Samuel A Morley – författare

Interviews with ten former chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers--from the Truman to the Carter administrations--are gathered in this book to examine the relationship between economic advisers and the president and the institutional relationships among the CEA, executive departments, and federal financial agencies. The interviews also reconstruct major presidential decisions since the establishment of the CEA, such as the 1964 tax cut, the 1971 wage and price freeze, and presidential strategies for managing inflation and recession. In a preface to each interview, the editors analyze the conditions for CEA effectiveness, look at how well the advice of the Council has conformed to the presidential world view, and pinpoint the distribution of responsibility for policy analysis and advice within successive administrations.

Brazil is one of the world's best-known examples of inequitable growth. Since 1964 its military government has used a trickle-down development strategy that relies on the private market and high profits for owners of capital and at the same time relies on holding down wages of the unskilled and neutralizing the power of labour unions. Although this strategy did result in an impressive amount of economic growth, it has been harshly criticized for its unfairness. The general consensus is that most of the benefits of growth went to the rich, precious few to the poor. This study, first published in 1982 challenges the majority view. It shows that the poor benefited far more from growth than the income distribution statistics seem to imply. Despite appearances, the economy was a highly dynamic one for all groups. Job creation more than kept pace with the growth of the labour force, and most of the jobs created were good ones, rather than make-work employment in the informal sector.

Interviews with ten former chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers--from the Truman to the Carter administrations--are gathered in this book to examine the relationship between economic advisers and the president and the institutional relationships among the CEA, executive departments, and federal financial agencies. The interviews also reconstruct major presidential decisions since the establishment of the CEA, such as the 1964 tax cut, the 1971 wage and price freeze, and presidential strategies for managing inflation and recession. In a preface to each interview, the editors analyze the conditions for CEA effectiveness, look at how well the advice of the Council has conformed to the presidential world view, and pinpoint the distribution of responsibility for policy analysis and advice within successive administrations.