Steven B. Webb – författare

This book applies the conceptual framework of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast's Violence and Social Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2009) to nine developing countries. The cases show how political control of economic privileges is used to limit violence and coordinate coalitions of powerful organizations. Rather than castigating politicians and elites as simply corrupt, the case studies illustrate why development is so difficult to achieve in societies where the role of economic organizations is manipulated to provide political balance and stability. The volume develops the idea of limited-access social order as a dynamic social system in which violence is constantly a threat and political and economic outcomes result from the need to control violence rather than promoting economic growth or political rights.

Can a developing country balance a stable democracy with a well-functioning market economy? THis question is addressed in this book by showing how political reforms influence the efforts of governments to initiate and sustain economic reforms. THe case studies used focus on two clusters of policies: monetary and fiscal controls, and trade and exhcange rate mechanims. In contrast to many analyses, the studies consider these policies not only as fuctions of their intended economc effects but also as outcomes of interactions among politicians, bureaucreats, an interest groups. The studies also examine the evolving institutional context in each country. The book explains how conflicts between pluralist politics and growth-promoting policies can be resolved, and it shows why adjustment is not complete until the public has voted for reform.