Sadika Hameed – författare

Every three weeks, a major political crisis begins somewhere in the world. The United States intervenes in less than a fifth of them. But that is still a new U.S. intervention about every two months. And almost all of them are civilian interventions; less than a third involve the military. CSIS has released a new dataset of “potential transitions” worldwide, covering responses to 758 political crises between 1989 and 2010, including 134 civilian and military interventions. The report describes the dataset and presents the results of the initial analysis. Its recommendations focus on the disconnect between the high demand for civilian power and the support civilian institutions have for responding to such crises, and on the importance of caution and moderation when deciding whether and how to intervene.

The CSIS Working Group on Private-Sector Development in Fragile, Conflict-Affected, and Violent States identifies tools available to the international business community and the U.S. government to assist these countries, as well as the gaps in needed resources. Participants examined cases from Afghanistan, Iraq, Burma, and Liberia to glean examples of successes and failures in private-sector development, with the goal of identifying potential roles for host governments and the international private sector. This report presents the results of those discussions.

The CSIS Working Group on Private-Sector Development in Fragile, Conflict-Affected, and Violent States identifies tools available to the international business community and the U.S. government to assist these countries, as well as the gaps in needed resources. Participants examined cases from Afghanistan, Iraq, Burma, and Liberia to glean examples of successes and failures in private-sector development, with the goal of identifying potential roles for host governments and the international private sector. This report presents the results of those discussions.

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been redefined repeatedly since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. It will continue to be strained by mutual distrust, internal threats to Pakistan’s stability, Pakistan’s relations with its neighbors and militants, and the U.S. role in Afghanistan beyond 2014. But there is a growing recognition that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is one of mutual necessity—“transactional” rather than “strategic.” This pragmatic recognition, along with recent developments (such as the peaceful transfer of power between elected civilian governments, the military’s declining prestige, and the political establishment’s growing willingness to engage constructively with India) and ongoing pressures (such as Pakistan’s youth bulge and energy crisis), give the United States and Pakistan a chance to focus on areas where cooperation is actually possible: civilian aid, trade relations, and support to Pakistan’s private sector. The author based these findings on interviews and rountables involving more than 220 officials and experts during a two-month field visit in Pakistan in late 2012.

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been redefined repeatedly since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. It will continue to be strained by mutual distrust, internal threats to Pakistan’s stability, Pakistan’s relations with its neighbors and militants, and the U.S. role in Afghanistan beyond 2014. But there is a growing recognition that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is one of mutual necessity—“transactional” rather than “strategic.” This pragmatic recognition, along with recent developments (such as the peaceful transfer of power between elected civilian governments, the military’s declining prestige, and the political establishment’s growing willingness to engage constructively with India) and ongoing pressures (such as Pakistan’s youth bulge and energy crisis), give the United States and Pakistan a chance to focus on areas where cooperation is actually possible: civilian aid, trade relations, and support to Pakistan’s private sector. The author based these findings on interviews and rountables involving more than 220 officials and experts during a two-month field visit in Pakistan in late 2012.

Once the United States withdraws most or all of its forces from Afghanistan, what issues are likely to continue to be of concern to U.S. policymakers in South Asia? What regional dynamics are likely to affect their ability to achieve policy priorities there? While the United States and its coalition partners have focused primarily on Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past 12 years, the strategic dynamics most likely to be relevant over the next 12 years will probably be clustered around relationships linking Pakistan, India, and China. The authors of this report propose a framework for U.S. policy in South Asia centered around that cluster rather than the more common cluster of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The report includes an analysis of U.S. policy priorities, contingencies, and regional dynamics in South Asia.

Once the United States withdraws most or all of its forces from Afghanistan, what issues are likely to continue to be of concern to U.S. policymakers in South Asia? What regional dynamics are likely to affect their ability to achieve policy priorities there? While the United States and its coalition partners have focused primarily on Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past 12 years, the strategic dynamics most likely to be relevant over the next 12 years will probably be clustered around relationships linking Pakistan, India, and China. The authors of this report propose a framework for U.S. policy in South Asia centered around that cluster rather than the more common cluster of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The report includes an analysis of U.S. policy priorities, contingencies, and regional dynamics in South Asia.

