Steven Brams – författare

This book examines theology and the idea of a superior being in the context of game theory. The author shows how game theory can help breathe life into questions and he clarifies the structure of our thought about an ultimate reality.

"Approval Voting" proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and - by offering voters the opportunity to influence election outcomes more equitably - a probable increase in voter turnout.Since the publication of the first edition of this book, its arguments in favor of an election reform practically unknown in 1983 have stood the test of time. Perhaps the proof of the pudding lies in the adoption of approval voting by about a dozen professional societies - several with tens of thousands of members - and their generally favorable experience with it. After a generation of discussion and debate on the subject, the authors remain convinced that "Approval Voting" is as relevant today as it was when rigorous analysis and systematic empirical research on this election reform began more than 30 years ago.

The concept of negotiation is critical to coping with all manner of strategic problems that arise in the everyday dealings that people have with each other and organizations. Game theory illustrates this to the full and shows how these problems can be solved.This is a revised edition of a classic book and uses some wonderfully adroit case studies that remain relevant today. Negotiation Games covers such themes as:· trade offs and the game of chicken· the effects of power in the cease-fire game· the use of threat power in sequential games · fallback bargaining and rational negotiation.Written by one of the leading game theorists of the generation, this book will be greatly appreciated not only by academics and students involved in game theory, economics, business and international relations, but also by those involved in diplomacy and international business.

The concept of negotiation is critical to coping with all manner of strategic problems that arise in the everyday dealings that people have with each other and organizations. Game theory illustrates this to the full and shows how these problems can be solved.This is a revised edition of a classic book and uses some wonderfully adroit case studies that remain relevant today. Negotiation Games covers such themes as:· trade offs and the game of chicken· the effects of power in the cease-fire game· the use of threat power in sequential games · fallback bargaining and rational negotiation.Written by one of the leading game theorists of the generation, this book will be greatly appreciated not only by academics and students involved in game theory, economics, business and international relations, but also by those involved in diplomacy and international business.

In this path-breaking theoretical work, political scientist Steven Brams and mathematician Mark Kilgour show how game theory can be applied to the rigorous development and thoughtful analysis of several critical problems that afflict the security of nations, from the deterrence of foes who might launch attacks, to the stabilization of crises that could explode into wars. In addition, they analyze a variety of related questions, including the interlocking preferences that fuel arms races, the strategic impact that Star Wars may have on nuclear deterrence, and optimal strategies for verifying arms control treaties. Of interest to students on international relations and foreign policy as well as those concerned with the formal analysis of conflict, Game Theory and National Security provides new foundations for understanding the rational basis of international conflict.

Peter Fishburn has had a splendidly productive career that led to path-breaking c- tributions in a remarkable variety of areas of research. His contributions have been published in a vast literature, ranging through journals of social choice and welfare, decision theory, operations research, economic theory, political science, mathema- cal psychology, and discrete mathematics. This work was done both on an individual basis and with a very long list of coauthors. The contributions that Fishburn made can roughly be divided into three major topical areas, and contributions to each of these areas are identi?ed by sections of this monograph. Section 1 deals with topics that are included in the general areas of utility, preference, individual choice, subjective probability, and measurement t- ory. Section 2 covers social choice theory, voting models, and social welfare. S- tion 3 deals with more purely mathematical topics that are related to combinatorics, graph theory, and ordered sets. The common theme of Fishburn’s contributions to all of these areas is his ability to bring rigorous mathematical analysis to bear on a wide range of dif?cult problems.