpose of this book is to redirect study of what we called comparative economic systems toward analysis of the development of institutions and the effects of alternative institutional arrangements on economic performance. To that end, the book internalizes into a theoretical framework (1) the effects of alternative property rights on the costs of transactions and incentives structures, (2) the effects of the costs of transactions and incentives on economic behavior, and (3) the evidence for refutable implications of those effects. Analysis here focuses on the issues, propositions and conclusions that lend themselves to the only known scientific test: empirical verification. Thus, this book is not about what socialism or capitalism could have been, should have been, or should be. Nor is it an ode to capitalism. Its purpose is not to assert that capitalism is a better economic system than socialism. The history of this century and the market for institutions have done that. My purpose is to explain what is it that makes the institutions of capitalism better in terms of economic outcome than all other alternatives that have been tried since the beginning of recorded history.

It was Lenin's genius to recognize the importance of [socialist] system with all the trappings of embellishing the democracy. If the people want a constitution. give them one. and even include the bill of rights. If they want a parliament, give them that too. And a system of courts. If they want a federal system create that myth as well. Above all, let them have e 1 ecti ons, for the act of voti ng is what the common man most clearly associates with democracy. Give them all these, but make sure that they have no effect on how things are run. - G. Warren Nutter Most research by Western scholars has emphasized macroeconomics (and to a considerable extent still does) as the method of analysis and growth rates as a standard for evaluating the performance of different economies. In the early 1960s Nutter raised questions about the reported growth rates in socialist states, the importance of growth policies for human welfare, and the abil ity of macroeconomi cs to enhance our understandi ng of soci a 1 and economic processes. In his work, Nutter used the standard price theory adjusted to incorporate the incentive effects of property rights in resources. He was casti gated for defyi ng the traditi ona 1 wi sdom. Not surprisingly, history has validated Nutter's theoretical framework and his conclusions.

In the late 1980s, the field of comparative economics and NATO faced a similar problem: the threat of obsolescence. A predictable reaction of those who had made major investments in both comparative economics and NATO was to look for a new job. It was time to say: comparative economic systems are dead, long live comparative economic systems. The purpose of this book is to redirect study of what we called comparative economic systems toward analysis of the development of institutions and the effects of alternative institutional arrangements on economic performance. To that end, the book internalizes into a theoretical framework (1) the effects of alternative property rights on the costs of transactions and incentives structures, (2) the effects of the costs of transactions and incentives on economic behavior, and (3) the evidence for refutable implications of those effects. Analysis here focuses on the issues, propositions and conclusions that lend themselves to the only known scientific test: empirical verification. Thus, this book is not about what socialism or capitalism could have been, should have been, or should be. Nor is it an ode to capitalism. Its purpose is not to assert that capitalism is a better economic system than socialism. The history of this century and the market for institutions have done that. My purpose is to explain what is it that makes the institutions of capitalism better in terms of economic outcome than all other alternatives that have been tried since the beginning of recorded history.

Economic Analysis of Institutions and Systems aims to redirect the study of what was previously referred to as comparative economic systems toward analysis of the history and development of institutions, and the effects of alternative institutional arrangements on economic behavior. To this end, the book internalizes into a theoretical framework: (i) the effects of alternative institutions on the costs of transactions and incentive structures; (ii) the effects of the costs of transactions and incentives on economic behavior, and (iii) the evidence for refutable implications of those effects. In the process, it provides the logical premises for various institutions from which refutable implications can be deduced.