Corruption remains a priority area for both the private sector and development implementers. However, there is no consensus on actionable steps toward addressing it on a global level. This issue is especially important in the context of international trade and development as the private sector plays an increasing role in development outcomes. Moreover, countries with the weakest governance structures tend to be those that most need economic development. This report reviews the literature surrounding corruption; identifies the opportunity costs of corruption; and posits actionable steps for the private sector to effectively address corruption worldwide, as well as ways for private-sector actors to work with governments to achieve this goal.

Corruption remains a priority area for both the private sector and development implementers. However, there is no consensus on actionable steps toward addressing it on a global level. This issue is especially important in the context of international trade and development as the private sector plays an increasing role in development outcomes. Moreover, countries with the weakest governance structures tend to be those that most need economic development. This report reviews the literature surrounding corruption; identifies the opportunity costs of corruption; and posits actionable steps for the private sector to effectively address corruption worldwide, as well as ways for private-sector actors to work with governments to achieve this goal.

Pakistan’s economic crisis is one of the main sources of its instability, but government and donor efforts to stabilize and grow its economy have so far been inadequate. One of the barriers to investing in Pakistan’s private sector has been the perceptions of risk due to insecurity and corruption. This report suggests that opportunities for economic cooperation are hidden among those real risks. It reviews a number of sectors, focusing on small and medium-size enterprises, where foreign investors might find opportunities for joint ventures and investments, including the stock market, financial services, information and communication technologies, agriculture, consumer goods, and private education. Prospects for growth in these sectors derive from Pakistan’s large and growing population, consumer spending trends, and other comparative advantages. This report should be treated not as a guide to investing but as a study of where U.S.-Pakistan policy dialogues might focus on connecting investors with entrepreneurs.

Pakistan’s economic crisis is one of the main sources of its instability, but government and donor efforts to stabilize and grow its economy have so far been inadequate. One of the barriers to investing in Pakistan’s private sector has been the perceptions of risk due to insecurity and corruption. This report suggests that opportunities for economic cooperation are hidden among those real risks. It reviews a number of sectors, focusing on small and medium-size enterprises, where foreign investors might find opportunities for joint ventures and investments, including the stock market, financial services, information and communication technologies, agriculture, consumer goods, and private education. Prospects for growth in these sectors derive from Pakistan’s large and growing population, consumer spending trends, and other comparative advantages. This report should be treated not as a guide to investing but as a study of where U.S.-Pakistan policy dialogues might focus on connecting investors with entrepreneurs.

This report presents the results of a study on whether a link exists between the rise of militants and the quality of subnational governance in Pakistan and, if one exists, what the United States can do about it, if anything. Its basic finding is that Pakistan’s governance problems are not caused by militancy, and its problems with militancy are not directly caused by its governance problems, but improving governance will be necessary (though not sufficient) to counter militancy. Pakistan’s governance problems are not insurmountable, and recent trends offer reason for hope: the military’s prestige has declined, the civilian government is likely to complete its full term, the judiciary is increasingly independent, civil society is increasingly confident even in the face of militant intimidation, and recent reforms—the Local Governance Ordinance of 2001 and the Eighteenth Amendment to the constitution—have put in place a set of institutions and incentives likely to contribute to improvements in the future. The United States has little influence over Pakistan’s domestic politics and policies, but can help to reinforce these positive trends by working to empower Pakistan’s reformers, moderates, and democrats (who prefer that public policies be developed and implemented through peaceful or democratic means) and to marginalize Pakistan’s hardliners and extremists (who encourage the use of violence or proxy armies).

Religious Movements, Militancy, and Conflict in South Asia we draws on recent research on religion and conflict to offer a broad overview of the different roles religion has played in governance, politics, and conflicts in South Asia. The authors argue that it is important that policy officials pay specific attention to the role of religion in conflict settings. It is not safe to assume that religiously themed rhetoric represents the true motives of conflict actors or the true beliefs of local communities. But nor is it safe to assume that religion, and especially religious identity, does not contribute to conflict—or that it could not contribute to peace. Religion needs to be understood in context.